CONFIRMED BY ILL. SUPREME COURT– YOU ARE VIEWING THE MOST DANGEROUS BLOG IN ILLINOIS. This blog warranted a 3 year suspension by the ARDC/Jerome Larkin! Mottos: "Sunlight is the best disinfectant". Justice Louis Brandeis ; "If the truth can destroy something, then it deserves to be destroyed" Carl Sagan; "Justice is Truth in Action" Benjamin Disraeli. Illinois uses the ARDC to quash dissenting attorney activist blogs ; "The freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic Governments" — (1776-First Amendment preamble adopted by 8 US colonies)
The fiasco with Mrs. West is outrageous. Tomorrow she goes before a Judge pro se – this e-mail was sent to here with the hope that she can remember: 1) The guardian’s appointment was limited – he was not appointed to be God – but only to assist Mr. West to address – without interfering with his 14th Amendment Rights and also within the limits that the guardian’s action is to be:
1) reasonable,2) necessary, and3) actually, provide a benefit to Mr. West. The standard for determining whether the criterion are met is – “by the clear light of hindsight.”
The guardian is not appointed GOD!
Ken Ditkowsky
On Monday, April 22, 2024 at 08:36:13 PM CDT, Joanne Denison <joanne@denisonlaw.com> wrote:
There is also freedom of association under the first amendment and probably also somewhere in the Illinois Constitution which means that parents and children and spouses can freely see and communicate with one another. That is being violated too
The foregoing notwithstanding. I think my note to Mrs. West can be used in both the SAllas and the Compansano cases.
April 16, 2014
To: Mr. David Chipman – dchipman@monzonlaw,com
Subject: William and Rose West/ financial elder abuse
Dear Mr. Chipman,
Please allow me to introduce myself. I have encouraged Mrs. Rose West to seek legal help in addressing the financial elder abuse that she and her husband are currently experiencing. As Mrs. West has contacted your office for that service, I’ve taken the liberty of contacting you in the hope that you will help her and her husband out of this totally amoral and deplorable situation. Indeed, it gets worse almost daily – this afternoon I understand that Mr. West’s trust has been depleted by almost ¾’s to about $100,000.00 from its original corpus of approximately $400,000.00 –
Financial elder abuse usually accomplished by breaches of fiduciary relationship by Court supervised guardians has become a National scandal. The West case is outrageous in that Mrs. West and the family pastor are both being denied not only the usual courtesy to which they are entitled, but visitation with Mr. West. And it appears to me and those who have contacted me that Mr. West’s convalescence at his current “sheltered care facility” is reported to be more in the nature of solitary prison confinement rather than any health care endeavor. Mrs. West today informed me that she has some documentation that is most disturbing and allegedly wrongful.
Unfortunately, the West case is not a lone situation of financial elder abuse, but part of a serious problem. It has been reported in the New York Times, the New Yorker magazine, the Wall Street Journal, Netflix, some GAO reports to Congress ***** etc.
Mr. and Mrs. West are being forced to address an alleged wrongful interference in their marriage along with the dissipation of their estate. Worse yet, Mrs. West (and many other victims) have reached deaf ears in their attempts to interest Law Enforcement in protecting them and similarly situated elderly. The fact that the guardian =as a matter of law – is a fiduciary and held to the highest of standards appears to be irrelevant. Mr. West is allegedly held captive far from his home. In my opinion = based upon Mrs. West’s statements to me – intended as a deterrent to Mrs. West demanding that Mr. West receive appropriate health care and services that are tailored to Bill West’s needs.
I am certain that Mrs. West’s very legitimate complaints were communicated to you and your office. I am communicating with you in the hope that you and your firm will undertake to assist Mr. and Mrs. West in addressing this very serious problem.
While I know nothing about Nebraska law, I do know that it is wrong for any individual to interfere with the rights of husband and wife in each other, and a claim for alienation of affections is usually recognized. I am also aware that a ‘bunch’ of laws have been passed to obviate the scandal associated with FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE.
Recently I sent out an e-mail that summarized the situation here in Illinois, to wit:
Memorandum.
Pursuant to the 14th Amendment every person is guaranteed certain rights of civilization and in particular to be treated equally under the law. This right is not limited to a vague statement mumbled and forgotten but an honest recognition of each individual’s worth. The elderly and the disabled are included in this understanding and recognition.
Thus, when it became apparent that an individual might be suffering from a disability, or a mental deficiency society is faced with the prospect of assisting that individual with only such assistance as might be need for the individual to reasonably survive in a competitive environment/society. Illinois Law described this situation in 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b. (It should be noted that each state has an amazing similar statute/statement, to wit:
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3)
(b) Guardianship shall be utilized only as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s actual mental, physical and adaptive limitations. The order shall conform with Sections 11a-12 and 11a-14. (Source: P.A. 102-72, eff. 1-1-22.)
It should be noted that the 14th Amendment provision is mentioned, i.e. “ only as is necessary to promote the wellbeing of the person with disability” To protect the citizen’s rights from over-reaching the statute provides another limitation, to wit: “GUARDIAN SHALL BE ORDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSITATED BY THE INDIVIDUALS ACTUAL MENTAL, PHYICAL & ADAPTIVE LIMITATIONS.
In the Sallas, Compasano, West, and just about every other guardianship case that has been discussed these limitations have been grossly ignored. In the West case, as an example, why should a guardianship place Mr. West more than 100 miles from his home when it bars him from having the companionship of his wife and family. In the Sallas Mrs. Sallas was placed for a decade right in her home with her husband. To facilitate the “Tyler” style theft of the equity of her home, she was removed into a nursing home mile from Skokie in Buffalo Grove. In the Campasano case not only was the marriage arbitrarily not recognized by the guardian, but to prevent Mr. Campasano from enjoying the rights of his marriage an order of protection was granted by Judge Boliker without notice to Mrs. Campasano. (We also believe that Mr. Campasano was not given the right to protest). ALL OF THE FOREGOING ARE DIRECT VIOLATIONS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT to the United States Constitution.
American Law, prior to present assault on the rights of the elderly, honored the Bill of Rights and the Constitutional protections of the 1st Paragraph of the 14th Amendment. Indeed, protection was even provided prior to the appointment of a Guardian. Unfortunately, it appears that this protection was granted in form and not in substance. Such is manifest by the number of professional guardians rummaging through the estates and the absence of express findings of law and fact by judges. In Illinois, the applicable statute is 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3a, which states:
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3) Sec. 11a-3. Adjudication of disability; Power to appoint guardian. (a) Upon the filing of a petition by a reputable person or by the alleged person with a disability himself or on its own motion, the court may adjudge a person to be a person with a disability, but only if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person with a disability as defined in Section 11a-2. If the court adjudges a person to be a person with a disability, the court may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person, or (2) a guardian of his estate, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs, or (3) a guardian of his person and of his estate. The court may appoint co-guardians in accordance with Section 11a-15.
If one reads section 3a and 3b together, we note the following requirements, to wit:
1) Due process averments must be made, served on all interested parties and proven by clear and convincing evidence. This is most procrustean of the burdens of proof.
2) The burden of proof is upon the person asserting that another person is disabled and in need of a guardian. This burden of proof has to be specific to meet the criteria of section 3b.
3) The person appointed to be guardian is A FIDUCIARY and as such is held to the highest standard of conduct.
4) The guardianship appointment is not a rote matter. A person being deprived of his/her rights is entitled to counsel, a written document detailing the basis upon which guardianship is sought, and the finder of fact a jury rather than the judge. (In fact the usual proceeding is a “joke!” if all the required people are indeed notified, they are silenced by a judge who 99 out of 100 times will appoint predatory Guardian’s ad litem, and listen to a physician who would if every person in the Courtroom was wearing a mask and dressed in the same attire as the elderly person would find them all in need of guardian including the esteemed judge. In too many cases this physician is not paid to give evidence, he/she is paid to provide a testimony that he has examined the elderly person, and he finds from his examination that the elderly person has no ability to do anything of substance.
(In the case of Amy Sallas, she was actually doing the shopping, engaging trades people to do work around the home, making meals, etc. She was so disabled that her guardian placed her back in her home where she and Dean lives for ten years with virtually no supervision. The guardian’s primary duty was to harass the couple and make demands of the court for compensation).
The statute is consistent [1] with the proposition that as a fiduciary the Guardian is held to highest standard of care and compliance with the RULE OF LAW. What this means in simple terms is that the guardian’s actions must be a) reasonable, b) necessary, and c) must provide a benefit to his ward.
If any of these 3 elements are not present not only is the guardian not entitled to compensation, but the guardian is subject to sanction and reimbursement of the guardian’s estate. In today’s guardianship lawfare, it is noted that.
a) In most of these guardianship cases the presiding judge does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ergo, the Court cannot enter and order that comports with the requirements of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b.
b) The order entered by the Court makes no attempt to spell out the authority of the guardian and specifically limits the same to the criteria of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b.
c) That the Judge presiding in the Guardianship Court is essentially a rubber stamp and no matter what, if anything the Guardian requests he gets. In the Sallascase the guardian desired to ravage Mr. Sallas credit. It appears that a Judgement was entered against Mr. Sallas for support of his wife – no petition, no service of process, no domestic relations proceeding, no basis, no averment – the real purpose was to prevent Sallas from refinancing certain loans that were coming due. Such was successful. In the Campasano case the Order of Protection appears to have been entered – the real purpose is to prevent Ms. Campasano from preventing the neglect of her husband.
d) If a person KNOWS the object of his bounty, KNOWS the extent and nature of his property, and CAN PERFORM a simple business-like transaction such as purchasing something from the local store – -the need for a guardian is very questionable.
Every State in the Union has a Statute similar to the Illinois statute addressing the 14th Amendment’s prohibition on indenturing citizens for the benefit of public officials such as guardians and protection all citizens so that they enjoy the RULE OF LAW. In the Britney Spears case, the California Courts made a mockery out of the Guardianship law. Ms. Spears negotiated and performed multi=million-dollar contracts – the fact that she liked to wander around inappropriately dressed and say wild things did not warrant her rights being violated. But they were!
Across America, the elderly are being preyed upon but individuals who owe them fiduciary responsibility and corrupt judges. This aspect of Lawfare is being ignored by Law enforcement and government in general. It is corruption personified and cannot be further tolerated.
I assume that Nebraska has similar laws that are designed to protect its citizens. Illinois’ 720 ILCS 5/17 – 56 was remedial and in Illinois provides a civil lawsuit that is interesting and an incentive to the legal profession. In particular, it provides for Attorney fees, and triple damages – PLUS – the reduction of the burden of proof from clear and convincing to preponderance.
As I am retired, and pushing 88 years of age, I do not have ready access to Nebraska law, but section the financial elder abuse statute was enacted as a remedial statute based upon the overflowing number of financial elder abuse situations that are current being perpetrated -thus Nebraska mush have something similar.
Today, it is Bill West – tomorrow it may be me or thee! I hope that you can assist Mr. and Mrs. West in getting the remaining years of their life back.
Thank you for your courtesy and any assistance you can provide my friends.
Ken Ditkowsky
[1] Read together 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3 states, to wit:
‘
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3) Sec. 11a-3. Adjudication of disability; Power to appoint guardian. (a) Upon the filing of a petition by a reputable person or by the alleged person with a disability himself or on its own motion, the court may adjudge a person to be a person with a disability, but only if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person with a disability as defined in Section 11a-2. If the court adjudges a person to be a person with a disability, the court may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person, or (2) a guardian of his estate, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs, or (3) a guardian of his person and of his estate. The court may appoint co-guardians in accordance with Section 11a-15. (b) Guardianship shall be utilized only as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s actual mental, physical and adaptive limitations. The order shall conform with Sections 11a-12 and 11a-14. (Source: P.A. 102-72, eff. 1-1-22.)
Ken Ditkowsky
On Monday, April 22, 2024 at 02:24:09 PM CDT, Joanne Denison <joanne@denisonlaw.com> wrote:
biden is not involved in the doj and the doj is mostly republican. remember the states are mostly going after clown 45, not the feds or the gop. the federal court judges are mostly gop.
Joanne M Denison, Executive Director
Justice 4 Every1, NFP, 5534 N. Milwaukee Ave, Chicago, IL 60630
NOTE: Joanne Denison is not a licensed attorney and does not provide any legal opinions or advice. She is an expert consultant in political/court corruption only.
make an appt at https://joanne-denison.youcanbook.me/ and please bring a donation if you can. We do not charge, but we do ask for a small donation or whatever you can afford.
Interesting observation – apparently I’m not the only one to observe this situation.
Now let’s translate this to guardianship scenario. Trump has billions of dollars to defend him – Rose West, Dean Sallas, Sophia Campasano ***** do not. Have you noticed Rose and Sophia are being harassed with claims of orders of protection that may or may not exist. Dean has been threatened with arrest.
From SC: Desperate plea to find missing mom; kidnapped in guardianship–Seeking Virginia Danno
Information:
Mother: Virginia Danno Crest Hill, IL Daughter: Maria Danno Yorkville, IL dannomaria@gmail.com 815-212-7910
She is either in a nursing home or a hospital.
More info: She was at Silver Cross in New Lennox and Trust Well in Joliet.
anything in Joliet,Cest Hill, or New Lennox area. Her house is in Carillon Lakes,. It’s on Renwick rd in crest Hill.
Please give her your cell phone and call Daughter Maria who is worried sick about her mom.
16340 Montclare lake drive crest hill Il is her home address
SUCCESS. We have success and Mother has been found! And the court cronies were all furious and an unwritten order issued from the bench that Daughter cannot see or talk to mom for 14 days We all know that is unconstitutional and illegal and basically amounts to a gag order and intimidation and harassment. No due process no petition filed no 105b service. Biz as usual.
UPDATE UPDATE UPDATE. more success. apparent the cronies are watching and fearful of this blog because when Daughter went back to court she was immediately socked with a court order (of course totally illegal) that she cannot see her mother for 14 days or talk to her.
So just another unconstitutional gag order, another imaginary “petition” for rule to show cause that does not actually exist, no due process, no 105b sheriff’s service and of course proof that none of the 1st, 5th and 14th amendment exist in that court room.
I am impressed that you read this blog; however, this is my blog. I post and decide what to post no one else. And this is pure harassment, intimidation and contemptuous conduct by the cronies. The Danno family has nothing to do with my posts, but you want to blame them for wanting to see a loved one?
The US constitution, 1st amendment guarantees freedom of association. This means that in the case of parent and child, I submit that throughout the US there is, and always has been the tort of loss of consortium between parent and child. If a parent wants to see a child and the child want to see a parent, that is a constitutional right.
In addition the following laws apply also to the cronies:
Nice confession cronies. But let me remind you this is a civil rights violation and it’s also criminal:
Federal Civil Rights Statutes Title 18, U.S.C., Section 249 – Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act This statute makes it unlawful to willfully cause bodily injury—or attempting to do so with fire, firearm, or other dangerous weapon—when 1) the crime was committed because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin of any person, or 2) the crime was committed because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person and the crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or occurred within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
(I would imagine the elderly and disabled are covered via the ADA or Americans with Disabilities Act and Illinois Elder Abuse Act).
The law also provides funding and technical assistance to state, local, and tribal jurisdictions to help them to more effectively investigate, prosecute, and prevent hate crimes.
The law provides for a maximum 10–year prison term, unless death (or attempts to kill) results from the offense, or unless the offense includes kidnapping or attempted kidnapping, or aggravated sexual abuse or attempted aggravated sexual abuse. For offenses not resulting in death, there is a seven–year statute of limitations. For offenses resulting in death, there is no statute of limitations.
Note, in most abusive gship cases, grandma, grandpa or both have been kidnapped under color of law, forced into a locked down nursing home and drugged against their will by lawyers in suits and judges in robes
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 – Conspiracy Against Rights This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same).
It further makes it unlawful for two or more persons to go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another with the intent to prevent or hinder his/her free exercise or enjoyment of any rights so secured.
Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both; and if death results, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years, or for life, or may be sentenced to death.
Isolation, taking away glasses, hearing aids, protheses, etc. is a hinderance of the free exercise of US constitutional rights.
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242 – Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law This statute makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.
This law further prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different punishments, pains, or penalties, than those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such person being an alien or by reason of his/her color or race.
Acts under “color of any law” include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under “color of any law,” the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. This definition includes, in addition to law enforcement officials, individuals such as Mayors, Council persons, Judges, Nursing Home Proprietors, Security Guards, etc., persons who are bound by laws, statutes ordinances, or customs.
Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
Now, I don’t want anyone to be “put to death” or even imprisoned. I want them confined to the dirtiest, most dangers nursing home in Illinois, diaper at one end, feeding tube at the other, 4 point restraints and restraint mittens. Never to be seen again. Probate victims can have the vote for the worst nursing homes.
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 – Federally Protected Activities 1) This statute prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference, or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of any person or class of persons because of their activity as:
A voter, or person qualifying to vote…; a participant in any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States; an applicant for federal employment or an employee by the federal government; a juror or prospective juror in federal court; and a participant in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 2) Prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin and because of his/her activity as:
A student or applicant for admission to any public school or public college; a participant in any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by a state or local government; an applicant for private or state employment, private or state employee; a member or applicant for membership in any labor organization or hiring hall; or an applicant for employment through any employment agency, labor organization or hiring hall; a juror or prospective juror in state court; a traveler or user of any facility of interstate commerce or common carrier; or a patron of any public accommodation, including hotels, motels, restaurants, lunchrooms, bars, gas stations, theaters…or any other establishment which serves the public and which is principally engaged in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises.
3) Prohibits interference by force or threat of force against any person because he/she is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or class of persons from participating or affording others the opportunity or protection to so participate, or lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate in any of the benefits or activities listed in items (1) and (2), above without discrimination as to race, color, religion, or national origin.
Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life or may be sentenced to death.
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 247 – Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 Prohibits (1) intentional defacement, damage, or destruction of any religious real property, because of the religious, racial, or ethnic characteristics of that property, or (2) intentional obstruction by force or threat of force, or attempts to obstruct any person in the enjoyment of that person’s free exercise of religious beliefs. If the intent of the crime is motivated for reasons of religious animosity, it must be proven that the religious real property has a sufficient connection with interstate or foreign commerce. However, if the intent of the crime is racially motivated, there is no requirement to satisfy the interstate or foreign commerce clause.
Punishment varies from one year imprisonment and a fine or both, and if bodily injury results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section, and the violation is by means of fire or an explosive, a fine under this title or imprisonment of not more than forty years or both; or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined in accordance with this title and imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both, and if death results or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined in accordance with this title and imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
In many cases, the elderly have their religious jewelry taken away, rosaries taken away, and they are no longer “allowed” to attend their house of worship. They often have religious pictures (Jesus, Mother Mary and the angels) taken away or thrown out at nursing homes)
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 3631 – Criminal Interference with Right to Fair Housing This statute makes it unlawful for any individual(s), by the use of force or threatened use of force, to injure, intimidate, or interfere with (or attempt to injure, intimidate, or interfere with), any person’s housing rights because of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin. Among those housing rights enumerated in the statute are:
The sale, purchase, or renting of a dwelling; the occupation of a dwelling; the financing of a dwelling; contracting or negotiating for any of the rights enumerated above; applying for or participating in any service, organization, or facility relating to the sale or rental of dwellings. This statute also makes it unlawful by the use of force or threatened use of force, to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person who is assisting an individual or class of persons in the exercise of their housing rights.
Punishment varies from a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results, shall be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned up to ten years, or both, and if death results, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
This statute is for all the courtroom criminals that think it’s okay to intentionally ruin or destroy a home, create a fake condemnation and toss out elderly disable children onto the street in hours. It should also apply to the disableds when the court forces them into a dirty, filthy disgusing nursing home against their will and consent.
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141 – Pattern and Practice This civil statute was a provision within the Crime Control Act of 1994 and makes it unlawful for any governmental authority, or agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
Types of misconduct covered include, among other things:
Excessive Force Discriminatory Harassment False Arrest Coercive Sexual Conduct Unlawful Stops, Searches, or Arrests
I’m still trying to figure out why Child is responsible for my blog and my post and how the miscreants avoid these important Civil Rights statutes which provide for severe punishments, up to and including death. I’ll tell you right now, Child had nothing to do with this blog and even if she did, it’s clearly free speech and the miscreants need to review both the Citizens United case (distributing a trashy lie filled lengthy video about Hillary right before and election) and the Alvarez case (lying about having a medal of honor/valor). If strings of trash and lies are allowed, how can this stupid court and it’s cronies go after a child just trying to see his or her parent
Pursuant to the 14th Amendment every person is guaranteed certain rights of civilization and in particular to be treated equally under the law. This right is not limited to a vague statement mumbled and forgotten but an honest recognition of each individual’s worth. The elderly and the disabled are included in this understanding and recognition.
Thus, when it became apparent that an individual might be suffering from a disability, or a mental deficiency society is faced with the prospect of assisting that individual with only such assistance as might be need for the individual to reasonably survive in a competitive environment/society. Illinois Law described this situation in 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b. (It should be noted that each state has an amazing similar statute/statement, to wit:
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3)
(b) Guardianship shall be utilized only as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s actual mental, physical and adaptive limitations. The order shall conform with Sections 11a-12 and 11a-14. (Source: P.A. 102-72, eff. 1-1-22.)
It should be noted that the 14th Amendment provision is mentioned, i.e. “ only as is necessary to promote the well being of the person with disability” To protect the citizen’s rights from over-reaching the statute provides another limitation, to wit: “GUARDIAN SHALL BE ORDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSITATED BY THE INDIVIDUALS ACTUAL MENTAL, PHYICAL & ADAPTIVE LIMITATIONS.
In the Sallas, Compasano, West, and just about every other guardianship case that has been discussed these limitations have been grossly ignored. In the West case, as an example, why should a guardianship place Mr. West more than 100 miles from his home when it bars him from having the companionship of his wife and family. In the Sallas Mrs. Sallas was placed for a decade right in her home with her husband. To facilitate the “Tyler” style theft of the equity of her home, she was removed into a nursing home mile from Skokie in Buffalo Grove. In the Campasano case not only was the marriage arbitrarily not recognized by the guardian, but to prevent Mr. Campasano from enjoying the rights of his marriage an order of protection was granted by Judge Boliker without notice to Mrs. Campasano. (We also believe that Mr. Campasano was not given the right to protest). ALL OF THE FOREGOING ARE DIRECT VIOLATIONS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT to the United States Constitution.
American Law, prior to present assault on the rights of the elderly, honored the Bill of Rights and the Constitutional protections of the 1st Paragraph of the 14th Amendment. Indeed, protection was even provided for prior to the appointment of a Guardian. Unfortunately, it appears that this protection was granted in form and not in substance. Such is manifest by the number of professional guardians rummaging through the estates and the absence of express findings of law and fact by judges. In Illinois the applicable statute is 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3a, which states:
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3) Sec. 11a-3. Adjudication of disability; Power to appoint guardian. (a) Upon the filing of a petition by a reputable person or by the alleged person with a disability himself or on its own motion, the court may adjudge a person to be a person with a disability, but only if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person with a disability as defined in Section 11a-2. If the court adjudges a person to be a person with a disability, the court may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person, or (2) a guardian of his estate, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs, or (3) a guardian of his person and of his estate. The court may appoint co-guardians in accordance with Section 11a-15.
If one reads section 3a and 3b together, we note the following requirements, to wit:
1) Due process averments must be made, served on all interested parties and proven by clear and convincing evidence. This is most procrustean of the burdens of proof.
2) The burden of proof is upon the person asserting that another person is disabled and in need of a guardian. This burden of proof has to be specific to meet the criteria of section 3b.
3) The person appointed to be guardian is A FIDUCIARY and as such is held to the highest standard of conduct.
4) The guardianship appointment is not a rote matter. A person being deprived of his/her rights is entitled to counsel, a written document detailing the basis upon which guardianship is sought, and the finder of fact a jury rather than the judge. (In fact the usual proceeding is a “joke!” if all the required people are indeed notified, they are silenced by a judge who 99 out of 100 times will appoint predatory Guardian’s ad litem, and listen to a physician who would if every person in the Courtroom was wearing a mask and dressed in the same attire as the elderly person would find them all in need of guardian including the esteemed judge. In too many cases this physician is not paid to give evidence, he/she is paid to provide a testimony that he has examined the elderly person, and he finds from his examination that the elderly person has no ability to do anything of substance.
(In the case of Amy Sallas, she was actually doing the shopping, engaging trades people to do work around the home, making meals, etc. She was so disabled that her guardian placed her back in her home where she and Dean lives for ten years with virtually no supervision. The guardian’s primary duty was to harass the couple and make demands of the court for compensation).
The statute is consistent [1] with the proposition that as a fiduciary the Guardian is held to highest standard of care and compliance with the RULE OF LAW. What this means in simple terms is that the guardian’s actions must be a) reasonable, b) necessary, and c) must provide a benefit to his ward.
If any of these 3 elements are not present not only is the guardian not entitled to compensation, but the guardian is subject to sanction and reimbursement of the guardian’s estate. In today’s guardianship lawfare, it is noted that.
a) In most of these guardianship cases the presiding judge does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ergo, the Court cannot enter and order that comports with the requirements of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b.
b) The order entered by the Court makes no attempt to spell out the authority of the guardian and specifically limits the same to the criteria of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b.
c) That the Judge presiding in the Guardianship Court is essentially a rubber stamp and no matter what, if anything the Guardian requests he gets. In the Sallascase the guardian desired to ravage Mr. Sallas credit. It appears that a Judgement was entered against Mr. Sallas for support of his wife – no petition, no service of process, no domestic relations proceeding, no basis, no averment – the real purpose was to prevent Sallas from refinancing certain loans that were coming due. Such was successful. In the Campasano case the Order of Protection appears to have been entered – the real purpose is to prevent Ms. Campasano from preventing the neglect of her husband.
d) If a person KNOWS the object of his bounty, KNOWS the extent and nature of his property, and CAN PERFORM a simple business-like transaction such as purchasing something from the local store – -the need for a guardian is very questionable.
Every State in the Union has a Statute similar to the Illinois statute addressing the 14th Amendment’s prohibition on indenturing citizens for the benefit of public officials such as guardians and protection all citizens so that they enjoy the RULE OF LAW. In the Britney Spears case, the California Courts made a mockery out of the Guardianship law. Ms. Spears negotiated and performed multi=million-dollar contracts – the fact that she liked to wander around inappropriately dressed and say wild things did not warrant her rights being violated. But they were!
Across America, the elderly are being preyed upon but individuals who owe them fiduciary responsibility and corrupt judges. This aspect of Lawfare is being ignored by Law enforcement and government in general. It is corruption personified and cannot be further tolerated.
Ken Ditkowsky
[1] Read together 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3 states, to wit:
‘
(755 ILCS 5/11a-3) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-3) Sec. 11a-3. Adjudication of disability; Power to appoint guardian. (a) Upon the filing of a petition by a reputable person or by the alleged person with a disability himself or on its own motion, the court may adjudge a person to be a person with a disability, but only if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person with a disability as defined in Section 11a-2. If the court adjudges a person to be a person with a disability, the court may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person, or (2) a guardian of his estate, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because of his disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs, or (3) a guardian of his person and of his estate. The court may appoint co-guardians in accordance with Section 11a-15. (b) Guardianship shall be utilized only as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s actual mental, physical and adaptive limitations. The order shall conform with Sections 11a-12 and 11a-14. (Source: P.A. 102-72, eff. 1-1-22.)
After a docket check on the Marjorie Ivy case, it appears that the Estate is going be distributed to the rightful heirs and legatees. See the following motion
You will recall in the news about 10 years ago Marjorie Ivy was hacked to death by a Mordechai Faskowitz, brother of Miriam Solo. Since that time, Miriam Solo has been desperately trying to grab that Estate away from the relatives of Marjorie Ivy, the victim.
As you will recall the case went up on appeal once and Miriam Solo lost, see below decision.
After a stranger became their guardian, Rudy and Rennie North were moved to a nursing home and their property was sold.Illustration by Anna Parini
For years, Rudy North woke up at 9 a.m. and read the Las Vegas Review-Journal while eating a piece of toast. Then he read a novel—he liked James Patterson and Clive Cussler—or, if he was feeling more ambitious, Freud. On scraps of paper and legal notepads, he jotted down thoughts sparked by his reading. “Deep below the rational part of our brain is an underground ocean where strange things swim,” he wrote on one notepad. On another, “Life: the longer it cooks, the better it tastes.”
Rennie, his wife of fifty-seven years, was slower to rise. She was recovering from lymphoma and suffered from neuropathy so severe that her legs felt like sausages. Each morning, she spent nearly an hour in the bathroom applying makeup and lotions, the same brands she’d used for forty years. She always emerged wearing pale-pink lipstick. Rudy, who was prone to grandiosity, liked to refer to her as “my amour.”
On the Friday before Labor Day, 2013, the Norths had just finished their toast when a nurse, who visited five times a week to help Rennie bathe and dress, came to their house, in Sun City Aliante, an “active adult” community in Las Vegas. They had moved there in 2005, when Rudy, a retired consultant for broadcasters, was sixty-eight and Rennie was sixty-six. They took pride in their view of the golf course, though neither of them played golf.
Rudy chatted with the nurse in the kitchen for twenty minutes, joking about marriage and laundry, until there was a knock at the door. A stocky woman with shiny black hair introduced herself as April Parks, the owner of the company A Private Professional Guardian. She was accompanied by three colleagues, who didn’t give their names. Parks told the Norths that she had an order from the Clark County Family Court to “remove” them from their home. She would be taking them to an assisted-living facility. “Go and gather your things,” she said.
Rennie began crying. “This is my home,” she said.
One of Parks’s colleagues said that if the Norths didn’t comply he would call the police. Rudy remembers thinking, You’re going to put my wife and me in jail for this? But he felt too confused to argue.
Parks drove a Pontiac G-6 convertible with a license plate that read “crtgrdn,” for “court guardian.” In the past twelve years, she had been a guardian for some four hundred wards of the court. Owing to age or disability, they had been deemed incompetent, a legal term that describes those who are unable to make reasoned choices about their lives or their property. As their guardian, Parks had the authority to manage their assets, and to choose where they lived, whom they associated with, and what medical treatment they received. They lost nearly all their civil rights.
Without realizing it, the Norths had become temporary wards of the court. Parks had filed an emergency ex-parte petition, which provides an exception to the rule that both parties must be notified of any argument before a judge. She had alleged that the Norths posed a “substantial risk for mismanagement of medications, financial loss and physical harm.” She submitted a brief letter from a physician’s assistant, whom Rennie had seen once, stating that “the patient’s husband can no longer effectively take care of the patient at home as his dementia is progressing.” She also submitted a letter from one of Rudy’s doctors, who described him as “confused and agitated.”
Rudy and Rennie had not undergone any cognitive assessments. They had never received a diagnosis of dementia. In addition to Freud, Rudy was working his way through Nietzsche and Plato. Rennie read romance novels.
Parks told the Norths that if they didn’t come willingly an ambulance would take them to the facility, a place she described as a “respite.” Still crying, Rennie put cosmetics and some clothes into a suitcase. She packed so quickly that she forgot her cell phone and Rudy’s hearing aid. After thirty-five minutes, Parks’s assistant led the Norths to her car. When a neighbor asked what was happening, Rudy told him, “We’ll just be gone for a little bit.” He was too proud to draw attention to their predicament. “Just think of it as a mini-vacation,” he told Rennie.
After the Norths left, Parks walked through the house with Cindy Breck, the owner of Caring Transitions, a company that relocates seniors and sells their belongings at estate sales. Breck and Parks had a routine. “We open drawers,” Parks said at a deposition. “We look in closets. We pull out boxes, anything that would store—that would keep paperwork, would keep valuables.” She took a pocket watch, birth certificates, insurance policies, and several collectible coins.
The Norths’ daughter, Julie Belshe, came to visit later that afternoon. A fifty-three-year-old mother of three sons, she and her husband run a small business designing and constructing pools. She lived ten miles away and visited her parents nearly every day, often taking them to her youngest son’s football games. She was her parents’ only living child; her brother and sister had died.
She knocked on the front door several times and then tried to push the door open, but it was locked. She was surprised to see the kitchen window closed; her parents always left it slightly open. She drove to the Sun City Aliante clubhouse, where her parents sometimes drank coffee. When she couldn’t find them there, she thought that perhaps they had gone on an errand together—the farthest they usually drove was to Costco. But, when she returned to the house, it was still empty.
That weekend, she called her parents several times. She also called two hospitals to see if they had been in an accident. She called their landlord, too, and he agreed to visit the house. He reported that there were no signs of them. She told her husband, “I think someone kidnapped my parents.”
On the Tuesday after Labor Day, she drove to the house again and found a note taped to the door: “In case of emergency, contact guardian April Parks.” Belshe dialled the number. Parks, who had a brisk, girlish way of speaking, told Belshe that her parents had been taken to Lakeview Terrace, an assisted-living facility in Boulder City, nine miles from the Arizona border. She assured Belshe that the staff there would take care of all their needs.
“You can’t just walk into somebody’s home and take them!” Belshe told her.
Parks responded calmly, “It’s legal. It’s legal.”
Guardianship derives from the state’s parens patriae power, its duty to act as a parent for those considered too vulnerable to care for themselves. “The King shall have the custody of the lands of natural fools, taking the profits of them without waste or destruction, and shall find them their necessaries,” reads the English statute De Prerogative Regis, from 1324. The law was imported to the colonies—guardianship is still controlled by state, not federal, law—and has remained largely intact for the past eight hundred years. It establishes a relationship between ward and guardian that is rooted in trust.
In the United States, a million and a half adults are under the care of guardians, either family members or professionals, who control some two hundred and seventy-three billion dollars in assets, according to an auditor for the guardianship fraud program in Palm Beach County. Little is known about the outcome of these arrangements, because states do not keep complete figures on guardianship cases—statutes vary widely—and, in most jurisdictions, the court records are sealed. A Government Accountability report from 2010 said, “We could not locate a single Web site, federal agency, state or local entity, or any other organization that compiles comprehensive information on this issue.” A study published this year by the American Bar Association found that “an unknown number of adults languish under guardianship” when they no longer need it, or never did. The authors wrote that “guardianship is generally “permanent, leaving no way out—‘until death do us part.’ ”
When the Norths were removed from their home, they joined nearly nine thousand adult wards in the Las Vegas Valley. In the past twenty years, the city has promoted itself as a retirement paradise. Attracted by the state’s low taxes and a dry, sunny climate, elderly people leave their families behind to resettle in newly constructed senior communities. “The whole town sparkled, pulling older people in with the prospect of the American Dream at a reasonable price,” a former real-estate agent named Terry Williams told me. Roughly thirty per cent of the people who move to Las Vegas are senior citizens, and the number of Nevadans older than eighty-five has risen by nearly eighty per cent in the past decade.
In Nevada, as in many states, anyone can become a guardian by taking a course, as long as he or she has not been convicted of a felony or recently declared bankruptcy. Elizabeth Brickfield, a Las Vegas lawyer who has worked in guardianship law for twenty years, said that about fifteen years ago, as the state’s elderly population swelled, “all these private guardians started arriving, and the docket exploded. The court became a factory.”
Pamela Teaster, the director of the Center for Gerontology at Virginia Tech and one of the few scholars in the country who study guardianship, told me that, though most guardians assume their duties for good reasons, the guardianship system is “a morass, a total mess.” She said, “It is unconscionable that we don’t have any data, when you think about the vast power given to a guardian. It is one of society’s most drastic interventions.”
After talking to Parks, Belshe drove forty miles to Lakeview Terrace, a complex of stucco buildings designed to look like a hacienda. She found her parents in a small room with a kitchenette and a window overlooking the parking lot. Rennie was in a wheelchair beside the bed, and Rudy was curled up on a love seat in the fetal position. There was no phone in the room. Medical-alert buttons were strung around their necks. “They were like two lost children,” Belshe said.
She asked her parents who Parks was and where she could find the court order, but, she said, “they were overwhelmed and humiliated, and they didn’t know what was going on.” They had no idea how or why Parks had targeted them as wards. Belshe was struck by their passive acceptance. “It was like they had Stockholm syndrome or something,” she told me.
Belshe acknowledged that her parents needed a few hours of help each day, but she had never questioned their ability to live alone. “They always kept their house really nice and clean, like a museum,” she said. Although Rudy’s medical records showed that he occasionally had “staring spells,” all his medical-progress notes from 2013 described him as alert and oriented. He did most of the couple’s cooking and shopping, because Rennie, though lucid, was in so much pain that she rarely left the house. Belshe sometimes worried that her father inadvertently encouraged her mother to be docile: “She’s a very smart woman, though she sometimes acts like she’s not. I have to tell her, ‘That’s not cute, Mom.’ ”
When Belshe called Parks to ask for the court order, Parks told her that she was part of the “sandwich generation,” and that it would be too overwhelming for her to continue to care for her children and her parents at the same time. Parks billed her wards’ estates for each hour that she spent on their case; the court placed no limits on guardians’ fees, as long as they appeared “reasonable.” Later, when Belshe called again to express her anger, Parks charged the Norths twenty-four dollars for the eight-minute conversation. “I could not understand what the purpose of the call was other than she wanted me to know they had rights,” Parks wrote in a detailed invoice. “I terminated the phone call as she was very hostile and angry.”
Amonth after removing the Norths from their house, Parks petitioned to make the guardianship permanent. She was represented by an attorney who was paid four hundred dollars an hour by the Norths’ estate. A hearing was held at Clark County Family Court.
The Clark County guardianship commissioner, a lawyer named Jon Norheim, has presided over nearly all the guardianship cases in the county since 2005. He works under the supervision of a judge, but his orders have the weight of a formal ruling. Norheim awarded a guardianship to Parks, on average, nearly once a week. She had up to a hundred wards at a time. “I love April Parks,” he said at one hearing, describing her and two other professional guardians, who frequently appeared in his courtroom, as “wonderful, good-hearted, social-worker types.”
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Norheim’s court perpetuated a cold, unsentimental view of family relations: the ingredients for a good life seemed to have little to do with one’s children and siblings. He often dismissed the objections of relatives, telling them that his only concern was the best interest of the wards, which he seemed to view in a social vacuum. When siblings fought over who would be guardian, Norheim typically ordered a neutral professional to assume control, even when this isolated the wards from their families.
Rudy had assured Belshe that he would protest the guardianship, but, like most wards in the country, Rudy and Rennie were not represented by counsel. As Rudy stood before the commissioner, he convinced himself that guardianship offered him and Rennie a lifetime of care without being a burden to anyone they loved. He told Norheim, “The issue really is her longevity—what suits her.” Belshe, who sat in the courtroom, said, “I was shaking my head. No, no, no—don’t do that!” Rennie was silent.
Norheim ordered that the Norths become permanent wards of the court. “Chances are, I’ll probably never see you folks again; you’ll work everything out,” he said, laughing. “I very rarely see people after the initial time in court.” The hearing lasted ten minutes.
The following month, Even Tide Life Transitions, a company that Parks often hired, sold most of the Norths’ belongings. “The general condition of this inventory is good,” an appraiser wrote. Two lithographs by Renoir were priced at thirty-eight hundred dollars, and a glass cocktail table (“Client states that it is a Brancusi design”) was twelve hundred and fifty dollars. The Norths also had several pastel drawings by their son, Randy, who died in a motorcycle accident at the age of thirty-two, as well as Kachina dolls, a Bose radio, a Dyson vacuum cleaner, a Peruvian tapestry, a motion-step exerciser, a LeRoy Neiman sketch of a bar in Dublin, and two dozen pairs of Clarke shoes. According to Parks’s calculations, the Norths had roughly fifty thousand dollars. Parks transferred their savings, held at the Bank of America, to an account in her name.
Rennie repeatedly asked for her son’s drawings, and for the family photographs on her refrigerator. Rudy pined for his car, a midnight-blue 2010 Chrysler, which came to symbolize the life he had lost. He missed the routine interactions that driving had allowed him. “Everybody at the pharmacy was my buddy,” he said. Now he and Rennie felt like exiles. Rudy said, “They kept telling me, ‘Oh, you don’t have to worry: your car is fine, and this and that.’ ” A month later, he said, “they finally told me, ‘Actually, we sold your car.’ I said, ‘What in the hell did you sell it for?’ ” It was bought for less than eight thousand dollars, a price that Rudy considered insulting.
Rudy lingered in the dining room after eating breakfast each morning, chatting with other residents of Lakeview Terrace. He soon discovered that ten other wards of April Parks lived there. His next-door neighbor, Adolfo Gonzalez, a short, bald seventy-one-year-old who had worked as a maître d’ at the MGM Grand Las Vegas, had become Parks’s ward at a hearing that lasted a minute and thirty-one seconds.
Gonzalez, who had roughly three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in assets, urged Rudy not to accept the nurse’s medications. “If you take the pills, they’ll make sure you don’t make it to court,” he said. Gonzalez had been prescribed the antipsychotic medications Risperdal and Depakote, which he hid in the side of his mouth without swallowing. He wanted to remain vigilant. He often spoke of a Salvador Dali painting that had been lost when Parks took over his life. Once, she charged him two hundred and ten dollars for a visit in which, according to her invoice, he expressed that “he feels like a prisoner.”
Rudy was so distressed by his conversations with Gonzalez that he asked to see a psychologist. “I thought maybe he’d give me some sort of objective learning as to what I was going through,” he said. “I wanted to ask basic questions, like What the hell is going on?” Rudy didn’t find the session illuminating, but he felt a little boost to his self-esteem when the psychologist asked that he return for a second appointment. “I guess he found me terribly charming,” he told me.
Rudy liked to fantasize about an alternative life as a psychoanalyst, and he tried to befriend the wards who seemed especially hopeless. “Loneliness is a physical pain that hurts all over,” he wrote in his notebook. He bought a pharmaceutical encyclopedia and advised the other wards about medications they’d been prescribed. He also ran for president of the residents, promising that under his leadership the kitchen would no longer advertise canned food as homemade. (He lost—he’s not sure if anyone besides Rennie voted for him—but he did win a seat on the residents’ council.)
He was particularly concerned about a ward of Parks’s named Marlene Homer, a seventy-year-old woman who had been a professor. “Now she was almost hiding behind the pillars,” Rudy said. “She was so obsequious. She was, like, ‘Run me over. Run me over.’ ” She’d become a ward in 2012, after Parks told the court, “She has admitted to strange thoughts, depression, and doing things she can’t explain.” On a certificate submitted to the court, an internist had checked a box indicating that Homer was “unable to attend the guardianship court hearing because______,” but he didn’t fill in a reason.
The Norths could guess which residents were Parks’s wards by the way they were dressed. Gonzalez wore the same shirt to dinner nearly every day. “Forgive me,” he told the others at his table. When a friend tried to take him shopping, Parks prevented the excursion because she didn’t know the friend. Rennie had also tried to get more clothes. “I reminded ward that she has plenty of clothing in her closet,” Parks wrote. “I let her know that they are on a tight budget.” The Norths’ estate was charged a hundred and eighty dollars for the conversation.
Another resident, Barbara Neely, a fifty-five-year-old with schizophrenia, repeatedly asked Parks to buy her outfits for job interviews. She was applying for a position with the Department of Education. After Neely’s third week at Lakeview Terrace, Parks’s assistant sent Parks a text. “Can you see Barbara Neely anytime this week?” she wrote. “She has questions on the guardianship and how she can get out of it.” Parks responded, “I can and she can’t.” Neely had been in the process of selling her house, for a hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars, when Parks became her guardian and took charge of the sale.
The rationale for the guardianship of Norbert Wilkening, who lived on the bottom floor of the facility, in the memory-care ward, for people with dementia (“the snake pit,” Rudy called it), was also murky. Parks’s office manager, who advertised himself as a “Qualified Dementia Care Specialist”—a credential acquired through video training sessions—had given Wilkening a “Mini-Mental State Examination,” a list of eleven questions and tasks, including naming as many animals as possible in a minute. Wilkening had failed. His daughter, Amy, told me, “I didn’t see anything that was happening to him other than a regular getting-older process, but when I was informed by all these people that he had all these problems I was, like, Well, maybe I’m just in denial. I’m not a professional.” She said that Parks was “so highly touted. By herself, by the social workers, by the judge, by everyone that knew her.”
At a hearing, when Amy complained to Norheim that Parks didn’t have time for her father, he replied, “Yeah, she’s an industry at this point.”
As Belshe spoke to more wards and their families, she began to realize that Lakeview Terrace was not the only place where wards were lodged, and that Parks was not the only guardian removing people from their homes for what appeared to be superficial reasons. Hundreds of cases followed the same pattern. It had become routine for guardians in Clark County to petition for temporary guardianship on an ex-parte basis. They told the court that they had to intervene immediately because the ward faced a medical emergency that was only vaguely described: he or she was demented or disoriented, and at risk of exploitation or abuse. The guardians attached a brief physician’s certificate that contained minimal details and often stated that the ward was too incapacitated to attend a court hearing. Debra Bookout, an attorney at the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, told me, “When a hospital or rehab facility needs to free up a bed, or when the patient is not paying his bills, some doctors get sloppy, and they will sign anything.” A recent study conducted by Hunter College found that a quarter of guardianship petitions in New York were brought by nursing homes and hospitals, sometimes as a means of collecting on overdue bills.
It often took several days for relatives to realize what had happened. When they tried to contest the guardianship or become guardians themselves, they were dismissed as unsuitable, and disparaged in court records as being neglectful, or as drug addicts, gamblers, and exploiters. (Belshe was described by Parks as a “reported addict” who “has no contact with the proposed ward,” an allegation that Belshe didn’t see until it was too late to challenge.) Family who lived out of state were disqualified from serving as guardians, because the law prohibited the appointment of anyone who didn’t live in Nevada.
Once the court approved the guardianship, the wards were often removed from their homes, which were eventually sold. Terry Williams, whose father’s estate was taken over by strangers even though he’d named her the executor of his will, has spent years combing through guardianship, probate, and real-estate records in Clark County. “I kept researching, because I was so fascinated that these people could literally take over the lives and assets of people under color of law, in less than ten minutes, and nobody was asking questions,” she told me. “These people spent their lives accumulating wealth and, in a blink of an eye, it was someone else’s.”
Williams has reviewed hundreds of cases involving Jared Shafer, who is considered the godfather of guardians in Nevada. In the records room of the courthouse, she was afraid to say Shafer’s name out loud. In the course of his thirty-five-year career, Shafer has assumed control of more than three thousand wards and estates and trained a generation of guardians. In 1979, he became the county’s public administrator, handling the estates of people who had no relatives in Nevada, as well as the public guardian, serving wards when no family members or private guardians were available. In 2003, he left government and founded his own private guardianship and fiduciary business; he transferred the number of his government-issued phone to himself.
Williams took records from Shafer’s and other guardians’ cases to the Las Vegas police department several times. She tried to explain, she said, that “this is a racketeering operation that is fee-based. There’s no brown paper bag handed off in an alley. The payoff is the right to bill the estate.” The department repeatedly told her that it was a civil issue, and refused to take a report. In 2006, she submitted a typed statement, listing twenty-three statutes that she thought had been violated, but an officer wrote in the top right corner, “not a police matter.” Adam Woodrum, an estate lawyer in Las Vegas, told me that he’s worked with several wards and their families who have brought their complaints to the police. “They can’t even get their foot in the door,” he said.
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Acting as her own attorney, Williams filed a racketeering suit in federal court against Shafer and the lawyers who represented him. At a hearing before the United States District Court of Central California in 2009, she told the judge, “They are trumping up ways and means to deem people incompetent and take their assets.” The case was dismissed. “The scheme is ingenious,” she told me. “How do you come up with a crime that literally none of the victims can articulate without sounding like they’re nuts? The same insane allegations keep surfacing from people who don’t know each other.”
In 2002, in a petition to the Clark County District Court, a fifty-seven-year-old man complained that his mother had lost her constitutional rights because her kitchen was understocked and a few bills hadn’t been paid. The house they shared was then placed on the market. The son wrote, “If the only showing necessary to sell the home right out from under someone is that their ‘estate’ would benefit, then no house in Clark County is safe, nor any homeowner.” Under the guise of benevolent paternalism, guardians seemed to be creating a kind of capitalist dystopia: people’s quality of life was being destroyed in order to maximize their capital.
When Concetta Mormon, a wealthy woman who owned a Montessori school, became Shafer’s ward because she had aphasia, Shafer sold the school midyear, even though students were enrolled. At a hearing after the sale, Mormon’s daughter, Victoria Cloutier, constantly spoke out of turn. The judge, Robert Lueck, ordered that she be handcuffed and placed in a holding cell while the hearing continued. Two hours later, when Cloutier was allowed to return for the conclusion, the judge told her that she had thirty days in which to vacate her mother’s house. If she didn’t leave, she would be evicted and her belongings would be taken to Goodwill.
The opinions of wards were also disregarded. In 2010, Guadalupe Olvera, a ninety-year-old veteran of the Second World War, repeatedly asked that his daughter and not Shafer be appointed his guardian. “The ward is not to go to court,” Shafer instructed his assistants. When Olvera was finally permitted to attend a hearing, nearly a year after becoming a ward, he expressed his desire to live with his daughter in California, rather than under Shafer’s care. “Why is everybody against that?” he asked Norheim. “I don’t need that man.” Although Nevada’s guardianship law requires that courts favor relatives over professionals, Norheim continued the guardianship, saying, “The priority ship sailed.”
When Olvera’s daughter eventually defied the court’s orders and took her father to live at her seaside home in Northern California, Norheim’s supervisor, Judge Charles Hoskin, issued an arrest warrant for her “immediate arrest and incarceration” without bail. The warrant was for contempt of court, but Norheim said at least five times from the bench that she had “kidnapped” Olvera. At a hearing, Norheim acknowledged that he wasn’t able to send an officer across state lines to arrest the daughter. Shafer said, “Maybe I can.”
Shafer held so much sway in the courtroom that, in 2013, when an attorney complained that the bank account of a ward named Kristina Berger had “no money left and no records to explain where it went,” Shafer told Norheim, “Close the courtroom.” Norheim immediately complied. A dozen people in attendance were forced to leave.
One of Shafer’s former bookkeepers, Lisa Clifton, who was hired in 2012, told me that Shafer used to brag about his political connections, saying, “I wrote the laws.” In 1995, he persuaded the Nevada Senate Committee on Government Affairs to write a bill that allowed the county to receive interest on money that the public guardian invested. “This is what I want you to put in the statute, and I will tell you that you will get a rousing hand from a couple of judges who practice our probate,” he said. At another hearing, he asked the committee to write an amendment permitting public guardians to take control of people’s property in five days, without a court order. “This bill is not ‘Big Brother’ if you trust the person who is doing the job,” he said. (After a senator expressed concern that the law allowed “intervention into somebody’s life without establishing some sort of reason why you are doing it,” the committee declined to recommend it.)
Clifton observed that Shafer almost always took a cynical view of family members: they were never motivated by love or duty, only by avarice. “ ‘They just want the money’—that was his answer to everything,” she told me. “And I’m thinking to myself, Well, when family members die they pass it down to their children. Isn’t that just the normal progression of things?”
After a few months on the job, Clifton was asked to work as a guardian, substituting for an absent employee, though she had never been trained. Her first assignment was to supervise a visit with a man named Alvin Passer, who was dying in the memory-care unit of a nursing home. His partner of eight years, Olive Manoli, was permitted a brief visit to say goodbye. Her visits had been restricted by Shafer—his lawyer told the court that Passer became “agitated and sexually aggressive” in her presence—and she hadn’t seen Passer in months. In a futile attempt to persuade the court to allow her to be with him, Manoli had submitted a collection of love letters, as well as notes from ten people describing her desire to care for Passer for the rest of his life. “I was absolutely appalled,” Clifton said. “She was this very sweet lady, and I said, ‘Go in there and spend as much time with him as you want.’ Tears were rolling down her cheeks.”
The family seemed to have suffered a form of court-sanctioned gaslighting. Passer’s daughter, Joyce, a psychiatric nurse who specialized in geriatrics, had been abruptly removed as her father’s co-guardian, because she appeared “unwilling or (more likely) unable to conduct herself rationally in the Ward’s best interests,” according to motions filed by one of Shafer’s attorneys.
She and Manoli had begged Norheim not to appoint Shafer as guardian. “Sir, he’s abusive,” their lawyer said in court.
“He’s as good as we got, and I trust him completely,” Norheim responded.
Joyce Passer was so confused by the situation that, she said, “I thought I was crazy.” Then she received a call from a blocked number. It was Terry Williams, who did not reveal her identity. She had put together a list of a half-dozen family members who she felt were “ready to receive some kind of verbal support.” She told Passer, “Look, you are not nuts. This is real. Everything you are thinking is true. This has been going on for years.”
During Rennie North’s first year at Lakeview Terrace, she gained sixty pounds. Parks had switched the Norths’ insurance, for reasons she never explained, and Rennie began seeing new doctors, who prescribed Valium, Prozac, the sedative Temazepam, Oxycodone, and Fentanyl. The doses steadily increased. Rudy, who had hip pain, was prescribed Oxycodone and Valium. When he sat down to read, the sentences floated past his eyes or appeared in duplicate. “Ward seemed very tired and his eyes were glassy,” Parks wrote in an invoice.
Belshe found it increasingly hard to communicate with her parents, who napped for much of the day. “They were being overmedicated to the point where they weren’t really there,” she said. The Norths’ grandsons, who used to see them every week, rarely visited. “It was degrading for them to see us so degraded,” Rudy said. Parks noticed that Rennie was acting helpless, and urged her to “try harder to be more motivated and not be so dependent on others.” Rudy and Rennie began going to Sunday church services at the facility, even though they were Jewish. Rudy was heartened by what he heard in the pastor’s message: “Don’t give up. God will help you get out of here.” He began telling people, “We are living the life of Job.”
At the end of 2014, Lakeview Terrace hired a new director, Julie Liebo, who resisted Parks’s orders that medical information about wards be kept from their families. Liebo told me, “The families were devastated that they couldn’t know if the residents were in surgery or hear anything about their health. They didn’t understand why they’d been taken out of the picture. They’d ask, ‘Can you just tell me if she’s alive?’ ” Liebo tried to comply with the rules, because she didn’t want to violate medical-privacy laws; as guardian, Parks was entitled to choose what was disclosed. Once, though, Liebo took pity on the sister of an eighty-year-old ward named Dorothy Smith, who was mourning a dog that Parks had given away, and told her that Smith was stable. Liebo said that Parks, who was by then the secretary of the Nevada Guardianship Association, called her immediately. “She threatened my license and said she could have me arrested,” Liebo told me.
After Liebo arrived, Parks began removing wards from Lakeview Terrace with less than a day’s notice. A woman named Linda Phillips, who had dementia, was told that she was going to the beauty salon. She never returned. Marlene Homer, the ward whose ailments were depression and “strange thoughts,” was taken away in a van, screaming. Liebo had asked the state ombudsman to come to the facility and stop the removals, but nothing could be done. “We stood there completely helpless,” Liebo said. “We had no idea where they were going.” Liebo said that other wards asked her if they would be next.
Liebo alerted the compliance officer for the Clark County Family Court that Parks was removing residents “without any concern for them and their choice to stay here.” She also reported her complaints to the police, the Department of Health Services, the Bureau of Health Care, and Nevada Adult Protective Services. She said each agency told her that it didn’t have the authority or the jurisdiction to intervene.
At the beginning of 2015, Parks told the Norths that they would be leaving Lakeview Terrace. “Finances are low and the move is out of our control,” Parks wrote. It was all arranged so quickly that, Rudy said, “we didn’t have time to say goodbye to people we’d been eating with for seventeen months.” Parks arranged for Caring Transitions to move them to the Wentworth, a less expensive assisted-living facility. Liebo said that, the night before the move, Rudy began “shouting about the Holocaust, that this was like being in Nazi Germany.” Liebo didn’t think the reference was entirely misguided. “He reverted to a point where he had no rights as a human being,” she said. “He was no longer the caregiver, the man, the husband—all of the things that gave his life meaning.” Liebo also didn’t understand why Belshe had been marginalized. “She seemed like she had a great relationship with her parents,” she said.
Belshe showed up at 9 a.m. to help her parents with the move, but when she arrived Parks’s assistant, Heidi Kramer, told her that her parents had already left. Belshe “emotionally crashed,” as Liebo put it. She yelled that her parents didn’t even wake up until nine or later—what was the rush? In an invoice, Kramer wrote that Belshe “began to yell and scream, her behavior was out of control, she was taking pictures and yelling, ‘April Parks is a thief.’ ” Kramer called the police. Liebo remembers that an officer “looked at Julie Belshe and told her she had no rights, and she didn’t.”
Belshe cried as she drove to the Wentworth, in Las Vegas. When she arrived, Parks was there, and refused to let her see her parents. Parks wrote, “I told her that she was too distraught to see her parents, and that she needed to leave.” Belshe wouldn’t, so Parks asked the receptionist to call the police. When the police arrived, Belshe told them, “I just want to hug my parents and make sure they’re O.K.” An officer handed her a citation for trespassing, saying that if she returned to the facility she would be arrested.
Parks wrote that the Norths were “very happy with the new room and thanked us several times,” but Rudy remembers feeling as if he had “ended up in the sewer.” Their room was smaller than the one at Lakeview Terrace, and the residents at the Wentworth seemed older and sicker. “There were people sitting in their chairs, half-asleep,” Rudy said. “Their tongues hung out.”
Rennie spent nearly all her time in her wheelchair or in bed, her eyes half-closed. Her face had become bloated. One night, she was so agitated that the nurses gave her Haldol, a drug commonly used to treat schizophrenia. When Rudy asked her questions, Rennie said “What?” in a soft, remote voice.
Shortly after her parents’ move, Belshe called an editor of the Vegas Voice, a newspaper distributed to all the mailboxes in senior communities in Las Vegas. In recent months, the paper had published three columns warning readers about Clark County guardians, writing that they “have been lining their pockets at the expense of unwitting seniors for a very long time.”
At Belshe’s urging, the paper’s political editor, Rana Goodman, visited the Norths, and published an article in the Voice, describing Rudy as “the most articulate, soft spoken person I have met in a very long time.” She called Clark County’s guardianship system a “(legal) elder abuse racket” and urged readers to sign a petition demanding that the Nevada legislature reform the laws. More than three thousand people signed.
Two months later, the Review-Journal ran an investigation, titled “Clark County’s Private Guardians May Protect—Or Just Steal and Abuse,” which described complaints against Shafer going back to the early eighties, when two of his employees were arrested for stealing from the estates of dead people.
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In May, 2015, a month after the article appeared, when the Norths went to court to discuss their finances local journalists were in the courtroom and Norheim seemed chastened. “I have grave concerns about this case,” he said. He noted that Parks had sold the Norths’ belongings without proper approval from his court. Parks had been doing this routinely for years, and, according to her, the court had always accepted her accounting and her fees. Her lawyer, Aileen Cohen, said, “Everything was done for the wards’ benefit, to support the wards.”
Norheim announced that he was suspending Parks as the Norths’ guardian—the first time she had been removed from a case for misconduct.
“This is important,” Rudy, who was wearing a double-breasted suit, said in court. “This is hope. I am coming here and I have hope.” He quoted the Bible, Thomas Jefferson, and Euripides, until Belshe finally touched his elbow and said, “Just sit down, Dad.”
When Rudy apologized for being “overzealous,” Norheim told him, “This is your life. This is your liberty. You have every right to be here. You have every right to be involved in this project.”
After the hearing, Parks texted her husband, “I am finished.”
Last March, Parks and her lawyer, along with her office manager and her husband, were indicted for perjury and theft, among other charges. The indictment was narrowly focussed on their double billings and their sloppy accounting, but, in a detailed summary of the investigation, Jaclyn O’Malley, who led the probe for the Nevada Attorney General’s Office, made passing references to the “collusion of hospital social workers and medical staff” who profited from their connection to Parks. At Parks’s grand-jury trial, her assistant testified that she and Parks went to hospitals and attorneys’ offices for the purpose of “building relationships to generate more client leads.” Parks secured a contract with six medical facilities whose staff agreed to refer patients to her—an arrangement that benefitted the facilities, since Parks controlled the decisions of a large pool of their potential consumers. Parks often gave doctors blank certificates and told them exactly what to write in order for their patients to become her wards.
Parks and other private guardians appeared to gravitate toward patients who had considerable assets. O’Malley described a 2010 case in which Parks, after receiving a tip from a social worker, began “cold-calling” rehabilitation centers, searching for a seventy-nine-year-old woman, Patricia Smoak, who had nearly seven hundred thousand dollars and no children. Parks finally found her, but Smoak’s physician wouldn’t sign a certificate of incapacity. “The doctor is not playing ball,” Parks wrote to her lawyer. She quickly found a different doctor to sign the certificate, and Norheim approved the guardianship. (Both Parks and Norheim declined to speak with me.)
Steve Miller, a former member of the Las Vegas City Council, said he assumed that Shafer would be the next indictment after Parks, who is scheduled to go to trial next spring. “All of the disreputable guardians were taking clues from the Shafer example,” he said. But, as the months passed, “I started to think that this has run its course locally. Only federal intervention is going to give us peace of mind.”
Richard Black, who, after his father-in-law was placed into guardianship, became the director of a grassroots national organization, Americans Against Abusive Probate Guardianship, said that he considered the Parks indictment “irrefutably shallow. It sent a strong message of: We’re not going to go after the real leaders of this, only the easy people, the ones who were arrogant and stupid enough to get caught.” He works with victims in dozens of what he calls “hot spots,” places where guardianship abuse is prevalent, often because they attract retirees: Palm Beach, Sarasota, Naples, Albuquerque, San Antonio. He said that the problems in Clark County are not unusual. “The only thing that is unique is that Clark County is one of the few jurisdictions that doesn’t seal its records, so we can see what is going on.”
Approximately ten per cent of people older than sixty-five are thought to be victims of “elder abuse”—a construct that has yet to enter public consciousness, as child abuse has—but such cases are seldom prosecuted. People who are frail or dying don’t make good witnesses—a fact that Shafer once emphasized at a 1990 U.S. congressional hearing on crimes against the elderly, in which he appeared as an expert at preventing exploitation. “Seniors do not like to testify,” he said, adding that they were either incapable or “mesmerized by the person ripping them off.” He said, “The exploitation of seniors is becoming a real cottage industry right now. This is a good business. Seniors are unable to fend for themselves.”
In the past two years, Nevada has worked to reform its guardianship system through a commission, appointed by the Nevada Supreme Court, to study failures in oversight. In 2018, the Nevada legislature will enact a new law that entitles all wards to be represented by lawyers in court. But the state seems reluctant to reckon with the roots of the problem, as well as with its legacy: a generation of ill and elderly people who were deprived of their autonomy, and also of their families, in the final years of their lives. Last spring, a man bought a storage unit in Henderson, Nevada, and discovered twenty-seven urns—the remains of Clark County wards who had never been buried.
In the wake of Parks’s indictment, no judges have lost their jobs. Norheim was transferred from guardianship court to dependency court, where he now oversees cases involving abused and neglected children. Shafer is still listed in the Clark County court system as a trustee and as an administrator in several open cases. He did not respond to multiple e-mails and messages left with his bookkeeper, who answered his office phone but would not say whether he was still in practice. He did appear at one of the public meetings for the commission appointed to analyze flaws in the guardianship system. “What started all of this was me,” he said. Then he criticized local media coverage of the issue and said that a television reporter, whom he’d talked to briefly, didn’t know the facts. “The system works,” Shafer went on. “It’s not the guardians you have to be aware of, it’s more family members.” He wore a blue polo shirt, untucked, and his head was shaved. He looked aged, his arms dotted with sun spots, but he spoke confidently and casually. “The only person you folks should be thinking about when you change things is the ward. It’s their money, it’s their life, it’s their time. The family members don’t count.”
Belshe is resigned to the fact that she will be supporting her parents for the rest of their lives. Parks spent all the Norths’ money on fees—the hourly wages for her, her assistants, her lawyers, and the various contractors she hired—as well as on their monthly bills, which doubled under her guardianship. Belshe guesses that Parks—or whichever doctor or social worker referred her to the Norths—had assumed that her parents were wealthier than they actually were. Rudy often talked vaguely about deals he had once made in China. “He exaggerates, so he won’t feel emasculated,” Belshe said. “He wasn’t such a big businessman, but he was a great dad.”
The Norths now live in what used to be Belshe’s home office; it has a window onto the living room which Belshe has covered with a tarp. Although the room is tiny, the Norths can fit most of their remaining belongings into it: a small lamp with teardrop crystals, a deflated love seat, and two paintings by their son. Belshe rescued the art work, in 2013, after Caring Transitions placed the Norths’ belongings in trash bags at the edge of their driveway. “My brother’s paintings were folded and smelled,” she said.
The Norths’ bed takes up most of the room, and operates as their little planet. They rarely stray far from it. They lie in bed playing cards or sit against the headboard, reading or watching TV. Rudy’s notebooks are increasingly focussed on mortality—“Death may be pleasurable”—and money. “Money monsters do well in this society,” he wrote. “All great fortunes began with a crime.” He creates lists of all the possessions he has lost, some of which he may be imagining: over time, Rennie’s wardrobe has become increasingly elaborate and refined, as have their sets of China. He alternates between feeling that his belongings are nothing—a distraction from the pursuit of meaning—and everything. “It’s an erasure,” he said. “They erase you from the face of the earth.” He told me a few times that he was a distant cousin of Leon Trotsky, “intellect of the revolution,” as he called him, and I wondered whether his newfound pride was connected to his conflicted feelings about the value of material objects.
A few months after the Norths were freed, Rudy talked on the phone with Adolfo Gonzalez, his neighbor from Lakeview Terrace, who, after a doctor found him competent, had also been discharged. He now lived in a house near the airport, and had been reunited with several of his pets. The two men congratulated each other. “We survived!” Rudy said. “We never thought we’d see each other on the other side.” Three other wards from Lakeview Terrace had died.
Rennie has lost nearly all the weight she gained at Lakeview Terrace, mostly because Belshe and her husband won’t let her lounge in her wheelchair or eat starchy foods. Now she uses a walker, which she makes self-deprecating jokes about. “This is fun—I can teach you!” she told me.
In July, Rennie slipped in the bathroom and spent a night in the hospital. Belshe didn’t want anyone to know about her mother’s fall, because, she said, “this is the kind of thing that gets you into guardianship.” She told me, “I feel like these people are just waiting in the bushes.”
Two days after the fall, Rennie was feeling better—she’d had thirteen stitches—but she was still agitated by a dream she had in the hospital. She wasn’t even sure if she’d been asleep; she remembers talking, and her eyes were open.
“You were loopedy-doopy,” Scott Belshe, Julie’s husband, told her. They were sitting on the couch in their living room.
“It was real,” Rennie said.
“You dreamed it,” Scott told her.
“Maybe I was hallucinating,” she said. “I don’t know—I was scared.” She said that strangers were making decisions about her fate. She felt as if she were frozen: she couldn’t influence what was happening. “I didn’t know what to do,” she told Scott. “I think I yelled for help. Help me.” The worst part, she said, was that she couldn’t find her family. “Honest to God, I thought you guys left me all alone.” ♦Published in the print edition of the October 9, 2017, issue, with the headline “The Takeover.”
It is very rare to get a victim willing to publish the string of horrific crimes against them in Illinois, but Judith is one brave woman. 83 years old, Kane County, Illinois guardianship victim
To: Key Phillip-s <phillipskey@yahoo.com>; sion-from-nc-the-system-of-corruption-is-endemnic> Wasn’t That Convenient? And With Such Duly Documented “Surgical-Precision Timing.” <lanreamu@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 5, 2023 at 10:14:14 AM CST
Subject: Re: The Washington post exposes, Guardianship Corruption The “Goodman” case scared most of the Arizona lawyers. The miscreants and the legal profession went after him tooth and nail. While I do not know if Goodman was a ‘good guy’ or an opportunist, the public relations campaign against him parallels the campaign mounted by the left against Trump. They spit at the mention of Goodman’s name and – its all part of the public record. When a lawyer, a politician, or someone who is in the public eye is on bad paper with the dominant political powers expect that he/she will be vilified – at least until he/she is no longer a threat. Sometimes it is subtle, other times it is outrageous. There is no quarter given. If you need an example — JoAnne Denison has a blog called MARYGSYKES. Therein she exposed the perfidiousness of the accepted legal practice in relation to guardianship and how the word TRUTH and due process were removed from the lexicon in vogue at the Courthouse. As her practice concentrated on INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, they could not Goodmanize her, so harassment and mafia tacts became the name of the game. They really had to stretch. The SALLAS ZOOM outrage demonstrated just how ethically challenged the FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSER political group have become. To hell with ADA! Teaching a victim to use ZOOM In Illinois is ethically challenged, and the IARDC (Disciplinary Commission) went full out to attempt to intimidate Denison so that Sallas would be helpless to complaint as to the JUSTICE being promulgated and handed out in Judge Boliker’s courtroom designed to deny Mr. and Mrs. Dean Sallas of even the most basic rights of due process. The IARDC actually subpoenaed Dean SAllas’ Google Account! (Whose else’s privacy rights they violated is unknown. Of course, Dean and Amy Sallas were punished with the loss of their rights privileges and immunities as citizens. (8 million dollars of lifetime work, savings, and **** were forfeit.) Today DEAN SALLAS lives in his car – homeless, and Amy is a hostage in a nursing home facility – DEAN AND AMY ARE MARKED INDIVIDUALS – no lawyer is willing to even file an appearance for either of them — IT IS FUTILE! SALLAS does not have the chance of a snowball in HELL of even getting the opportunity to enjoy his vested civil liberties!! Now with the foregoing in mind – please re=read the guardianship articles published in the NEWYORKER, NYTIMES, WALL STREET JOURNAL, and make certain that everyone has a copy of the Post Article, to wit:
The retired pilot went to the hospital. Then his life went into a tailspin.
Many older people are one medical emergency away from a court-appointed guardian taking control of their lives
A 2021 picture of Douglas Hulse on his niece’s phone. Hulse, a former pilot, was put in a guardianship in Florida where he lived and moved into a nursing home without anyone telling his family in Pennsylvania. (Lianne Milton)
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ORLANDO — When Douglas Hulse pulled his Ford Mustang convertible into a Florida gas station three years ago, he looked so distressed that someone called 911.
An ambulance rushed him to Orlando Health South Seminole Hospital, where doctors said he had a stroke. At 80, the retired pilot who had flown famous passengers around the country could no longer care for himself.
But Hulse lived alone — as 3 out of 5 Americans in their 80s do.
A hospital can be liable if a patient is discharged into an unsafe environment. Because Hulse lived alone and the hospital officials saw no sign that he had family, that put them in a bind when his health didn’t improve. So they argued in court that he was no longer capable of making his own decisions and needed a guardian — a caretaker with enormous legal power.
When a judge agreed, Hulse lost basic freedoms: He couldn’t spend his own money or decide where to live. The lifelong Republican who had just cast his ballot in the 2020 presidential primary even lost his right to vote. He was quickly moved to a nursing home. His new guardian, a woman he had never met, began selling his house and his belongings.
Many people lose their fundamental rights when a judge places them in a guardianship giving another person, often a stranger, the power to make the ailing person’s financial and medical decisions. (The Washington Post)
Hulse had joined 1 million Americans in a guardianship, a court-sanctioned arrangement created to protect vulnerable people — some young, but many elderly. The system has been widely criticized for inviting abuse and theft. Local judges give extraordinary power to a guardian, including access to the bank account of the person in their care, despite a lack of effective ways to monitor them. When excessive billing, missing money and other abuses are discovered, guardians are rarely punished. Prosecutors are keenly aware they were appointed by a judge.
As America ages, there is new focus on this legal arrangement, especially in Florida, a mecca for seniors where state officials have called the rising number of elderly the “silver tsunami.” Already, Florida has 2 million residents 75 or older — more than the entire population of 14 other states. Many moved here from other parts of the country, far from family, and are showing up alone in emergency rooms.
The Orlando Health South Seminole Hospital in Longwood, Fla. (Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post)
What happened to Hulse over the past three years shines a light on the serious flaws in this government system and on the hospital pipeline that thrust Hulse into it. During the coronavirus pandemic, more hospitals went to court to seek guardianships; it was a way to legally move out patients and free up beds. Today, the practice quietly continues as an efficient way to discharge elderly patients who cost hospitals money the longer they stay.
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“This should scare people to death,” said Rick Black, the founder of the Center for Estate Administration Reform who has examined thousands of guardianship cases and has seen a rise in hospitals initiating them. “This is a common practice nationwide, and its adoption is growing.”
In court, the Orlando hospital requested that Hulse be assigned Dina Carlson, a 51-year-old former real estate agent who became a professional guardian. After a judge assigned her, Hulse was immediately moved out of the hospital and into a nursing home. Carlson’s sale of his home raised suspicions because of its seemingly low price in a hot market, and an inspector general’s investigation later found “probable cause” of exploitation of an elderly person and a scheme to defraud.
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Carlson denied any wrongdoing, and no criminal investigation was ever opened. “I am a little bit salty about this whole thing,” Carlson said in an interview. She said she wanted “to be a ray of sunshine” for elderly people.
Guardianships are not well understood. Rules vary by jurisdiction, and key information is often sealed by judges.
“People don’t realize how abusive the system is,” said Pinellas County Circuit Court Clerk Ken Burke, who led a recent Florida task force to improve guardianships. “If they knew, there would be bigger cries for reform.”
Very often, the person in a guardianship is unable to publicly complain and has nobody in their life to do it for them.
But it turned out Hulse did have family, and they were searching for him.
Jonathan Thompson holds a portrait of his uncle, Douglas Hulse, as he and his sister, Katie Thompson, sort through old family pictures. When Hulse was assigned a guardian, no one told his family. (Lianne Milton for The Washington Post)
A pilot who thought he would live forever
Douglas Hulse was born in 1939 and raised in McLean, Va., where his father was a lobbyist for the trucking industry. In the 1950s, Hulse enrolled in a Florida college and became a pilot.
Like his father, Hulse was a Republican who loved to talk politics. He also drew caricatures of every president in the last half century. After flying Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig, former Republican secretaries of state, he proudly showed off photos he took of them to his sister, niece and nephew.
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He never married or had children. He kept busy, teaching flying and taekwondo. But when he retired he spent more time alone. Five residents on his street in Lake Mary, near Orlando, said they barely knew the tall, blue-eyed neighbor. He had lived there 25 years, longer than many in a transient place.
Raymond Charest, president of the Seminole County Gun and Archery Association, said that in the 1990s Hulse taught members about how to safely handle and store guns but that recently he wasn’t involved in the club. “I would see him shooting out there. But it was just, ‘Hey, how are you doing?’ and that was it.”
For a year, Katie Thompson, who lives in Pennsylvania, did not know what happened to her uncle, who lived in Florida. (Lianne Milton for The Washington Post)
Katie Thompson, Hulse’s niece, said for years her uncle regularly visited her mother, father, brother and her in the Philadelphia area. She also went to see him at his three-bedroom Florida home full of exceptional items he collected in his travels, including a Las Vegas-style slot machine.
But his visits stopped when his sister, Katie’s mother, developed dementia before she died in 2018. Hulse had seen his own mother die the same way. “I think it just got too hard for him,” his niece said.
After Hulse’s only sibling passed away, he became harder to reach, but he eventually responded to calls and emails.
After his stroke, Hulse was confused and apparently unable to tell anyone to call his family. It’s unclear what efforts the hospital made to track down any relatives.
Geo Morales, a spokesman for the Orlando Health South Seminole Hospital, said he could not discuss details of Hulse’s case because of privacy laws. He emailed a statement that said the hospital works “with various community partners in an attempt to reach next of kin. However, reaching a patient’s next of kin is not always possible.”
“We are seeing more of these patients with dementia and other ailments who live alone and/or are estranged from relatives,” Morales said in an email. He strongly urged people to draw up a will or designate someone to make their health decisions and to note this in their medical file.
Hulse had not. In these cases, court records show, hospitals often turn to guardianships, even though they are widely considered a last resort and difficult to reverse.
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A safety net built for a different era
For generations, judges have been assigning a relative or close friend as the protector of someone unable to make their own decisions. But more people are socially isolated and have no one they can count on at the end of their life. Even many people with close relatives are estranged from them.
In many societies, family members of different generations live under one roof. But one of the most dramatic shifts in the American lifestyle is single-person households. Many live alone beginning in their 20s and by the time they are in their 80s, most live by themselves.
So judges now often assign professional guardians, a person paid to care for someone they don’t know. Carlson told the court she was already caring for 18 others when she was assigned to Hulse. Carlson charged him $65 an hour, according to her bills filed in court. When a judge signed off, she paid herself from Hulse’s bank account.
In some states, the only requirement to be a guardian is to be 18 years old. Florida has more requirements including a background and credit check. But still, compare the 40-hour training course with, for instance, the 900 educational hours required to become a licensed barber.
Yet these caretakers control people’s lives and money. In just one Florida county, Palm Beach, guardians control about $1 billion, according to Anthony Palmieri, deputy inspector general for the Palm Beach Circuit Court.
“You have your nail techs and tennis pros — their business is not so good and they want something more lucrative and they’re jumping into guardianship,” Palmieri said.
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But adding an independent monitor from outside the court, a frequent recommendation, is expensive. “The system would be cured, in my opinion, by the Department of Elder Affairs taking responsibility for guardianship” said Burke, the Pinellas court clerk.
In Florida, even funding a statewide guardianship database was a battle. Currently, there isn’t an official number of how many people are in them; best estimates are about 50,000. Each county keeps its own records, and some do that better than others. When the database goes online, it will give the first statistical snapshot of the system.
Critics have called for a uniform system with more oversight. But several Florida officials said those who benefit from the current, complex system, including lawyers, impede reform. Efforts to make attorneys’ fees in these cases more publicly visible have also failed.
“There are a lot of great attorneys out there,” Burke said. But the court clerk said there has been pushback from the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, adding, “It’s a trade union for all practical purposes, and it protects their members and the fees they receive.”
These attorneys are influential in the state legislature, where their expertise is often sought to draft laws related to guardianships and estates.
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John Moran, chair-elect of the Florida Bar’s Real Property, Probate and Trust Section, said far from blocking improvements, it has stated policy positions that seek reforms, including more transparency. Asked why legal fees cannot be more readily known, Moran cited privacy concerns of the incapacitated person. He also emphasized that “no lawyer gets paid without a judge’s approval.”
So the system with few guardrails continues. Court clerks audit guardians’ reports that detail how they spend the money of the person in their care, among other things. Any irregularities are to be flagged to a judge. But clerks are swamped, with little time to read through a case file that is often thousands of pages.
Grant Maloy, the Seminole County court clerk, said his office has a far bigger caseload today than 15 years ago yet a smaller budget.
The judges are overloaded, too. Pinellas County has two judges and two magistrates overseeing 3,000 guardianships — in addition to other types of cases.
No witness or body camera accompanies a guardian into a person’s home. They are trusted to accurately inventory all valuables in their court report. “There could be $5,000 stuffed under the sofa, and if the guardian pocketed it, who would know?” said Burke, the Pinellas court clerk.
The task force organized by the state clerks and comptrollers last year said hospitals should find a less drastic way to deal with patients costing them money, such as authorizing someone to be their power of attorney or health surrogate. It also sought a ban on requesting a specific guardian because that raises concerns about the guardian’s allegiance — is it to the patient or the hospital giving them work?
A Washington Post review of guardianship records in central Florida found scores of recent petitions by hospitals seeking a guardian for patients 65 and older, and many asked for a specific professional guardian.
Hulse’s guardianship
In April 2020, when Hulse was ready to be discharged, a staff member of the Orlando hospital signed a petition to the court stating that he had “no one to take care of the financial and medical decisions.”
Hulse, like most patients over 65, was covered by Medicare. It pays the hospital by diagnosis, not length of stay, an attempt to stop excessive billing. Generally it pays a hospital $23,000 for an elderly stroke patient in Orlando, a sum that assumes a five-day stay. After that, a hospital starts losing money. A new patient in the same bed would bring in thousands of dollars a day.
The American Hospital Association said more patients are staying “excessive days” and has lobbied for increased Medicare payments. Many hospitals are also overwhelmed by people who are homeless or have a mental illness and other patients unable to pay their bills. An AHA spokesman also said a hospital may initiate a guardianship but a judge approves it.
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Laura Sterling, an attorney hired by the Orlando hospital, recommended Carlson as Hulse’s guardian. In Florida, lawyers represent guardians in court, and Sterling was Carlson’s lawyer. In her court filing that requested Carlson, Sterling does not mention that if Carlson was assigned, she also would be paid as her lawyer, at a rate of $300 an hour.
One of the motions filed in court in Hulse’s guardianship case was for attorneys’ fees, including for time spent on the sale of his home. (The Washington Post)
Sterling did not respond to requests for comment. There is no Florida rule prohibiting a lawyer from representing both the hospital and the guardian the hospital recommended in the same case.
Moran, from the Florida Bar, said he could not speak for the lawyers’ group but said that scenario raised “all kinds of red flags.”
Sterling’s role in Hulse’s case was largely to file court motions. One sought approval for a monthly transfer of $10,000 from Hulse’s brokerage account to his checking account so Carlson could pay his nursing home and other bills. Another asked the court for $2,925 for Carlson, for time spent opening Hulse’s mail, arranging physical therapy and other tasks during her first four months. The money to pay Sterling and Carlson came from Hulse’s accounts, which had more than $1.5 million, according to a note in his file.
In August 2020, after Hulse had fallen five times at the Lake Mary nursing home, Carlson moved him to a smaller facility. She also started liquidating his possessions, reporting to the court that she sold his cars, paintings, a diamond ring, camera equipment and guns. Many items were sold in cash at an estate sale, according to neighbors who went to it. It’s unclear how much Carlson reported earning for Hulse; most financial details are kept sealed.
Hulse’s former home on a quiet, pretty street in Lake Mary, Fla. (Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post)
In April 2021, Carlson signed an agreement to sell Hulse’s house with Kimberly and Mark Adams, husband-and-wife real estate agents who lived in her gated community lined with palm trees, giving them a 6 percent commission, an amount typically split between the seller’s and buyer’s agents. Carlson quickly sold the home for $215,000 before it was even publicly known to be on the market, according to the inspector general’s investigation. A company called Harding Street Homes bought Hulse’s home and resold it a few months later for $347,000 — $132,000 more than Hulse got for it. Efforts to reach the person who runs that company were unsuccessful.
Soon after the home was sold, Katie Thompson, Hulse’s niece, expanded her search for her uncle. Busy with her job and her first baby, she had not realized for months that her brother and father also had not heard from Hulse. She was a legal researcher who used Westlaw, an online legal database, and when she typed her uncle’s name into it, she was stunned to see him listed in a guardianship case.
“How could the hospital do this?” she thought. Since older people end up in an emergency room, she figured there must be a system for contacting family. “If they just called me none of this would have happened.”
In the days after Carlson became Hulse’s guardian, she did not call his relatives, either. Carlson said it was unfortunate but no one’s fault: “How does a person find out about somebody who doesn’t live in the same state? About family who don’t have the same last name? I didn’t have anybody’s name to Google.”
Thompson has her own regrets. For one thing, she wished she had gotten on a plane earlier despite worries about the pandemic.
Katie and Jonathan Thompson sent a letter to a judge in the Florida courthouse where their uncle had been assigned a guardian. They wanted to know where their uncle was and if he was safe.
On top of everything else, she said, she and her brother were helping their father, heartbroken over the death of their mother. “I kept thinking if something was really wrong with my uncle I would have gotten a call,” she said.
Thompson and her brother began calling those involved in the court case. But nobody answered their key question: Where was Hulse?
Finally, a court clerk advised them to write a letter to the court.
“We want to know where our uncle is, that he is safe and well cared for, and that his money was being well-stewarded so that he can remain so,” Katie Thompson wrote on July 28, 2021, to Seminole County Circuit Court Judge Donna Goerner. “We want to be able to be in contact with him.”
Months passed with no reply.
Hillary Hogue, a citizen watchdog, searches through guardianship cases looking for red flags at her home in Naples, Fla. (Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post)
A watchdog helping from her kitchen table
Around the start of 2022, Hillary Hogue was sitting at her kitchen table in Naples, Fla., scrolling online through guardianship cases, when she randomly clicked on Hulse’s.
“I look for red flags and when you see a hospital is involved, it’s a red flag,” said Hogue. A single mom of two teenage boys, she became an unpaid citizen watchdog after her own horrible guardianship experience. To get her father released from one, she paid over $100,000 in legal fees. He now lives with her.
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Hogue knew other cases where hospitals did not notify relatives before setting in motion a hard-to-stop legal process. “It’s just outrageous. Doesn’t anyone care about Mr. Hulse?”
She zeroed in on the price of Hulse’s home, which seemed remarkably low to her, especially after she looked up more information about it. Aware of other cases where guardians sold homes at bargain rates to friends or for kickbacks, Hogue filed a complaint with the office that regulates guardians, knowing it would draw scrutiny to Hulse’s case.
Because the system has so little official oversight, Hillary Hogue has devoted a huge amount of her time to scrutinizing case files and searching for signs that an elderly or vulnerable person is being exploited. (Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post)
Hogue, who spent $100,000 in legal fees to get her father released from a guardianship, cares for the 94-year-old in her home. (Thomas Simonetti for The Washington Post)
Katie Thompson, meanwhile, inquired about getting her uncle released from his guardianship. The Florida lawyer she contacted told her that she could spend $20,000 trying, with no guarantee of success. Hulse’s health was worsening and soon, any hope she had of moving him to Pennsylvania so she could manage his care became less of an option.
In January 2022, Carlson finally contacted the family. She called Jonathan Thompson, Hulse’s nephew, who believes her call was prompted by the family’s letter to the judge six months earlier. “I guess the letter finally got to the top of someone’s pile,” he said.
Carlson outlined Hulse’s medical problems and said he probably had a series of strokes. Because of the pandemic, she said, for a long stretch at the start of the guardianship she had not met him in person. She offered to arrange FaceTime calls. and soon Katie and Jonathan were talking to Hulse about old family trips to Gettysburg, Pa., and Cape Canaveral, Fla.
But they were wary. A state investigator, spurred by Hogue’s complaint, had called them, asking questions about Carlson.
They had their own questions: Since Carlson knew Hulse had the money for in-home aides why was he in a strange place that added to his confusion? Didn’t she see their cards mailed to his home or their contacts in his phone? And, why would a former real estate agent undersell a home without advertising it?
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The investigation
In July 2022, the inspector general’s office issued a critical report, a copy of which was obtained by The Post through a Freedom of Information Act request.
It stated that Carlson, when seeking court approval for the sale of Hulse’s home, submitted a “deficient, deceptive, and fraudulent” comparative market analysis supplied by Kimberly Adams, the real estate agent. Hulse’s home was “undervalued” and not publicly advertised.
The inspector general’s investigation also found no permits required for significant renovation. It concluded that after “superficial changes,” Hulse’s home was “flipped” for a big profit for the buyer — money that Hulse lost out on.
The inspector general’s office, lacking the investigative power of law enforcement, including the ability to subpoena bank records, pushed for a criminal investigation. It urged law enforcement to look into the handling of Hulse home and two others Carlson sold with the same real estate agents, stressing it had found “probable cause” that Carlson and the real estate agents “engaged in a scheme to defraud.”
Reached by phone, Kimberly Adams denied knowing anything about the inspector general investigation: “I honestly don’t know what you are referring to … I sell property all the time.”
Mark Adams did not return phone calls.
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Carlson defended her sale of Hulse’s home. She told a state investigator that it was in “very poor condition,” according to the inspector general report, and that “it wasn’t safe to allow the general public” inside because there were “a lot of valuables in the house, a lot of guns and a lot of ammo as well.”
But Hulse’s family said he kept his guns in a safe, and Carlson billed Hulse for finding locksmiths to open his gun safe.
In The Post interview, Carlson said there are ways to improve the guardianship system but most importantly family should take care of their relatives. Then she quickly added, “In Doug’s case, no one knew about his family.”
Katie and Jonathan Thompson, Hulse’s niece and nephew, look at old family pictures. (Lianne Milton for The Washington Post)
Carlson did not answer questions about whether she saw the names and addresses of Hulse’s niece and nephew on cards and gifts mailed to his home. She also distanced herself from hospitals: “I have never met anyone at the hospital. Lawyers do.”
Carlson said she got Hulse’s case when “a lawyer” sent an email to her and other professional guardians, asking if anyone had “the bandwidth” to care of another patient leaving a hospital.
In February, Katie Thompson did not meet Carlson when she flew to Orlando with her 3-month-old, her second child, to visit her uncle. He seemed comforted by the photos she brought of his childhood home in Virginia, of her mother and him when they were young. “He was very sick then. I was grateful for the time with him.”
On March 16, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement said its preliminary inquiry found “no evidence” to warrant a criminal investigation “at this time,” according to an email received in the FOIA request.
Advocates for the elderly say police and prosecutors often do not treat financial exploitation of elderly people seriously enough and are reluctant to sink time into cases where the only witness has dementia, if still alive.
Two days after the state declined to pursue a criminal investigation, Hulse died.
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Carlson had prepaid for the same basic cremation package she purchases for many in her care. Hulse’s family had his ashes buried with his parents on Long Island.
Katie Thompson received a small box from Carlson with photos and a few other items that belonged to her uncle. She and her brother are now waiting to learn what is left in his estate.
The Florida Department of Elder Affairs, after being contacted by The Post, reprimanded Carlson for her failure to file timely reports. Her penalty: She must take eight more hours of classroom training.
“Not even a slap on the wrist,” said Hogue. “The result is the corruption continues, and it only gets worse, bigger and bigger.”
Said Katie Thompson, “This system trusts a person to be a guardian angel, but people are not.”
Alice Crites contributed to this repor
Ken Ditkowsky
On Saturday, November 4, 2023 at 09:22:02 PM CDT, David Redkey <dredkey@gmail.com> wrote:
Well, never trust a lawyer.
William A. Clarke represented me, and then he went on to represent all of the other conservators. Hopefully, I can get someone to cover that aspect of the story as well.
William A. Clarke representing me:
Then he starts his long journey of representing all of the other conservators (and exploiting me):
Can judges and lawyers manage the mentally ill and homeless?
Maybe the solution is wealth equality, tiny homes, improved nutrition free mental health care and drugs and alternative therapies (yoga, tai chi, etc.) that come with a 6 month to one year backlog.
Our attornment with the breakdown in the concept of EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW, or the misuse by government directly or indirectly of the Rule of Law is relevant only if we allow the propaganda to deter us from demanding the tradition of Equal protection under the law be unabated.What we are observing in today’s Justice System is a total breakdown. How can FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE be tolerated? How can law enforcement be silent – and more important how can our elected officials treat this scandal with such benign neglect! How can the Courts take affirmative action to facilitate this corruption? Why have me and thee not done something! The parallel at the highest levels of our government is a grim and stark reminder of the middle 1930’s and the cold war! This distinction is it is happening here and now.It is frustrating to be helpless as leaf in ocean as the hurricane of corruption rages! The Lanre Amu IARDC fiasco grinds more than a bit.Amu is a lawyer. He also has a bunch of degrees in other disciplines, but they are relevant only in that the degree of official public dislike for him (we call it jealousy) is enhanced. He is endowed with a very dark hue to his skin (as he his African) and with a naive sense that if you do right, you will be treated right and Justice will prevail. Unfortunately, Amu ran across a Chicago Judge who had clout, and a defendant appearing in her courtroom had some special attributes. It seemed that the Judge was on the defendant’s board of directors and her brother was an attorney for the said defendant. To Amu this proposition seemed unfair, and he has been reported to have complained about the situation. The complaint to the IARDC (Disciplinary Commission) was not well received and Amu was accused of lying to the Commission. A kangaroo court was convened. It heard the director of the IARDC label Amu’s complaint to be a vicious untruth, and he was suspended from the Practice of Law. Of course the legal profession accepted the result. Fortuitously, CRAINS CHICAGO BUSINESS independently investigated the Judge and was appalled to find the same facts reported by Amu. Naturally this being our Justice system here in Illinois the RULE OF “DO NOT CONFUSE ME WITH THE FACTS, I’M MADE UP MY MIND” was operative the Amu remains suspended from the Practice of Law. Key – you know that I’m in 1958 graduated from a small Baptist college on the South Side of Chicago – the University of Chicago – and was indoctrinated with the credo of when you can say something nice about someone – do so! Let me then tell you about JoAnne Denison’s foray with Dean Sallas. As you know Sallas is a year younger than yours truly, and suffers from many of the same technological deficiencies that I exhibit. Thus ZOOM is a mystery and attending Zoom proceedings is not automatic. JoAnne Denison is reported to have besides her JD an engineering degree! Thus, when Covit hit, and Courts continued to operate pursuant to Zoom, Ms. Denison did not turn Sallas away when he asked for help in connecting to Zoom, she assisted him. It appears that CHARLES P. GOLBERT and/or one of his attorneys was enraged at Ms. Denison now determined unethical behavior. How dare she in deed defend the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution! Everyone knows that in Illinois aiding a victim of a officially approved FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE crime is ethically challenged and even ‘form does not trump substance!’ AN ETHICS COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY THE COOK COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN against Ms. Attorney Denison. You probably do not realize how serious an offense it is in Illinois to aid and abet a victim of FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE to evade the consequences of being vulnerable and have resources coveted by the Court approved predators! Immediately, the IARDC subpoenaed the GOOGLE account of Mr. Sallas and dispatched a “TRIAL ATTORNEY” to “investigate Ms. Denison” and take her deposition. During the deposition, Ms. Denison expressed her utter dismay that the ARDC continues to cover up corruption, dismiss valid complaints against attorneys who lie cheat and steal from their clients, and told the ARDC under no circumstances would she ever attorn to their corruption. The ARDC refuses to provide a copy of the video tape of this deposition to Ms. Denison, despite the fact she specifically requested it.
To its credit, the IARDC did not charge Ms. Denison with any additional ethical violations. (Previously Mrs. Denison was charged with exerting her 1st Amendment Rights and not comporting with the unpublished (and denied) censorship edits of the undisclosed political figures protecting dishonesty and corruption in the Courts. She maintained a blog and refused to report on the blog the ‘party line!’ She received a suspension of her law license.The ARDC does not tolerate honest Attorney blogs that reveal court corruption and favors and they only promote special deals in the courtroom.
By a separate cover I received a generic petition to be signed people seeking to prevent travesties
such as occurred to Amu and Denison. It will not be favored, but if you wish to sign it, I’m certain I can get someone to sent it to you. (As to computer stuff I’m an ignoramus, so do not expect me to forward it – My skills are so well known that I understand that Auto Dealers have been warned NOT TO SELL ME a Tesla, or any of EV’s ****!)
NEWS UPDATE: TRIAL DELAYED. More motions have been filed and trial will be delay a few more weeks
David Pasulka’s trial was supposed to start next Monday, August 7, 2023, at 9:00 AM at 26th & California in courtroom 706. It is scheduled for Monday – Wednesday of next week but new motions have been filed, so the trial likely will not begin until late September of 2023. Bummer. Check here for updates and I will try to get you the zoom information.
The victim in this case is a mother who Pasulka sexually assaulted.
Like all good predators, Pasulka separated the victim from others in his office, to include the mother’s attorney, to have a private conversation with the mother regarding custody. When they were alone, Pasulka told the mother that there were certain texts that would cause a problem for her to gain custody. Then, while sexually assaulting the mother, Pasulka told the mother that she needed to be a good girl and do a little extra to get custody. As the mother made her escape, Pasulka told the mother that she could return after hours to ensure his help for the mother to gain custody.
A flipping true predator – using the kids to sexually assault a person and to ensure silence.
Smartly, the mother informed her attorney and filed a police report. The custody case proceeded without outside (police/ARDC) interference.
But wait, there’s more!
After custody was settled and Pasulka was no longer the GAL (but probably still had sway over any future custody litigation), Pasulka had the mother sign a general release barring the mother from suing Pasulka for any alleged inappropriate activity.
It was only after others came forward that the ARDC contacted this mother. Let’s not kid ourselves, if others who came forward were not attorneys sexually assaulted by Pasulka, the ARDC would have ignored this complaint with their usual, “GALs are saving children from evil parents. Any parent who says otherwise is a disgruntled parent who didn’t get their way.”
F*** you Pasulka! F*** you ARDC!! How many people’s complaints has the ARDC (and judges) ignored with the diatribe of “disgruntled parents”? How many parents were extorted or sexually assaulted because the ARDC (and judges) ignored complaints? We will never know because the ARDC does not have to answer to anyone, nor open their books to anyone. My personal belief is that several officers of the ARDC should be charged with accessory to these crimes because they helped cover up the crimes. Again, F*** you ARDC!!!
If you can, support this victim and show up to Pasulka’s trial. Let Pasulka (and the ARDC) know that we know what turds they are, and we will be there watching them and supporting the victims until family law is fixed.
Feel free to post this anywhere. We want the judge, Pasulka, (and the ARDC) know that Pasulka is not an isolated incident.
MG
From Joanne:
I will try to get the zoom link for this but I see 26th and Cal already has some zoom links.
Everyone should watch
Joanne
(post edited for strong language, despite the fact the ARDC deserves it)
This week, a Ms. Roisin (pronounced rush-een) Quigg was released on a psych hold but Samaritan Behavioral Center at 5555 Conner St in Detroit, Michigan refuses to release her although Judge Darlene A O’Brien issued at order that she be released on July 19, 2023 at approximately 9:00 am. Roisin’s state appointed attorney simply argued that her psych hold was a travesty of justice because Roisin was taken in 7 days earlier, was entitled to a 72 hour hearing, which did not occur until one week later!
If you are a victim or know any families victim of probate court, please print out this order at the below link:
RIP Catherine Kassenoff. The Family Court Mafia has claimed another victim. By Michael Volpe
“This is a story that ends with my own assisted death in Switzerland. Its lead up has been published for years on Facebook, in Ms. Magazine and in other media. The New York Court system is responsible for this outcome and should be held accountable for ruining the lives of my children, me, and so many other similarly-situated protective parents (mostly mothers) who have tried to stand up against abuse but were labeled “liars”, “mentally ill” and then treated like criminals. The reason the courts engaged in this horror, where they “temporarily” took away custody, my personal property, a home I owned and lived in, my dogs, my health, my career, and my dignity – for the last 4 years – was so that the nearly $ 4 million that Allan Kassenoff…
Here is a copy of Ms. Hadzi-Tanovic’s Federal Complaint against ex-husband Slabodan Pavlovich, Associate Judge Robert W. Johnson, and former powerful attorney David Pasulka, who acted as the Guardian ad Litem on the Case. Pasulka also formerly headed a secret list of lawyers chosen for the highly lucrative appointments as GAL’s & Child Reps in Cook County Chicago. Recently, the IL ARDC finally acted to disbar Pasulka, after many years of ignored complaints. True to the pattern of bad judges and lawyers protecting one another through the IL ARDC, Judicial Inquiry Board, and the head judge offices, they only acted after significant publicity. Sadly, bad judges and lawyers continue causing serious harm to children and families on a routine basis, only facing consequences once the negative publicity finally becomes too great to ignore. In this case, the IL ARDC finally acted against Pasulka only after attorney Lawrence Thompson’s open letter calling for the resignations of Cook County’s head judges Tim Evans and Grace Dickler, for allowing Paulka to remain in power, was aired on CBS Channel 2 News. https://songsunsilenced.wordpress.com/2021/03/23/attorney-claims-top-chicago-judges-enabled-embattled-lawyer-david-pasulka-to-have-unchecked-power-in-selecting-family-lawyers/
“Aneta Hadzi-Tanovic, leader of the local Illinois Women’s Coalition, has filed an $8 million federal lawsuit against Family Court judge Robert Wade Johnson, the GAL, and her ex for conspiring to deprive her under the color of law of her right to due process and equal protection, as well as for the intentional torts “abuse of process” and “intentional infliction of emotional distress”.
Aneta’s custody nightmare mirrors women’s cases all over the country and world in which Family Court judges disregard substantial negative evidence about the father, and fabricate negative evidence about the mother, in order to justify switching custody to the father.” Mom Sues Judge, GAL and Ex For $8M In U.S. Federal Court
LAWSUIT COUNTS 1. Conspiracy to deprive of due process [42 U.S.C. §1983] 2. Conspiracy to deprive of equal protection under the law [42 U.S.C. §1983] 3. Abuse of process [intentional tort] 4. Intentional infliction of emotional distress [intentional tort]
Gamze’s State of Illinois License Sanctions/Discplinary Court Orders(four so far)keep piling up, along with refusals to comply with Probation conditions, fines, and several lawsuits filed against him, including by parents on behalf of their children who he overprescribed/misprescribed to.
There’s also Gamze’s failed lawsuit against his own lawyers, Cassidy Schade and John Seibel, Cook County Chicago Case # 2017L007185, where he whined that they didn’t get him a lenient enough sentence (he complained about $3 Million dollars in lost wages dispensing more drugs) when in reality there had been ELEVEN other criminal complaints that could have been filed against him during that same case, per the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IL medical licensing board). Illinois Appellate Case:https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/16200eea-0351-408c-8a37-c2a3a011178b/Gamze%20v.%20Seibel,%202022%20IL%20App%20(1st)%20211368-U.pdf
Why isn’t Gamze concerned with making restitution to his victims or the great burden to we the Illinois taxpayers (already burdened with some of the highest taxes in the country) for these repeated investigations? But corruption like this is exactly why our taxes are so high and people are leaving Illinois in droves. Sounds like he got off pretty easy to me. What about the Hippocratic Oath, “Do No Harm”? Wow. Talk about Entitlement.
Prior article where several others wrote in to report on their own personal nightmares with Gamze:Dr. Jonathan Gamze Misconduct
UPDATE TO OUR CORRUPT COOK COUNTY FAMILY LAW CASE: Corrupt Child Representative NATALIE KOGA, JUDGE ALFRED LEVINSON & lawyer ELLIOTT HEIDELBERGER all abruptly, simultaneously gave up their lucrative lawyer & judge posts to avoid investigation. MEG JACKSON, who KOGA was caught conspiring with, changed her name to “MARY ELIZABETH” & moved her law practice to Lake County, Illinois. KOGA found a County Social Worker/Guardian job in Arizona. Inexplicably, KOGA still lists herself as an attorney in Chicago, though she is NO LONGER licensed. “Sex For Custody” lawyer DAVID PISULKA, who controlled the lucrative secret list of Guardian ad Litems & Child Reps, has finally been arrested and stripped of his law license, after years of the IL ARDC ignoring grievances filed.
Dr. Jonathan Gamze, Specializes in Psychiatry, Arlington Heights, IL – SEVERAL Sanctions, including: Misprescribing or Overprescribing Drugs (12/14/2020) Due to a lawsuit arising out of prescribing Lamictal in improperly increasing dosage increments to a pediatric patient.
Action Taken: Revocation, Surrender, Suspension of Controlled Substance License
Summary: Gamze, Jonathan C MD: License # 036078450: NATURE OF COMPLAINT: The physician failed to properly prescribe medications to a patient of his practice. ACTION TAKEN: The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation placed the physician’s license on indefinite PROBATION for a minimum of three years and the physician’s controlled substance license on indefinite SUSPENSION:
All states make the unauthorized practice of medicine a criminal offense with potentially serious penalties. Since states are responsible for providing medical licenses, each state has a slightly different legal definition for the practice of medicine. In general, a person practices medicine when he or she tries to diagnose or…June 23, 2016
She’s 90 and wants to live at home. A guardian put her house up for sale. What’s next?
DOUGLAS HANKS
Updated May 22, 2023 at 9:33 AM
Ela Avila outside the Little Havana house where she has lived for nearly 40 years.
Ela Avila, a 90-year-old retired uniform maker on food stamps, is in the second year of her fight against a court-appointed guardian who controls Avila’s money, housing decisions and medical care.
It’s a battle over small decisions — like when Avila says she can’t get enough cash to visit a hair stylist. And big ones — like when the guardian, Zaidis Alvarez, listed Avila’s Little Havana home for sale last year against her wishes.
“I don’t want her,” Avila said in Spanish during a recent interview with the Miami Herald in her home of 35 years. “I get sick every time she comes here.”
While Avila doesn’t want a guardian, she may end up paying for one. In March, Alvarez asked for court permission to use the divorced grandmother’s assets to pay a $21,000 legal bill from Alex Cuello, a lawyer charging $525 an hour to work for Alvarez in the guardianship case.
Probate lawyers and advocates for elders’ rights say Avila’s case is an example of the high-stakes consequences that can be lurking for an elderly person facing allegations of losing cognitive abilities even while they’re living at home,attending to everyday tasks and remaining well aware of their circumstances.
“One of the things I preach is guardianship avoidance,” said Collett Small, an elder-law attorney in the Pembroke Pines office of the Slater and Small law firm. “It can be a very scary process. Imagine someone knocks on your door and says, ‘I am here to evaluate you.’”
The case started in 2021 when Avila’s daughter, Rosa Hernandez, asked a court to name her guardian of her mother’s assets. A judge briefly approved that arrangement, then shifted to the appointment of an independent, professional guardian in 2022 after Avila’s son, Rogelio Hernandez, objected to his sister filling the role.
Alvarez is registered with the state Elder Affairs Department to serve as a court-appointed guardian for people deemed mentally incapacitated and unable to make decisions on their own. To become guardians, applicants must pass criminal history and credit checks and a state exam after completing a 40-hour course.
Alvarez and Cuello have not responded to requests for comment.
Under guardianship, Avila, a Cuban immigrant, has lost her right to vote, travel, accept medical treatment, make decisions on where she lives or sign contracts, according to an April 7, 2022 court order obtained by the Miami Herald.
The judge in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court case, Bertila Soto, appointed Alvarez on March 8, 2022, and instructed her to take charge of Avila’s money. Alvarez must submit budgets to Soto and get court approval for any big changes in Avila’s affairs.
Once fighting each other in court, both of Avila’s children now are united in asking Soto to restore their mother’s independence. Last month, they filed a joint motion asking Soto to end a guardianship they say is sapping the family’s cash.
“My mom used to have a lawyer. When the turmoil started getting bad, he wanted more money. We couldn’t pay him,” Rosa Hernandez said. “My brother and I are trying to do our best.”
A court fight for independence
While lacking a lawyer of her own, Avila is being asked to pay for the one behind the guardianship that has her an involuntary “ward” in the Miami-Dade case. On March 13, Alvarez filed a notice with the court saying she approved Cuello’s $21,054 legal bill for services he provided for the prior 12 months. The bill is to be paid “from the Ward’s assets,” according to the form, if a judge agrees to the fees.
The court records don’t show an order related to the fees, suggesting they remain unpaid. The Cuello bill shows a string of tasks the lawyer preformed for Alvarez, including attending hearings, reviewing court filings and communicating with lenders on a possible reverse mortgage.
Florida law requires three professionals, including at least one doctor, examine a person for mental capacity before a judge can declare them incapacitated and needing a guardian’s authority. Florida law dictates many guardianship documents remain off-limits to the public. Court clerks haven’t publicly released most filings in the Avila case, including the basis for her guardianship and medical reports. Avila and her family say they don’t have those reports.
Though Avila is described as an “incapacitated person” in court papers, at least two medical professionals weighed in positively on her mental state.
In December, a nurse practitioner filled out a court form saying Avila had the “full capacity to live independently.”
Last year, a nurse working in the elder-abuse unit for Miami-Dade prosecutors went to Avila’s house after she and her son called asking for help, according to a summary provided by theState Attorney’s Office. The nurse, Carmen Duran, “did a quick assessment on Ms. Avila requesting her to answer basic orientation questions. Ms. Avila responded to all questions correctly and clearly,” according to the summary of the May 17, 2022, meeting.
Alvarez and Cuello also attended the meeting. Duran said she asked about Avila’s mental examinations and “was informed that Ms. Avila had not been diagnosed with dementia or Alzheimer’s.”
In a prior conversation with Avila, Duran said it was clear Avila felt the court was ignoring her ability to live independently and that Avila wanted nothing to do with an assisted living facility or any other option forcing her to move.
“Ms. Avila also expressed frustration that she maintained a standard of self-care and grooming and yet was being denied her own money to maintain her hairdresser appointments and social schedule,” the summary said.
Rosa Hernandez said her mother initially agreed to have her become guardian as a way to stabilize a rocky financial situation amid trouble with tenants who were then living in the flat attached to Avila’s house and paying enough rent to cover the mortgage. The $1,500 rent payments stopped altogether in the summer of 2021, according to court records from an eviction proceeding, leading to a financial slide that now has Avila facing foreclosurebecause she’s behind on mortgage payments.
Avila signed documents saying she wants to put a reverse mortgage on the house, a financial arrangement that can let an older person remain in their home indefinitely but often leaves no equity for heirs as unpaid interest compounds and eats away at the value of the house. Rogelio Hernandez said he’s been pushing Alvarez to help secure a reverse mortgage, but the guardian won’t cooperate.
“Look at her. She’s fine. She’s well,” Rogelio said in an interview at the kitchen table. He lives in the house with his mother and a caretaker he sayshe pays $400 a week after Alvarez raised concerns about Avila being left alone while he works overnight shifts as a forklift operator at Miami International Airport. “I don’t want her to live in a home.”
Tidy bedroom, Cuban coffee in kitchen
Born in Cuba, Avila came to the United States in the 1960s, married, had two children and worked for a Miami uniform maker that clothed local police officers and firefighters.
In a tour of her home as Spanish-language morning news played in the background, Avila brought out a wind chime with a porcelain officer, gun and police dog she said was given to her as a retirement gift. When a charcoal portrait of a woman in pearls and a blouse caught a visitor’s attention, Avila explained a cousin drew that of her mother.
Then she walked into her bedroom, pointing out another portrait by the cousin: a framed rendering of Jesus hanging over the tidy bed that Avila said she makes each morning.
“And I wash the dishes,” she said.
She still has two sewing machines in her kitchen, where she offers to make Cuban coffee for visitors on a recent weekday. “Amargo o dulce?” she asked in Spanish as she set up the pot on the electric stove’s burner.
Guardianship laws are designed to give court protection and supervision to people who lose the mental capacity to make decisions for themselves.
Probate lawyers call it a legal last resort and often the result of a person waiting too long to make arrangements for how they want their affairs managed if they lose mental capacity during a medical crisis or due to old age.
see below, so don’t be surprised when you go to the clerk’s offices if you are an immigrant you might be given the run around for hours.
if that happens, you might want to use this letter because the clerks in cook county are not supposed to be doing this
Just so you know, the letter did work but it took about 10 days to get the documents by email, which they did not answer for days at a time. oh well
JUSTICE 4 EVERY1, NFP
5534 N. Milwaukee Ave JoAnne Denison, Executive Director Chicago, IL 60630 Cell Phone 773-255-7608 ph 312-553-1300 http://www.justice4every1.com fax 773-423-4455 JoAnne@Justice4Every1.com A social Justice Services NFP
Iris Martinez Cook County Clerk of Court 50 W. Washington St. Chicago, IL 60602 United States
Phone: (312) 603-5030
via Email: courtclerk@cookcountycourt.com, complaint about your services
Dear Ms. Martinez;
Last week two Turkish gentlemen came to your offices to get certified copies of any arrest records they may have, or a letter stating that none could be found.
While they do not speak English well, they were sent with a letter and the clerk turned them away.
Today I went to Skokie myself, and the same thing happened. The clerk refused to look up their records and provide a letter for them. But this time she told me to take them to the Chicago Police Department at 35th and Michigan to do the same thing–do a records search and a letter. However, this is 20 miles away or 40 miles round trip for them.
In the past, I have always been able to get certified disposition records for my clients or letters. I do not understand how this has suddenly changed or if there is any policy on whom to turn away.
I would appreciate it if this was in error you instruct your clerks accordingly and please email me letters for these two gentlemen because they do not speak English
I see no reason to drive an extra 40 miles to get these letters.
Thank you
/s/JoanneDenison/ Joanne Denison, Executive Director, Justice 4 Every1, NFP cc: Chicago FBI, marygsykes.com blog and justice4every1.com blog, Facebook, Twitter, etc. and Timothy Evans, Presiding Judge
Typically in probate, if the attorneys can get away with excessive billing they do.
The record on appeal is published in the last post so you can see for yourself.
F&M was appointed Guardian of the Estate. But were they billing the Estate as a normal Guardian would at $20 or $25 per hour. Heck no, that would be far too honest for them.
Instead look at the below image. They billed these Estate as “guardian” for 20 hours at $250 per hour in attorneys fees!
While most banks just bill their “trust” fee which is typically just a small percentage per year, this bank goes for attorneys fees at $250 per hour for a “Tom McIntire” and “Lori Hedden”.
If they wanted to bill attorneys fees, they had to file an appearance with the Estate as attorneys for the Guardian of the Estate and put in a fee petition. But neither attorney ever did that. Instead they ask for $250 per hour under the guise of Guardian of the Estate and not the attorney filing the appearance for the estate.
The Illinois states attorneys for Knox County should be investigating these two individuals for their excessive billing, but they are too busy pretending to the be attorneys for the guardian with an appearance on file and not acting as the guardian for $30 per hour or a small estate percentage.
Fred Stegall was a 90 year old former veteran, and and Tonny and Penny knew him as a dear family friend for years and years since they were young girls. Over the years they kept in touch.
Until one day when some persons in town drug him to a lawyer and insisted he leave all his property to the Catholic Church and Galesburg Rifle Club. While the reasons for this are unknown, often charities are used to hide the theft of smaller amount of money that can be taken more easily and surreptitiously.
In this case, Fred had acres of timberland on his farm that could easily and secretly be logged for hundreds of thousands of dollars and no one would know and the lumber would just be gone one day. But that’s not what Fred wanted with his land. He loved his wooded areas and felt they should be preserved for the environment.
In addition, the Galesburg Rifle Club had been squatting on his land for years and years and never paid Fred one dime of rent, although the Club made thousands of dollars for holding hunting events and setting up for hunters. At one time they put Fred on the Board of Directors so he was part of what was going on, but in the last few years, they removed him and he was very angry about that.
In January 2022 a probate proceeding was opened up because Tonny and Penny were worried about their friend Fred. They had been threatened that someone got Fred a protective order and so they could not longer go near him; but when they went to see him in January 2021, not only did they find out that was false, but Fred was living in a severe state of self neglect with no good food to eat, everything was filthy and rotted and he was dirty and had not bathed in weeks. Immediately Penny and Tonny bought Fred the good food, got him fed, washed and cleaned the home and did so up until his death in January of 2022.
Over that year, they spent $115,000 on caring for Fred and they filed for reimbursement with the Probate Court. During 2021 the probate court and Fred’s “guardian of the estate” F&M Bank did not get him a dime of his own $500k cash estate to life off of. The Williamsons spent their own funds on Fred to make sure he had his necessities–food, clothing, supplies and utilities.
Now, Tonny and Penny have been charged with “Elder Financial Abuse”–despite the fact for over a year they were the only ones doing the cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping and laundry and paying for everything–on their own accord!
Who does this? Who are these evil prosecutors? I am told it is Jeremy Karlin and Ashley Worby. Call them and tell them what you think.
And now here is the proof we have all been waiting for–you can see from the Record on Appeal in the 22 PR 12 Estate case that the charges are false and the Williamson Sisters have done nothing wrong. They cared for Fred when no one else did. And for their loving and kind care, they suffered a false $600,000 punitive damages judgement in 21 MR 21–a case cocked up and manipulated by Paul Mangieri and John Robertson and with alleged “oversight” by judge Curtis L Lane. All 3 of the cases involving Fred Stegall and the Williamson Sisters were a sham by Knox County–21 MR 21, the guardianship 21 PR 10 and the Decedent’s Estate 22 PR 12.
I will fax the states attorneys and invite them to leave any comments for this sordid situation and if they reply they will be promptly published in the comments section.
But as far as I am concerned, it’s time to remove Judge Curtis L Lane and get rid of prosecutors Jeremy Karlin and Ashley Worby. Instead of arresting Penny and Tonny Williamson, they should be investigating and arresting all of Paul Mangieri, John Robertson and Judge Curtis L Lane for their outrageous disgusting behavior toward teh Williamson Sisters.
We know that Mangeri, without any court authorization took $346,000 out of the estate and other attorneys were paid from the estate without a court order.
Both the Decedent’s Estate case 22 PR 12 (Decedent’s estate $346k missing without court order courtesy of Paul Mangieri) and the 21 MR 21 case (false judgment of $600k) are up on appeal.
Please pray for the Williamson sisters, that justice be done for them, finally!
The states attorneys need to investigate all of Judge Curtis L Lane, Jeremy Karlin and Ashley Worby, Paul Mangieri, John Robertson and Jacque Dare and John Hessler. Those are the real elder abusers in all of this.
This post will be about some issues when you appear pro se and how to avoid those issues.
If you are sick, you still have to appear on your court date. Court will still continue and this is always a great time to DWP (dismiss for want of prosecution) your case, or even worse, enter some horrible order against you. Under Supreme Court Rule 45 you can appear by phone and on zoom. Let the court know as soon as possible.
Always have a court reporter if you can possibly afford one and get your transcripts promptly. Sorry to say, I am still hearing complaints that transcripts come back materially altered in Illinois and these complaints are recent, not a part of the past. As what happened at my ARDC trial, the court reporter promised she would not change the transcripts but she did just that and the ARDC still has not reinstated me nor apologized for there perfidy.
If you file something in court, you have to have a Motion and Notice of Motion. Generally the court will set a briefing schedule. Replies are not required and not even encouraged unless you have something truly new to say about the cases, facts or the law. Otherwise, avoid them. Your Motion will explain exactly what you want and why you want it. It is best to cite the law and at least one case, but several cases would be better.
If you do not have transcripts, your chances of winning on appeal are slim to none. Always get a court reporter. Write the Chief Judge and tell him you want the right to record and use Google Translate Speech to Text because you are indigent and cannot afford a court reporter
Always appear in court if humanely possible and take notes, even if you have an attorney. If the attorney tells you you don’t have to appear or you should not appear, get a new attorney. Almost never should the attorney say that and they better have a very good reason (outstanding warrant or possible jail) but 99% of the time you should be coming to supervise your attorney to make sure they are doing their job.
Sometimes your judge might not be present due to illness, an emergency or training. It is okay for a substitute judge to appear and issue valid orders. Your regular judge may still be involved by phone or otherwise on that day and that is okay. Judges can work together, in general.
If you are not there and the judge issues an order you do not like or you think it is wrong, you have 30 days to vacate it for “good cause.” After that it is very difficult to vacate the order, even though the statute says up to 2 years. You would have to show diligence, new case law or evidence that could not possibly be obtained before that date, and when they say that standard, think of the word “impossible”. Probably 98% of motions to vacate filed after 30 days are denied. Judges do not like to do that. There are very few cases.
Try your best to get an attorney to help you. Check out all the law clinics at every law school and look around for lists of legal clinics and pro bono legal services for the indigent.
Even if you think your order is void or voidable, never delay in seeking to vacate it. The sooner you file a motion to vacate the better your chances of success in vacating it. Judges hate to vacate any order older than 30 days and they will come up with any excuse not to do that for you.
Those who had loved ones in a Lincolnshire nursing home when it was left unstaffed are angry and have unanswered questions.
LINCOLNSHIRE, Ill. (WLS) — Anger abounds and questions remain unanswered after people reported no medical staff were on duty Monday at a Lincolnshire nursing home.
A family member of a relative inside the former Warren Barr nursing home said it was like walking into a disaster zone on Monday when he said there were no medical staff on-site to care for patients.
As the state health department investigates any possible wrong-doing, families said they just want transparency from the new owners about what’s going to happen to their loved ones.
“It’s indescribable and inconceivable that there was nobody here,” said David Blair, whose mother moved from the nursing home. “I raced in here, and walked into what was an apocalyptic scene of people. I mean, it was eerie. There was nobody inside the building.”
“Where does that leave my dad? Should he stay, should he go?” said Sean Hobbs, whose father is still in the nursing home.
After the Wealshire Center of Excellence took control of the nursing home on Monday, family members of those inside said their loved ones went without medical care for hours.
Now, frustrated relatives like Hobbs, want to know if his 78-year-old father with dementia is going to get the around-the-clock care he needs.
“I hope these questions get answered sometime soon,” he said.
Illinois Health Department officials released a statement, which reads in part, “We are in ongoing discussions with the new owner, who is in control of the facility, to ensure they have a plan in place for the safe operation of the home.”
Wealshire President Arnie Goldberg did not respond to a request for comment.
In a letter to residents, Goldberg said he plans to turn the facility into a kidney and cardiac rehabilitation center, adding further confusion for families.
“We need transparency about what is going to happen next,” Hobbs said.
David Blair moved his 93-year-old mother from the nursing home to a different facility after the chaos, and is demanding clarity from the new owners.
“You have a responsibility, licensed by the state, to provide care, and you didn’t do it,” Blair said. “I feel a lot better that at least I know she is being cared for and nothing like that would ever happen in another facility. It’s unconscionable.”
The Lincolnshire Police Department said it’s working with the Lake County State’s Attorney to determine if charges will be filed.
Two weeks ago, a jury in Knox County, Illinois found testamentary documents leaving farmland to Penny and Tonny Williamson were invalid due to fraud and coercion.
But those documents are not and the case is up on appeal. The jurors were mistaken and Decedent Fred clearly loved Penny and Tonny Williamson, as evidenced by these videos:
And here is yet another Post Trial motion which explains as follows:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS KNOX COUNTY FREDERICK J. STEGALL, GALESBURG ) RIFLE CLUB, an Illinois not-for-profit ) Corporation, and THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE ) OF PEORIA, an Illinois Religious corporation, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 21-MR-21 ) TONNY J. WILLIAMSON and ) PENNY J. WILLIAMSON, ) ) Defendants. ) ) TONNY WILLIAMSON’S POST-TRIAL MOTION NOW COMES Defendant, TONNY J. WILLIAMSON (“Tonny”), by and through her attorney, JEFFREY A. RYVA of QUINN JOHNSTON, and, for her Post Trial Motion, states: I. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT JNOV FOR TONNY
A Court must enter a directed verdict when all the evidence, viewed in its light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict would ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern Railroad Company, 37 Ill.2d 494 (1967). In a civil case to which the clear and convincing standard applies, the judge must consider the applicable burden when deciding whether to send a case to the jury; the determination must be guided by the prism of the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Fraud Claim
Turning first to Plaintiffs’ fraudulent misrepresentation claim, it should not have survived. The allegation drawn directly from the Second Amended Complaint (p. 7 para. 43 D.) was simply that Defendants made a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact as “to the effect of the Irrevocable Trust, i.e., that Stegall could amend its beneficial provisions.” Plaintiffs’ original Proposed Jury Instruction 14 again described the fraud claim solely in terms of a misrepresentation to Stegall “that he could change the beneficiaries of the trust document.” Their Instruction 20 properly placed a clear and convincing burden of proof upon Plaintiffs for fraud. However, there was not a shred of evidence that Defendants made any statement about irrevocability of the trust or the ability to “amend its beneficial provisions” or “change the beneficiaries,” whether true or false. Attorney Holland exclusively communicated with Stegall about these issues. Plaintiffs’ fraud case failed at the first element, because there was no representation made at all.
Continuing through the elements, Defendants did not make a false statement; they did not make any statement. There could not have been a false statement of material fact, obviously, if there was no statement made true or false. See also discussion of mutual mistake claim below regarding the “falsity” and “materiality” issues in conjunction with the fact that Stegall could at any time while alive have directed property transfers for his enjoyment or utilized a decanting power under the then exiting Trust Code. Defendants could not have intended to make a statement to induce Stegall to rely upon it if they never made one at all. Stegall could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably believed or justifiably relied upon “the statements” if none were made in any event. None of these fraud elements were proved one iota and certainly not by clear and convincing evidence.
A fraudulent misrepresentation to be actionable must be one of fact. Plaintiffs alleged that the supposed fraud related to the effect of the Irrevocable Trust. This was a legal statement if anything. A misrepresentation of law is not a misrepresentation of fact and accordingly is not actionable. Hanning v. Murphy, 83 Ill.App.3d 1130 (1980). Penny’s Motion to Continue had summarized her view: The first proposition that Plaintiffs must prove is “that defendants made or caused to be made false statements of material fact to Stegall.” No witness has testified to any specific false statement of fact either defendant made to Mr. Stegall. Plaintiffs allege that the attorney who drafted Mr. Stegall’s Trust made a false statement of law regarding the ability to modify the irrevocable trust document. There is no evidence that Defendants had any direct or indirect involvement in the making of this statement. Mistake Claim
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ mutual mistake theory was woefully insufficient. The Second Amended Complaint alleged at p. 7 para. 43 E., that the mutual mistake of fact on the part of Stegall and Holland was regarding the effect of the designation of the trust as irrevocable “in that both believed that Stegall could modify the beneficial provisions of the trust at a later date.” Plaintiffs’ Instruction 14 was in substantially the same form and content. And their No. 22 required a clear and convincing burden of proof of mutual mistake.
As noted above for fraud, this was a legal issue, not a factual one. A mutual mistake must be of fact, not of law, and it is not a mistake of fact if the claimed fact is as to what the law is. Cameron v. Bogusz, 305 Ill.App.3d 267 (1999). In McCarthy v. McCarthy, 9 Ill. App. 2d 462 (1956), the Court rejected a mistake claim stating: “We do not think there was a mistake. Plaintiff had a mistaken opinion of the legal effect of the document. In Holbrook v. Tomlinson, 304 Ill. 579, the court said that the erroneous advice of an attorney is not sufficient ground for relief in equity as to an alleged mistake in a written instrument.”
Here, the only evidence Plaintiffs adduced is that neither Holland nor Stegall were mistaken. Stegall was never shown the internal memo Holland did for the file after Fred left. He cannot be mistaken about something he was never shown. The letter exhibit said clearly the trust could not be altered. If Stegall saw anything it was that, as Holland testified the Memo was not seen by Fred. Holland said Stegall left with a clear understanding of what he had done and signed. This included the issue Plaintiffs have raised about amending. Holland’s letter he recalled showing Fred at least said he should call Holland if he later had questions – and Holland never received a call back from Stegall. Even if somehow Stegall was confused or even mistaken, this does not mean that Holland was.
As additionally noted in Penny’s Motion to Continue, there was, as a matter of law, no mistake and certainly not one of fact per paragraph SECOND of the trust document: While the terms of an irrevocable trust cannot be changed, that does not mean that the transfer of property he was considering to the Galesburg Rifle Club could not be achieved through other means. i. FIRST, the co-trustees had discretion to distribute any trust property in accordance with an ascertainable standard for, inter alia, Mr. Stegall’s, “comfort, companionship [and] enjoyment.” At any time during his lifetime, Mr. Stegall could have instructed his co-trustees to transfer the 35-acre tract to the Galesburg Rifle Club under this standard. ii. SECOND, an irrevocable trust does not necessarily mean that it is unchangeable. Irrevocable trust terms can be altered when some or part of the trust’s assets are poured into a new trust with different terms through the process of decanting. The Illinois Legislature enacted a decanting provision when it repealed the former Trusts and Trustees Act (Article 12 of the Trust Code, titled “Trust Decanting,” defines and authorizes the exercise of decanting power or which means the power of an authorized fiduciary under this Article to distribute property of a first trust to one or more second trusts or to modify the terms of the first trust. 760 ILCS 3/1202(4). This Article applies to an express trust that is irrevocable. 760 ILCS 3/1 203(a).
The new Code became effective in January 2020. The evidence clearly showed that Attorney Blake, who purports to concentrate in this area, represented Stegall throughout the period from July 6, 2020, through the date of Fred’s passing in early 2022. He obviously knew per his admission when testifying that the Trust existed at least by early 2021. The whole basis of this very suit filed in February 2021 was that the July 2, 2020 trust document was no good or at least mistakenly signed. That entire time a decanting power would have been available to do what Plaintiffs claim could not have been done after July 2, 2020. That no one had Stegall try a decanting process before he passed is not Defendants’ fault; in actuality, such circumstance completely precludes any notion that the supposed mutual mistake of fact was even material. See Keller v. State Farm, 180 Ill. App. 3d 539 (materiality is an element of a mistake claim). See also Village of Oak Park v. Schwerdtner, 288 Ill. App. 3d 716 (a person’s mistake about the effect of an instrument is not sufficient to void it).
Two attorneys (Cassidy and Egan) testified further that, even with an irrevocable trust document, if the settlor, trustee and beneficiary all agree to do a transaction that might otherwise not be directly allowed in the document this can be effectuated. The evidence even produced by Plaintiffs showed Defendants said they were just managing Fred’s property and otherwise assisting him in 2021, when he had not been cared for in the least by others. There is no evidence then other than that Fred enjoyed being with Defendants and still trusted them. Yet there was no evidence offered to show Stegall ever even sought to have any property transfer occur by agreement. Again, this shut down any claim that any mistake here, or misstatement, was material. Mental Capacity Claim
Regarding the temporary incapacity allegations, the Court must again focus upon what was alleged. The Second Amended Complaint, in paragraph 24, stated that Stegall would have been meeting with Attorney Holland at 1:30 p.m. on July 2, 2020. Paragraph 35 then stated “Stegall was seen in the emergency room at OSF at 9:18 p.m. suffering from dehydration and hyponatremia – with symptoms documented as confusion and disorientation.” The condition was only listed as mild. No evidence was presented of an actual cause and effect. 6 And there was no proof that this alleged condition of ill-being existed at the time Stegall and Holland had met. The only actual evidence at that time was that Fred was fine then. There was no explanation offered by any competent medical testimony that such alleged confusion and disorientation eight hours after the Stegall/Holland meeting had anything to do with what happened essentially a whole work-day earlier. And it was not severe enough certainly to permit a reasonable inference Holland was wrong at the time and when he testified.
Moreover, the test of mental incapacity to make a Will or Trust is not whether someone is confused or disoriented later. As noted in Plaintiffs’ Instruction 19, the sole questions are whether the Testator had the ability to know the natural objects of his bounty and property interests and formulate a plan to dispose of them. The test is not whether Fred knew these but only if he was capable of knowing them. The law presumes soundness of mind, which Plaintiffs correctly agreed must be disproved by clear and convincing evidence. See Instruction
Fred’s capacity could not be inferred merely from old age, physical illness or defective memory. In re Estate of Gruske, 179 Ill. App. 3d 675, 678 (1989) Again, not one morsel of proof was offered that Stegall, when with Holland, lacked any of the capacity required by Illinois law. Interestingly, Plaintiffs relied upon a legal document from the very next day that Stegall purportedly signed. Once more, there was no medical testimony to explain how Stegall’s mental capacity could have returned so soon afterwards and yet his alleged lack of capacity can be retroactively established somehow to when he was with Holland. Undue Influence
One of Plaintiffs’ claims was based upon establishing a presumption of undue influence. As Plaintiffs’ Jury Instructions conceded, there must be proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was a relationship between Defendants and Stegall, whereby 7 they exercised dominance over him, and Defendants caused the preparation of the documents Stegall signed on July 2, 2020.
On the first element discussed, Plaintiffs did not establish a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law stemming from any power of attorney document signed by Stegall before July 2, 2020. As a matter of law, the health care POA given Penny in mid-June 2020 did not create a fiduciary relationship as to property matters. In re Estate of Stahling, 2013 IL App (4th)
The June 30, 2020 POA document specifically stated it never created any authority unless and until Stegall was determined to be disabled. This is quite like a successor agent or trustee who has no power until another event occurs. There was no evidence that this “trigger” ever occurred such that Defendants had a formal POA principal-agent relationship with Stegall.
The Supreme Court in In re Estate of Shelton, 2017 IL 121199 recited these governing principles. The Power of Attorney Act, which codifies an agent’s fiduciary duty, recognizes that it is the agent’s exercise of power pursuant to the authorizing document which triggers the agent’s duty to the principal. … By definition, a successor agent’s authority to act on behalf of the principal is contingent upon the initial agent’s resignation, death, incapacitation, or refusal to serve. … Until one of these events occurs, the successor agent has no authority to act. Under the Power of Attorney Act, if an individual cannot exercise the powers granted by the agency, he has no duty to act in good faith for the principal’s benefit. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(a) (West 2010). Thus, we can infer that the Power of Attorney Act does not impose any duties on a successor agent until that person is authorized to exercise the powers set forth in the power of attorney. A written power of attorney must be strictly construed so as to reflect the clear and obvious intent of the parties.” Fort Dearborn Life Insurance Co. v. Holcomb, 316 Ill. App. 3d 485, 499 (2000) 8
To create any fiduciary relationship, the claimed fiduciary must accept and exercise the powers delegated by the other person. The execution of a statutory short form power of attorney, alone and without evidence of acceptance by the named agent, is insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship between the principal and that agent. See Stahling v. Koehler, 2013 IL App (4th) 120271. A POA must be construed to only determine what powers exist in the present sense. Id.
In re Estate of Coffman, 2022 IL App (2d) 210053, governs. Drawing on Stahling, and citing Shelton, the Court recognized that for a fiduciary relationship to create the presumption it must be narrowly construed focusing on whether the supposed agent actually accepted and exercised an existing power, before execution of the contested document, regarding that specific transaction. An action taken after the will was signed and as to a different event did not qualify.
The Court relied upon three provisions of Coffman’s POA document that are exactly the same as Stegall’s June 30, 2020 document. The first stated: “THIS FORM DOES NOT IMPOSE A DUTY ON YOUR AGENT TO EXERCISE GRANTED POWERS; BUT WHEN POWERS ARE EXERCISED, YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO USE DUE CARE TO ACT FOR YOUR BENEFIT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS FORM ….” Pls. Ex. 2 p. 2 Intro paragraph. The second was: “The agent will be under no duty to exercise granted powers or to assume control of or responsibility for the principal’s property or affairs; but when granted powers are exercised, the agent will be required to use due care to act for the benefit of the principal in accordance with the terms of the statutory property power ….” Id. p.7 two-thirds of the way through Sec. 3-4. The third gave the alleged “agent” no power to make or change a will. Id. p.10 from section (n). Because of these restrictions, no fiduciary relationship was 9 determined to exist, as a matter of law.
The “relationship” issue should have been disposed of by directed verdict. Other than fiduciary relationships created as a matter of law, such a relationship only arises where one party asserts dominance over the other with resulting dependence on the other as the dominant personality. The dominant party must accept the confidence and maintain a resulting superiority over the subservient party. In re Estate of Kieras, 167 Ill.App.3d 275 (1988).
Here, there simply was no evidence whatsoever of Defendants accepting and exercising such a dominance, superiority, and influence over Stegall. The jury instructions required proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant exercised dominance over the other individual at the time the document was signed. Such exercise of dominance can only be established by proof that is “clear, convincing, and so strong, unequivocal and unmistakable as to lead to but one conclusion.” Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88, 100 (1968). There was no evidence of this. Mere speculation was not enough.
There was another flaw in Plaintiffs’ case. There was no evidence of the kind and quality that the Illinois reviewing courts insist upon under the causation element for raising the presumption. For instance, in Anthony v. Anthony, 20 Ill.2d 584 (1960), the case was taken from the jury by directed verdict. The beneficiary had driven the testator to a location where his lawyer was and “took him in” to the lawyer’s actual office. The beneficiary was not in the presence of the testator when he signed the Will. That individual was in the outer office when the document was signed. There was no proof that the beneficiary had attempted to persuade the testator to talk to an attorney regarding what his estate plan should be.
In In re Estate of Walls, 203 Ill.App.3d 574 (1990), the Appellate Court noted that more than the mere existence of a relationship between beneficiary and testator must be 10 shown to raise the presumption; the beneficiary must have participated in procuring the execution of the Will. The trial court granted judgment N.O.V. on the lack of evidence of such causation. The beneficiary had accompanied the testator to the lawyer’s office. But there was no evidence the beneficiary discussed with the testator what the terms of his Will should be, and no evidence either that he had secured witnesses for the decedent. The opinion states that “the evidence presented, without more, showed the decedent initiated the idea of changing his Will for reasons that may never be known.” Id. at 581. The Appellate Court also made clear that the plaintiff’s argument about conflicting statements between trial and deposition testimony was of no moment. While the Plaintiffs had argued this was substantive evidence of undue influence, the Court noted there was no case which supported that proposition and: “further, while the fact [the beneficiary] gave conflicting testimony reflects on his credibility, it does not constitute evidence of procurement of the Will, which plaintiffs wholly failed to prove.” Id.
In re Estate of Letsche, 73 Ill.App.3d 643 (1979), involved the defendant testifying she had nothing to do with the actual preparation of the Will. She was not present when it was signed. She merely read the lawyer over the phone what the testator stated he wanted. This was not sufficient participation whatsoever, and a directed verdict for the respondent was affirmed.
Even if the presumption case had been made, the evidence presented to the Court was sufficient to rebut it and eliminate the presumption claim from the case. This was a question of law for the Court based upon all the evidence heard. The cases suggest that only if the defendant-lawyer is the one who does the will and receives a significant benefit does the defendant have a clear and convincing burden. If “some evidence” comes in for other types of relationships, the presumption drops from the case. 11
Franciscan Sisters v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452 (1983), held even if clear and convincing evidence were required for a lawyer to rebut the presumption, he had done so on facts indistinguishable from ours: “We now find that measured by a “clear and convincing” standard, the evidence brought forward by Mr. Dean was sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence. The appellate court was correct in recognizing the critical question to be Mrs. Messmer’s state of mind on February 7, 1978, the day that she signed the will. The time the will was executed is the period we must scrutinize; what Mrs. Messmer felt on a prior occasion or at a later date is irrelevant. It was established that although the testator was old, she was alert and intelligent. She managed her own personal and business affairs prior to and during the period in which the contested will was executed. [Both witnesses] concluded that the will represented Mrs. Messmer’s wishes [and] … were convinced that she was aware that Mr. Dean was made a substantial beneficiary under the will and that is what she wanted to do. We conclude that the evidence Mr. Dean presented is sufficient to overcome the presumption of undue influence. In accord with Thayer’s theory in effectively rebutting the presumption, the “bubble” has burst and the presumption of undue influence has vanished.” This Court was bound to follow this precedent and should have stricken the presumption claim from the case.
The undue influence verdict cannot be sustained. Allowing the jury to rule on the presumption case made moot whether regular undue influence was found. The presumption case should not have been allowed to the jury and certainly not on instructions with an easier burden of proof to raise the presumption Defendants actually rebutted. Punitive Damages Claim
The claim for punitive damages should have been dismissed outright. The fraud claim upon which it is predicated failed, and so too must that component. It is a question of 12 law whether the facts of the particular case bring it within the rule in which punitive damages may be assessed. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 198 (1921); the rule stated therein is: “Punitive, vindictive or exemplary damages are allowed in this State where a wrongful act is characterized by circumstances of aggravation, … but to warrant an allowance of such damages the act complained of must not only be unlawful but must partake of a wanton and malicious nature. … The courts recognizing the doctrine within its proper scope ought to exercise a high degree of watchfulness to prevent it from being perverted and extended beyond the real principles upon which it is based by allowing plaintiffs, through the instrumentalities of instructions to the jury, to characterize the acts of the defendant with degrees of enormity and turpitude which the law does not affix to them.” Id. at 197. Plaintiffs’ claim just did not meet the strict test. II. THE JURY’S VERDICTS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL; CUMULATIVE ERROR AND PASSION AND PREJUDICE TESTS HIGHLIGHTED
For the same reasons set forth above, a new trial is at least required on all counts and claims. In the alternative, the balance of this Motion addresses many other claimed errors before and at trial. Each is sufficient alone to require a new trial. However, Tonny strongly urges that it is the cumulative or collective effect of all or at least many of them which denied Defendants a fair trial. See People v. Redmon, 2022 IL App (3d) 190167 (Illinois recognizes concept that individual claims of error must also be considered in their totality to determine if their cumulative effect denied a party a fair trial). Also, Illinois courts will reverse a verdict, whether punitive or otherwise, like for compensatory relief, if based upon passion or prejudice of the jury. Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98 (1997). The arguments made in Section IV below therefore do not apply only to the ridiculous punitive damage awards, but, on their face, 13 in amount and timing considerations, show Defendants are entitled to a completely new trial. If there ever has been a case where passion and prejudice were written all over, it is one where a jury basically seeks to destroy parties by awarding sums many times their net worths. III. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CONTINUANCE AND STAY MOTIONS
A number of motions to extend discovery and continuance requests were made by both Defendants and erroneously denied. For reasons stated therein, those motions should have been granted. Prejudicial error occurred because of those rulings.
There was a substantial change in circumstances since the Court Order of September 9, 2022, confirming rulings made September 7, 2022, setting this case for a February 27, 2023 trial date. At the time, there was no Will Contest even on file. This meant the Court had not fully resolved whether the cases dealing with the July 2, 2020 and July 6, 2020 documents should be tried together, after a reasonable period of discovery in the Will Contest.
There also remained an unresolved Motion to Remove F&M Bank as executor, and counsel, with the bank specifically taking the position that an evidentiary hearing was required for resolution of that motion.
As shown below, there was an absence of material evidence under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 231(a). Essentially, discovery was cut off right after the parties were at issue when Answers were filed, in the summer of 2022, to the operative Second Amended Complaint.
For these reasons as explained in detail below, Tonny requested the Court reconsolidate the cases for trial such that the Court in a single jury trial could resolve the issue of validity of both sets of documents in the interest of judicial economy and costs to various litigants, set a proof of will hearing before the jury trial and also provide a reasonable period of 14 discovery, as this Court said it would be providing, for the Will Contest portion of the combined matter. In the alternative, for other reasons detailed, the Court should have continued the case of 21 MR 21 for some subsequent calendar to permit the matter of the motion of F&M Bank to be heard, after a reasonable period of discovery on the motion to remove itself, or at a minimum, to be heard at a reasonable time and date.
After extensive briefing and argument, the Court made various rulings on September 7, 2022 that became incorporated into its September 9, 2022 Order. On April 18, 2022, Attorney Nepple had filed on behalf of Defendants a document requesting that the July 2, 2020 Will be admitted to probate. However, the petition also made vague reference to a will contest. There was no jury demand associated with the April 18, 2022 filing, but a general jury demand was made on June 24, 2022 for Defendants. This was well before Defendants answered the operative Second Amended Complaint later that Summer.
When the Court considered whether to sever 21 MR 21 from 22 PR 12, the net effect of the Nepple filing came to the forefront. Plaintiffs maintained that the April 18, 2022 filing was for the will contest and that the June 24, 2022 subsequent jury demand was ineffective. Defendants countered that the April 18, 2022 Nepple filing was not a will contest at all, such that they still had six months from the date the July 6, 2020 will was admitted to probate on March 8, 2022 to file a will contest. At the same time, the Court considered whether Defendants were entitled to a jury trial in 21 MR 21 and answered affirmatively.
The Court’s September 9, 2022 Order, in paragraph 9, essentially agreed that the April 18, 2022 petition was insufficient to have the Court declare a will contest. Defendants then filed their petitions to contest the purported July 6, 2020 will within six months of March 8,
The Court also correctly noted that as of the time it was making its September 7, 2022 15 ruling, there was no petition on file to which a jury trial right existed in 2022 PR 12.
The Court must keep in mind that when it entered its September 9, 2022 Order, it was basically confirming the status of matters as of September 7, 2022. What happened right after that was of major consequence. At the time of the Court ruling, later confirmed by written Order, there was no will contest on file whatsoever. In probate matters, there are extremely limited circumstances where a jury trial attaches. But a will contest is clearly one of them. So, the Court was absolutely correct that as of September 7, 2022, there was no will contest and therefore nothing of record in either 22 PR 12 or 21 MR 21, other than 21 MR 21 itself, to which a jury trial right attached. Nevertheless, as soon as Defendants filed their Will Contest Petitions, the very next day in fact, the claims were on file to which a jury trial right attached, namely a statutory right to contest a will.
Tonny maintains that the sole reason for the severance became a moot point once the will contest was on file with a corresponding jury trial right. The Court, noting only one case, 21 MR 21, had a proper jury demand on file at the time, set the case for the February, 2023 jury call. At that point, there being nothing else to which a jury right attached, the Court again correctly noted that 22 PR 12 matters would be heard by the Court in bench trial format for future evidentiary hearings. But as stated things quickly changed. On Tonny’s motion, the cases should have been reconsolidated. This was especially because the Court ultimately denied the Motion to Dismiss the will contest.
Here, it was absolutely clear that Plaintiffs intended to include as part of their 21 MR 21 case, against the July 2, 2020 documents, that Mr. Stegall executed a July 6, 2020 will. The Court admitted the document in evidence at trial without any limiting order. Plaintiffs tendered Jury Instruction #14, given erroneously on this issue by the Court’s Instruction No. 1, 16 which clearly began by noting if not outright establishing that the Rifle Club and Catholic Diocese were beneficiaries of Mr. Stegall’s Last Will. Defendants’ correct version was proper.
To say that the evidence from both cases would be bound up together and all matters should be tried at once, namely the 21 MR 21 claims about the July 2, 2020 documents and the affirmative defense and will contest that also address the July 6, 2020 documents, was an understatement. Furthermore, to the extent that the Court thought discovery should have occurred throughout 2021 before Mr. Stegall even died in early 2022, no formal will contest discovery could even have been undertaken until a probate matter was opened. Defendants had until September 8, 2022 just to file the will contest. Merely because Plaintiffs rushed this matter forward does not mean the Court should have.
Defendants were entitled in the probate case to a formal proof of will hearing. If Plaintiffs were going to be relying, as they seemingly appeared to be, upon the purported July 6, 2020 will, then Defendants should at least have had the right to a formal proof of will hearing to determine whether the purported July 6, 2020 document was even valid in that preliminary sense. The Court erred in denying such a hearing to Defendants. It was bound by the cited Illinois Supreme Court case. The distinction drawn by the Court between a second will and a codicil was erroneous as a matter of law.
Once the Motion to Dismiss the will contest was denied, Defendants should have been deemed entitled to a statutory right to jury trial on both sets of documents together. There was no reason to have a trial that deals with both July 2, 2020 and July 6, 2020 timeframes, circumstances, and disputes as a precursor to a second trial on the July 6, 2020 documents. Plaintiffs seemed to want this Court to pre-judge the 21 MR 21 case as if they automatically win and preclude Defendants from having standing to contest the July 6, 2020 document. That 17 approach was contrary to every aspect of fair and orderly jurisprudence. For all of these reasons, the case should have been continued for a combined jury trial after Defendants were given the reasonable period of discovery this Court had, on two prior occasions, indicated would be provided, before all the combined issues would be tried to a jury.
On October 31, 2022, Penny Williamson filed a motion to remove the bank as executor. As noted in its December 29, 2022 Answer, the bank moved for an evidentiary hearing of this motion. The bank noted twelve separate grounds were alleged for its removal and denied each. Obviously, a substantial evidentiary hearing would be needed to resolve those claims. Tonny joined in the request that there be an evidentiary hearing on all of these removal issues.
Tonny urged that this Court could not conduct a jury trial when no one even knew who would be the proper parties to be trying the case. The bank erroneously suggested that the jury trial could go forward because if Defendants lose 21 MR 21 on the merits, they would no longer have any standing to object to F&M Bank being executor.
There are two reasons why this argument lacked merit. First of all, Tonny and Penny both have motions pending requesting approval of their claims. These claims had nothing to do with whether the documents executed on July 2, 2020 or July 6, 2020 are valid. Defendants maintained a right to seek removal of F&M Bank in any event.
More importantly, F&M Bank placed the cart before the horse. If the bank should have been removed as executor, a new executor would had to have been named to determine the course of its interest in 21 MR 21, as well for that matter in the 22 PR 12 will contest. This Court could not merely assume that a replacement executor would take the same position on the issues as the bank and its present chosen counsel had. 18
The issue was not merely limited to an executor handling the administration of an estate in the abstract. Here, there were two actions essentially dealing with two separate sets of documents, and the F&M Bank also being involved as a plaintiff in 21 MR 21 and having the duty to defend the purported July 6, 2020 will in 22 PR 12. This issue relates directly to who is the proper party to be bringing or defending claims herein.
Since this case was forced to jury trial before resolution of the motion to remove executor, the Court and parties are at grave risk that if a reviewing Court holds that F&M Bank should have been removed as executor, that all steps and results in 21 MR 21 after the date the bank should have been removed are invalid.
If a Motion to Substitute Judge is denied, and a reviewing Court overturns that ruling later, all actions taken after the erroneous denial are void. Tonny believes the same rule would be applicable here.
F&M Bank was not the proper party to be representing the estate in the scheduled jury trial. This defect in who is a proper party plaintiff was raised under 735 ILCS 5/2-404. While the remedy would, of course, not be a dismissal (see 735 ILCS 5/2-407), F&M Bank would be removed and a new executor would, at a minimum, need to be substituted herein. The bottom line is that the Court has never felt open to the possibility of an egregious result that would occur if the Court proceeded to jury trial and either on its own, or through Appellate Court mandate, determined that F&M Bank should not have been representing the estate in 21 MR 21. The entire proceedings would have to be re-tried at vast and unwarranted expense to the litigants and contrary to judicial economy.
In addition to the request to remove F&M Bank as executor, Penny’s motion also sought to disqualify Attorney Mangieri as counsel. This situation compounded the matter even 19 further. The Court should, again, have determined not only who the proper parties are for the 21 MR 21 jury trial, but who even should be counsel representing one of the parties.
Supreme Court Rule 231(a) provides that a party may apply for a continuance because of the absence of material evidence. The issue is whether diligence has been used to obtain the evidence or want of time to obtain it and that if further time is given, the evidence can be produced. After the initial Complaint was filed, Defendants moved to dismiss. Plaintiffs sought leave to amend and amended their Complaint ultimately filing a Second Amended Complaint. It became the operative document in this case. Once that Second Amended Complaint was filed, as allowed by rules, Defendants availed themselves of an attempt to have it dismissed. Only after the Court ruled, did Tonny timely file her Answer to Second Amended Complaint on July 15, 2022. Penny also filed hers. Plaintiffs did not reply to Defendants’ affirmative defenses until August 11, 2022. Thus, even though this case was filed in early 2021, the parties were never fully at issue on the operative pleadings until mid-August, 2022.
As a practical matter, discovery does not usually begin in earnest until the initial pleadings (complaint, answer and reply to affirmative defenses) are finalized and all motions regarding pleadings are resolved. For example, if a pending motion to dismiss is granted, why would counsel and the parties want to incur the expense of beginning discovery in a case that might be dismissed? This should have definitely sounded quite familiar. Plaintiffs vociferously objected to conducting any discovery in connection with the will contest on file while their motion to dismiss it remained pending – through two cancelled hearings moreover. This Court agreed and ordered no discovery while the motion to dismiss was pending. Fair treatment of both sides compels the conclusion that the same rule should have applied to each case. Defendants should not be blamed for not conducting discovery earlier in 21 MR 21, while 20 motion practice was ensuing on their various pleadings filed in early 2021 and amended February 9, 2022; March 17, 2022; and April 11, 2022.
The Court on May 23, 2022 stated that all discovery depositions should be completed by July 11, 2022 and discovery would close on that date. The June 24, 2022 hearing date Order only extended discovery until August 1, 2022, with no further extensions being granted. The Court then did permit three depositions to be taken out of the dozens of witnesses disclosed by the parties in their Witness Disclosure lists circulated roughly during the same timeframe. Those were wrapped by the end of August, as directed by the Court, less than three weeks from when Defendants’ affirmative defenses were replied to by Plaintiffs.
As noted in the preceding section, the Court on September 9, 2022 set the 21 MR 21 case for jury trial. Once Defendants filed their will contest petitions, however, they sought to do discovery of many of the same principally-involved witnesses for both sets of documents. The executor then moved to dismiss the will contest petitions, and ultimately no discovery was allowed to be undertaken. Had the parties been allowed to do discovery in the will contest case over the preceding months, they would have been able to obtain the material evidence they sought and still have not received through the depositions. Had discovery been permitted in the will contest, Defendants could have learned of material information and possible grounds for impeachment of witnesses in the 21 MR 21 case.
Again, it cannot be overlooked that we have been talking about a four-day (one business day) period between the two sets of documents. As is obvious beyond question, each side believed that their set of documents was appropriately generated and executed and that the other side’s was neither. Defendants could have had their discovery that relates at least to the will contest had such discovery been permitted. It was completely unfair to allow Plaintiffs to 21 offer a purported July 6, 2020 will in a trial on the July 2, 2020 documents and have neither a proof of will hearing in probate case 22 PR 12 nor any discovery in the will contest.
Notably, Plaintiffs did not propose in trying 21 MR 21 that they would have any burden of proof whatsoever regarding the purported July 6, 2020 document even though they are the plaintiffs in that case. Their proposed instruction turned into Court’s Instruction No. 1 jumped right over that issue and informed the jury that Plaintiffs are beneficiaries of the July 6, 2020 “last” will. Their instructions did not even leave open the question of Defendants being able to challenge that purported July 6, 2020 document at all. To repeat, Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to hamstring Defendants this way merely because they jumped the gun and filed 21 MR 21 a year or so before Stegall died.
The bottom line concerning this whole situation is that Defendants have been denied their right to discovery to produce material evidence. The issues are all intertwined, as noted above. The Court set deadlines to close discovery within a very short timeframe of Defendants even filing their Answers to the operative Second Amended Complaint, which added one or more theories to the previous pleadings. Then, to compound matters, Defendants unsuccessfully tried to depose over a dozen individuals in the 22 PR 12 case, which could have permitted the development of material evidence for the 21 MR 21 case.
It was also important to note the obvious, that Defendants were defending 21 MR 21 but prosecuting the will contest. They would have every right to call experts (to obtain and review all pertinent medical records) in the will contest where they would bear the burden of proof, even if they can be deemed to not have any for 21 MR 21. But if Plaintiffs are really trying to combine the cases in a way beneficial only to them, with a jury hearing about a July 6, 2020 document in a case involving July 2, 2020 documents, without full discovery and expert 22 disclosure, this was fundamentally unfair.
Co-Defendant, Tonny Williamson filed motions to continue and ultimately a motion to stay the beginning of the jury trial. Tonny adopted and incorporated by reference all of the motions and arguments made in those written filings. As noted in arguments on the first trial day, the denial of a continuance to Penny’s motions worked a substantial prejudice upon Tonny herself as well as her counsel.
Counsel for Penny filed a Motion for Stay, Tonny joined in the motion from her own perspectives and those of her own counsel. For reasons stated in the motions and affidavits, there were reasons why Tonny and Penny themselves might not be able to prepare for and conduct themselves through testimony and aiding their attorneys for same reasons. Attorney Ryva upon being engaged in this case had a specific agreement with Tonny that Penny would be represented and there would be two attorneys on each side of any future trial in the case. The attorney who was representing Penny at the time withdrew. If Penny’s present counsel felt, correctly, that there are reasons (1) that Penny will not be able to assist herself through the trial and (2) may not be able to properly and fully assist counsel thereby creating ethical obligations for Penny’s attorney, these matters had significantly negative impact upon Tonny as well. Since Penny’s counsel could not represent Penny efficiently and zealously, this had a major and complete negative effect on Mr. Ryva’s ability to zealously and properly represent Tonny. As shown, there were numerous witnesses listed, and with both sides having two lawyers, the division of work could be easily handled. With one attorney, not so much. Tonny was therefore prejudiced because she was unable to effectively work with her co-defendant to defend this case, for reasons stated. 23 IV. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS SHOULD BE VACATED OR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED
Turning next to punitive damages, Illinois law approaches those issues, posttrial, from the standpoint of Illinois common law and constitutional precepts. The Court should never have instructed the jury at all or submitted the case to the jury. Since the fraud verdict must be overturned for other reasons stated, a punitive award must fail as well. Defendants reiterate their argument that they were substantially prejudiced in the punitive damage aspect of the trial by not being able to show some modicum of good faith and reject the proposition that they were glomming onto Rifle Club property to kick them out, as a defense to the punitive damage case. See below.
Illinois common law authority tests jury verdicts of punitive damages by seeing if they resulted from passion and prejudice. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192 (1989). Here, the Court should consider the absolutely ridiculous speed by which the jurors decided liability and then the punitive damage amounts later. There were numerous exhibits introduced into evidence and a number of witnesses testified. There is no way other than through passion and prejudice that this jury could have considered all the evidence and arguments in the limited time they had the case once they were reinstructed and sent back a second time on Friday, March 10, 2023.
As an aside, and as additional argument, the Court allowed the jurors to not only deliberate in, but remain quartered during the trial, in a room that was obviously not soundproof. This was a Court error that cannot simply be passed off as “go talk to the building people.” This is not an abstract proposition. Such is required by Illinois Supreme Court Minimum Courtroom Standards 11.1. It was obvious, especially during the deliberations, that the jurors could be heard laughing and carrying about. The idea of 24 soundproofing is not a one-way street. It is equally reasonable that the jurors could have heard what was going on in the courtroom during breaks in the testimony.
On a number of occasions, the Court loudly chastised Tonny and her counsel. While the Court attempted to eradicate the prejudice associated with those claims both in front of the jury and through the non-soundproofed jury room, this did not cure the problem. Defendants raised this as soon as they heard how loud the jury was on Friday afternoon during deliberations and cannot be blamed for not raising the point earlier. However, there certainly was no indication that somehow the jury room had been soundproofed and all of a sudden lost its soundproofing on Friday, March 10, 2023. These issues are extremely important and can only be rectified by an entirely new, impartial trial.
The punitive award amounts in and of themselves establish passion and prejudice warranting action post-trial by this Court. The binding precedent from the Fourth District is Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 114 Ill.App.3d 703, 713 (1983): Although an award so small that it would be only an ordinary item of expense does not serve the purposes of retribution and deterrence, an award which bankrupts the Defendant is excessive. Punitive damages should be large enough to provide retribution and deterrence, but should not be so large that the award destroys the Defendant. Thus, before a Court can gauge the award, it must first gauge the financial position of the wrongdoer…Simply stated, the amount of the award should send a message loud enough to be heard, but not so loud as to deafen the listener. A deafening award is excessive.
This precedent overwhelmingly shows that the punitive award must be vacated or substantially reduced. While the Hazelwood court affirmed a $170,000.00 award in a railroad accident, that amount represented only .0237% of the railroad’s net worth, which was $716,180,000.00. Here, despite Plaintiffs’ attempts to claim a desire to be made whole, the amount awarded between the two Defendants is $600,000.00. 25 In and of itself, this is about twice what the attorneys’ fees claim even was. The rest clearly is a wind fall.
However, whether the fees paid were considered, the plain fact is that punitive damages cannot either bankrupt or destroy the Defendant. The punitive awards against Defendants far exceed the evidence offered to the jury regarding prospective net worths. The verdict against Tonny was at least four times what her net worth is. And, from Penny’s perspective, the point Tonny can make herself regarding the passion and prejudice for both awards, the $200,000.00 punitive award is likely 100 times what Penny’s net worth is.
Similarly, due process concerns under the United States and Illinois Constitutions show that these awards must be completely vacated or substantially reduced. The jury simply could not have followed the instructions regarding consideration of Defendants’ net worth. Therefore, under due process considerations, Defendants were denied due process of law by the outrageous, unsupported verdict amounts when one considers their actual net worths. In Hazelwood, with the railroad worth $716,000,000.00, a punitive award of anything over its net worth would obviously have been overturned. Here, the verdicts are worse as being many multiples of Defendants’ individual net worths. V. JUROR ISSUES WERE NOT PROPERLY HANDLED
Tonny respectfully maintains that the Court erred during jury selection voir dire and failure to reject certain jurors for cause. Tonny and Penny were forced to utilize all of their peremptory challenges, but there were still jurors that had connections to the Galesburg Rifle Club or were disclosed as avid hunters who should have been excluded from the jury: Brian Balser (friends with hunters and gun owners and connected to F&M Bank); Todd Howerter (Blake family friend/cousins and with him at gatherings and knew Mangieri and Deputy Dare); 26 Kathy Woodward (connection with Tompkins State Bank and Linda Glisan and would give benefit of the doubt to such personnel); John Hallan (knows Chaney, Trisha and went to school and otherwise knew Mangieri; wife was former Recorder of Deeds and knew local lawyers); Shirley Watters (connection to Rifle Club; retired from OSF and loved St. Mary and good friends with Dawn Brown); Richard Booth (would give more weight to testimony of police office; retired from OSF); Melissa Wheeler (worked for Sheriff office; connection with J. Dare and Mangieri). VI. SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY WAS INTENTIONALLY OFFERED AND HEARD AND COULD NOT BE CURED
During the course of trial, when Haynes was on the witness stand, Plaintiffs’ counsel, knowing full well they were seeking to obtain a startling and prejudicial hearsay statement from that witness, went ahead and asked the question in front of the jury causing an objection to it. The response was that Haynes had heard from Defendants’ sister to the effect that he should stay away from Stegall because Defendants had dibs on him and he was theirs. Haynes couched the testimony in terms of Defendants’ ill intentions. The Court purported to attempt to negate the substantial prejudice from the remark by instructing the jury to disregard it. However, there are many Illinois cases on which Tonny’s relies for the proposition that curative instructions often simply cannot cure an undue pervasively prejudicial comment. When counsel clearly asks a question knowing that the answer will produce inadmissible but substantially prejudicial evidence, the entire trial can be infected causing reversible error. Authorities upon which Tonny relies for these propositions are Pleasance v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill.App.3d 821, 830 (2009); and Konewko v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corporation, 2020 IL App (2d) 190684. 27 VII. THE COURT’S RULING ON OFFERS TO THE RIFLE CLUB WERE WRONG
The Court erred by substantially prejudicing Defendants in not allowing them to offer into evidence the fact that they had made a proposal to transfer the Galesburg Rifle Club the 35 acres. The Court erred first in indicating that there was no relevance because the offer was never accepted, but that was one of Defendants’ main points. It was unfair to allow the jury to hear just the Rifle Club claim, basically, that it is not going to get the 35 acres and presumably could be kicked off their property that had been used for many years. The jury was left with the impression that Defendants would actually kick the Rifle Club off the property if they prevailed, which simply was not and never has been true. They should have been allowed to disprove this notion. Defendants had even offered that a limiting instruction be given.
Additionally, the offers themselves were relevant to matters that Illinois Evidence Rule 408 does not bar. The entire idea of offering settlement negotiations is to prejudice the other party by attempting to introduce their offer to show the jury that their position at trial to oppose the other side was inconsistent with having made a settlement offer initially. Here, the evidence of Defendants’ settlement offers was not ever being offered to show that Defendants had accepted it and some how were arguing a position inconsistent with a previous offer. Rule 408 permits otherwise barred settlement offers if related to witness bias or prejudice, assertion of undue delay or the issue of bad faith. See California & Hawaiian v. Kansas City Terminal, 602 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff’d 788 F.2d 1331. Here, the evidence offered did relate to at least one or more of these issues.
The settlement offers were independently relevant in a number of ways. First, on the mutual mistake and fraud claims, one of which lead to the punitive damage finding and award, Defendants’ position was that there was no mistake or misstatement on Mr. Stegall’s 28 part or related to him because any false statement or mistake that he could not ever get the Rifle Club the 35 acres was not true or material. Tonny testified that she never intended to sell the Rifle Club property or kick the Club out. But, she should have been entitled to actually explain that Defendants went further and actually offered the property to the Club. The jury was instead left with the impression that a for sale sign and eviction notice were on the way to the Club had the jury ruled for the defense.
Moreover, the evidence certainly concerning the settlement offers should have been heard in the punitive damages portion of the trial. Even though the jury had ruled Defendants’ conduct was intentional and fraudulent, there were additional issues of reprehensibility of conduct, potential good faith, and absence of malice to discuss damages. Defendants should have been allowed to tell the jury that they had offered the property to the Rifle Club in an attempt to minimize the obvious passion and prejudice that the jury otherwise showed in rejecting Defendants’ intentions and version of events. VIII. THE JURY WAS OTHERWISE IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
The Court also erred in instructing the jury. No instructions should have been given at all on any issue on which directed verdict was proper. Specifically erroneous were the Court’s instructions denying Defendants’ right to have the jury instructed about the materiality of the alleged mistake and it needed to be a mistake of fact not law (see Defendants’ Instructions 10 series), allowing the jury to be instructed on the mental capacity claim by overlapping it in a way that if mistake was established that a mental capacity claim would be equally proven (Plaintiffs’ Instruction No. 18), refusing Defendants’ Instruction on guardianship and that on punitive damages all individuals are entitled to present their claims and defenses in a court of law pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Defendants’ 29 Instruction No. 24). A jury must be instructed if any evidence is presented on a point, whether or not the jury would have been persuaded. Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill.2d 83 (1995).
There clearly was evidence regarding both the materiality and “fact” issue under the mistake claimed. Defendants had cited case law defining materiality and including as “fact” an element of such claim. Mistakes of law are not actionable. Giving a better instruction on fraud did not cure this omission.
On the mental capacity claim, the case law test regarding the three elements is all that should have been given. The Court essentially allowed Plaintiffs a second bite at the apple by allowing them to use their mistake claim to also establish one for lack of mental capacity. This error was especially egregious when combined with the fact that Attorney Mangieri, in closing argument, conceded the mental capacity claim had not been proved. Defense counsel spent virtually no time arguing against that claim because of the concession, and no response could be made in a defense sur-rebuttal closing argument, when Attorney Mangieri backtracked in rebuttal and then urged that the mental capacity claim had been proven.
The Court erred in not giving Defendants’ Instruction No. 20. It would have told the jury to not consider the guardianship case issues from 2021 to determine the validity of the July 2, 2020 documents. The jury was left with the ability to do just that. The Court also erred in not telling the jury it could only consider the July 6, 2020 document for a limited purpose discussed herein elsewhere. (Defendants’ Instruction No. 19).
The Court also erred in failing to instruct the jury that a Defendant has a right to defend claims in a non-frivolous way under the First Amendment. While the Court gave the instruction that Defendants were entitled to a right to trial by jury, it said nothing about the much more important and substantive right to argue against Plaintiffs’ case at all. The 30 instruction was based directly on an Illinois Supreme Court case and should have been given. Plaintiffs argued at length that the main issue for punitive damages was that very point, that Defendants had forced them to litigate at great expense of attorney’s fees. The jury was left without the clear impression that Defendants had every right to try this case. The Court had never declared their defense frivolous, obviously allowing the case to go to the jury for its determination. If the Court really thought Defendants’ claims were frivolous, it would have granted its motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence. It did not do so. IX. ALLOWING AMENDMENT AFTER CLOSING OF PLAINTIFFS’ CASE AND INSTRUCTION ISSUES WERE ERRONEOUS
Especially egregious conduct by Plaintiffs’ counsel, accepted by the Court, was how the fraud case claims and instructions were addressed and handled. The Court should not have allowed what occurred to Defendants’ substantial prejudice as follows: The original Complaint and two amendments had limited Plaintiffs’ fraud claim to either Steve Holland or Defendants making a material misstatement of fact regarding whether Stegall could amend the trust to provide the 35 acres directly to the Rifle Club. Defendants felt they had an iron clad defense to the fraud claim as pleaded, which of course was the sole basis for the punitive award by the jury. They knew they had made no statements to Stegall at all regarding that issue. They also knew Holland would say that they made no such statements. There was no allegation that somehow whatever Holland told Stegall could be attributed to Defendants. Thus, Defendants determined that since Plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to amend, knew what their case was all along, urged vehemently that discovery should not be extended at a time when their Second Amended Complaint was limited to one type of alleged material misrepresentation concerning trust amenability, and demanded a jury trial even when there were strong assertions that Penny could not appear due to physical limitations, there would 31 be no games played and amendments to expand theories where there had been no opportunity previously to do discovery and otherwise prepare a full defense.
Plaintiffs having heard the defense Motion for Directed Verdict at the close of their case knew that their fraud claim as previously limited in their pleadings would flop. In arguing against the directed verdict motion on fraud, they did not remotely suggest that they had proven it. Instead, they sought to wholly expand their theory to include substantially different and other allegations claiming fraud. The Court erred in allowing the Second Amended Complaint to be amended to address such completely different and expanded theories.
Defense counsel urged that even amendments to conform pleadings to proof must be tested by factors governing amendments, such as knowledge by the intended amender of its claim earlier, previous opportunities to amend, and prejudice and surprise to the opposing party. The Court said no as if there were simply no factors to be considered and effectively that a motion to conform pleadings to proof is automatically granted. This was erroneous.
Here, the motion to amend itself stated that its basis was found in the documents which had already been admitted into evidence. There was no way Plaintiffs could not have known about this. They had an opportunity to plead any such theory previously. Instead, they were able to receive the benefit of Defendants not being able to do discovery on an expanded fraud theory. The Court misfocused on what Defendants knew.
As noted in Friested v. CTA, 129 Ill. App. 2d 153 (1970), the key is whether the amendment would alter the nature and quality of the proof required to defend the action. This is basically undebatable. Plaintiffs had limited their fraud and thus punitive damage case to one time period and one alleged misrepresentation. It was after Defendants were denied discovery and presented their defense that this amendment arose. Defendants were 32 entitled to defend a fraud and punitive damage case that was so limited in nature, believing that they, as stated, had an iron clad defense. Defendants do not even recall one attempt to show in the evidence, or argue in the closing arguments, that Defendants ever made any misstatement or any statement about amenability of the trust provisions. This was Holland’s deal. But Plaintiffs did not sue him and should not have been able to obtain a fraud verdict and punitive damages based upon what Holland may or may have not said.
The Court then approved a Court instruction presented, edited, and approved by Plaintiffs’ counsel. But the Court instructed the jury based upon the single misrepresentation from the Second Amended Complaint. It was up to Plaintiff to make sure a proper instruction was being given. When defense counsel saw how the Court was going to instruct the jury, on a significantly limited fraud and thus punitive damage claim, argument was presented based upon what the jury was to decide. Then, after defense closing arguments, when there would be no opportunity for further argument, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to substitute a new instruction and drag the jury back to have it read to them. But Defendants were denied any opportunity for a second closing argument on the then-newly expanded fraud theory. This was erroneous and substantially prejudicial to Defendants. X. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CASSIDY EX. 2
Tonny’s counsel asked Cassidy questions in his evidence deposition to develop grounds for disallowing Stegall’s discovery deposition from being read. This was because there was no Court Order as to a specific date of which Defendants were aware. When that went nowhere, the issue of Defendants’ non-participation in it became moot. There was no relevance to Cassidy’s Memo about Penny’s statements regarding whether Mr. Stegall’s deposition would go forward. They did not make the July 2, 2020 documents any more or less valid or invalid. 33 All objections on substance are reserved for trial. Supreme Court Rule 211(c)(1). Merely because the questions were presented by Tonny’s counsel does not make them nonobjectionable, if irrelevant, at trial. XI. ATTEMPTS TO IMPEACH OR CONTRADICT THE JULY 2, 2020 DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED
Because of the formal requirements for a will, that it be in writing, signed by the testator and attested in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, mere declarations of a testator may not be admitted for the purposes of impeaching or contradicting his will. See Cheney v. Goldy, 225 Ill. 394 (1907) (evidence of one’s estate planning intentions are only relevant if consistent with the attached document but not so if they are contrary to its terms). No evidence of what Mr. Stegall told others about what he may have wanted to do after July 2, 2020 should have been admitted and the Court never addressed that issue. XII. THE PURPORTED JULY 6, 2020 WILL ITSELF WAS INADMISSIBLE, AND THE COURT NEVER CURED THE ERRONEOUS RULING
The purported July 6, 2020 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 16) was never a subject to the statutory requirements for formal proof of will. Yet, that document should have been deemed inadmissible and not even mentioned before the jury at all. The July 6, 2020 document was admitted. This prejudiced Defendants by placing no burden of proof for its authenticity or effect. The jury was shown a document that says it revoked the prior will. Essentially, the verdict was preordained by just admitting it.
Plaintiffs seemed to think the only way they could prove July 2, 2020 was no good was by putting in a subsequent will never tested in a formal proof of will hearing. This could have been done by testimony that Stegall came in and wanted to make a change that soon. But Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to put in the document itself executed after the fact 34 to attack a previous document. It was unfairly prejudicial to put such document in at all. Plaintiffs put in a will that had never been attacked in a proof of will hearing, argued a binding effect from it and yet denied a right to challenge the document in any way, saying that comes later.
Defendants offered an instruction to have the Court at least tell the jury that they could only consider Exhibit No. 16 as going to Stegall’s intent on July 2, 2020. Defendants’ instruction was drawn directly from Plaintiffs’ response to the defense motion in limine. They there had agreed the document was admissible for a limited purpose at that time. The Court erroneously refused, letting the jury consider the document for all purposes. XIII. ORDER ADMITTING WILL TO PROBATE ISSUE
At a minimum, the jury should not have heard that the Court had blessed the July 6, 2020 document to any extent. But the Court’s instruction did this from a practical standpoint. Illinois law precludes admission into evidence of the order admitting a will to probate. In re Ketter’s Estate, 63 Ill.App.3d 796 (1978) (it has no force and effect). The concept is to not allow the jury to give weight in favor of a contested will on grounds the Court approved it in one sense earlier. Here, the Court effectively did the same thing in reverse, allowing the jury to hear about a will to be attacked in a separate case later. XIV. STEGALL’S DEPOSITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READ
Stegall was not a competent witness. Any reasonable reading of the deposition text, where Stegall did not know where he was, who he was with, who was who, the property involved etc., even thinking he was being asked to re-enlist in the armed services, militates against a finding of competency. As gatekeeper on witness competency, the Court erred in permitting this “evidence.” 35 XV. THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS TO BRITTANY MILLER TESTIMONY
The Court had reserved rulings on the attorney-client privilege issues to determine whether Penny was in an agency relationship with Stegall. Once at trial, the Court allowed the testimony without having the separate hearing earlier contemplated. Plaintiffs very argument was that there was such a relationship for the underlying case itself. This would and should have forbidden the Miller testimony under the agency exception to the third-person waiver rule. XVI. ATTORNEY MANGIERI’S CHANGE OF POSITION IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL AND INDICATIVE ITSELF OF PASSOIN AND PREJUDICED
Counsel for the estate in closing conceded the mental capacity claim was not proven. After defense closings basically jumped past that count to concentrate on others, Mangieri retreated and said the claim was good. This was after Defendants had closed without detailed comment on mental capacity. The Court ruled there would be no sur-rebuttal closings. Plus, the jury passionately and prejudicially ruled for Plaintiffs on this claim. The combination of error must be rectified with a new trial. XVII. OFFERS OF PROOF WERE IMPROPERLY REJECTED
Defendants wanted to show through Holland that if an original will goes missing there is a presumption that it has been revoked. This related to whether once the purported July 6, 2020 went missing it had been revoked and also showed how incredible Blake’s testimony was about not making a true, full copy, as it would not be usable to show what the revoked will even was. Holland also was asked about Stegall telling him Haynes had threatened him, and the Court rebuffed this important evidence. Massey was asked about decanting, which questioning was refused. These improper rulings substantially prejudiced Defendants. 36 XVIII. OTHER ISSUES WARRANTING A NEW TRIAL
Each of the issues Tonny raises are themselves reversible on appeal and should provide a basis for a new trial. But even more importantly, it is the concept of the veritable combination of them or many of them that simply shows Defendants were denied a fair trial.
As the Court is aware, each Defendant is entitled to file her own post-trial motion. Penny will have 30 days from the date of judgment. Tonny would like to reserve the ability to amend her post-trial motion to include any points Penny raises that are not contained in the present post-trial motion.
For sake of completeness at this time, however, Tonny notes a number of matters where Defendants were irreparably prejudiced. One, the Court in front of the jury told its members, actually yelling, that Defendants and their counsel were being rude by having them wait for witnesses when one of them had taken ill at no fault to them or counsel. The Court also interrupted questioning of Tonny to lash out telling her to answer yes or no to questions that were either confusing or did not restrict answers to yes or no. The Court took sides on these two issues at least. The Court showed its prejudice and bias too when it said one more time and all of Tonny’s testimony would be stricken. This stressed Tonny out immensely putting her at grave risk that the Court was primed for disallowing her entire testimony. This was unfair and not cured by global assertions later that the Court had yelled at everybody and do not consider that to be evidence. Effectively, the Court had become an advocate for one side.
For direct application of these rules in a similar situation, the Court is directed to Pavilion v. Kaferly, 204 Ill. App. 3d 235 (1990) (improper conduct by trial judge, objecting, interrupting, criticizing, and threatening to stop the questioning, warranted 37 reversal and new trial because of the special recognized fact that jurors may give court comments deference or even controlling weight such that cautionary instructions “do not cure a comment of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence.”)
Defendants offered a number of pictures to show there was still an excellent relationship between Stegall and them in 2021. The Court with these and a lot of other evidence ruled such inadmissible as not related to the validity of the July 2, 2020 documents. Actually, they were relevant to shop that Stegall was friendly with them and content with the documents and on the question of affirmative defenses 1 and 3. WHEREFORE, Defendant, TONNY J. WILLIAMSON prays for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence standard and for the numerous trial and pre-trial errors noted herein. ORAL ARGUMENT OF THIS MOTION IS REQUESTED. TONNY J. WILLIAMSON, Defendant By: Jeffrey A. Ryva Jeffrey A. Ryva, ARDC# 3128318 Email address for service of pleadings: ryvapleadings@quinnjohnston.com Email address for correspondence: jryva@quinnjohnston.com QUINN JOHNSTON 227 NE Jefferson Avenue Peoria, IL 61602 T: (309) 674-1133 F: (309) 674-6503 38 PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that on March 21, 2023, all counsel of record were served with a copy of the foregoing document via hand delivery in court in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 11. Attorney Paul L. Mangieri Barash & Everett, LLC paul@barashlaw.com patti@barashlaw.com John W. Robertson Statham & Long, LLC jwr@galesburglaw.com jennifer.steck@galesburglaw.com Honorable Curtis Lane c/o Knox County Courthouse clane@9thjudicial.org Theresa L. Sosalla Sosalla Law, LLC 1800 3 rd Avenue, Suite 404 Rock Island, IL 61201 attorney@ravenclawyer.com paralegal@ravenclawyer.com 4886-8277-9735, v. 1
So yesterday we learned from former attorney and judge Harry Bulkeley that the times have changed and now you can wear hats in court and tshirts emblazoned with lettering. (See blog post from yesterday)
Seems to be inappropriate to me and grounds for a mistrial because some jurors on some days wore camo hats and tshirt obviously to show support for the Galesburg Gun Club and some jurors on some days wore tshirts with OSF or Order of St Francis which is a division of the Catholic Church/Diocese of Peoria emblazoned on it.
Even in the Circuit Court of Cook County none of that would ever happen.
However, since the jurors did it and no one said anything in court, today Penny and Tonny Williamson went to appear on zoom, one in camo tshirt and a hat with a large cross on it and the other with clothing with crosses on it.
They got on zoom, no one said anything, but as soon as court started, the zoom video cut out! Interesting. the audio was fine, but not the video.
No one said anything or objected, so we’ll see what happens out of this.
Apparently Knox County does not have a published dress code in its rules and I wonder if what the jurors wore was grounds for a mistrial. Appeals have been filed in 22 PR 12 and 21 MR 21, so let’s wait and see what the 4th District Court of Appeals says.
While this blog is investigating the strange and mysterious rulings of Judge Curtis Lane fueled by John Robertson and Paul Mangieri, out of no where comes a glowing article on the Williamson case wherein 150 acres of a home, farmland and timberland was taken from two elderly Christian ladies who were good lifelong friends of Frederick Stegall in Galesburg.
Apparently this is a weak and strange coverup of the nefarious activities in Knox County, IL court system.
So read on and let me know if anyone else has had their local newspapers publish strange and out of character articles in order to cover up crimes against the innocent in probate.
I’m sure it goes on.
Your turn: Our system of laws is still in good hands
Harry Bulkeley
Special to the Register-Mail
Did you ever go back to a place you used to work? It’s interesting how things are both the same and yet different. Recently I went back to the Knox County courthouse to observe a two week long jury trial. It evoked a lot of feelings.
I walked into one of the courtrooms where I had presided for 24 years. My picture is even hanging on the wall in one of the other rooms. But there was a different judge sitting where I used to sit. He and I had never worked together so it was interesting to watch someone else’s way of running a trial.
Some of the lawyers had familiar faces. One had appeared before me for years and another had been a judicial colleague until he retired and returned to the practice of law. The clerk had taken care of court files for me and the court reporter had written down a lot of things I have said.
The courtroom was always known as “The Big Courtroom” and had seen a lot of changes through its 140 years. New to me were the accessibility ramps and the television screens. It had also been fancied up since I sat there when I would sometimes find fallen plaster on my chair.
Among of the things I love about the law are its traditions. Everyone stood up when the jury came in. The clerk swore in the witnesses with the same oath used for centuries. (“Do you solemnly swear…”) The judge wore a robe like the one I had worn and like the ones judges have worn since back in England.
There were some differences. The jurors took notes and were allowed to submit to the judge questions they wanted him to ask the witnesses. A couple of jurors wore baseball caps through the proceedings. That was something I never allowed.
The case itself was an interesting one. A man had died and left his farmland to two sisters who claimed they had taken care of him. The Catholic Church and the local gun club sued, claiming that the man had promised to leave his property to them. He had, in fact, drawn up a will leaving everything to the church and the club but changed it shortly before he died.
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For two weeks witnesses testified about the decedent’s connection to the church and how his father had founded the gun club. Other witnesses recounted how he had been very close to the father of the two women who received the estate. With all the back and forth, it started to seem like a television drama.
In time-honored tradition each witness took the stand and told their idea of what happened. Then the lawyers on the other side started probing, looking for holes in their stories. All the while the jurors listened intently and took notes.
My experience was that in many cases less interesting than this one, jurors (and judges if you must know) sometime drift off during the dull parts of testimony. But for this trial, everyone listened carefully. There were even spectators who came to watch the trial every day. That is something you don’t see in a boring contract case.
Finally, the day came for closing arguments. Some of you may be aware that there are more than a couple of lawyer jokes circulating out there. Usually, they revolve around how crooked or inhuman attorneys are.
The arguments made to the jurors and their response to them made me proud of my profession. Both sides argued clearly and rationally. They didn’t shout or try to fool the jury.
They presented their clients’ case in a fair and reasonable way. It was a demonstration of what is good about our legal system and it made me proud to have been a part of it.
The jury was only out for about an hour before returning a verdict in favor of the church and the gun club. They not only gave them the land back but assessed a large penalty against the two women. It was how I would have voted but you can never predict what a jury will do.
The judge, the lawyers and the jurors all did their jobs well. Each one is an indispensable part of our legal system, and I was proud to see them perform so well.
As I sat in that courtroom and observed the same rituals that I had practiced, I thought about all those people both before and after me who have sworn to uphold our court system. Sometimes I could see swirling around the room the spirits of the scholars who had written my law books. Books that taught the logic and majesty of the law to past generations as well as the “youngsters” who came after me.
Americans have long taken pride in our judicial system, but we have also seen the frequent and often vicious attacks on lawyers and the law. Despite the criticism, when I went back to my old salt mine, I left assured that our system of laws is in good hands.
Who ever this guy is, he clearly has not read the entire court file, nor did he ever contact the co-trustees, Penny and Tonny Williamson to confirm the truth of what he asked to be published. He also knows nothing about probate law, or Fred Stegall, or Haynes, Hessler and Blake who appear to have put their dasterdly plans in motion.
If he did, he would have read the following file stamped post trial motion by the Williamson attorneys, Jeff Ryva and Teri Sosalla who know a complete different side of the case:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT KNOX COUNTY, ILLINOIS F&M BANK, Executor of the Estate of FREDERICK J. STEGALL, Deceased, GALESBURG RIFLE CLUB, an Illinois not-for-profit Corporation and THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PEORIA, an Illinois Religious corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. TONNY J. WILLIAMSON and PENNY J. WILLIAMSON, Defendants. Case No.: 2021 MR 21 DEFENDANT PENNY J. WILLIAMSON’S POST-TRIAL MOTION NOW COMES, Defendant, PENNY J. WILLIAMSON (hereinafter “PENNY”), by and through her attorney THERESA L. SOSALLA of SOSALLA LAW, LLC, and for her Post-Trial Motion states as follows:
In addition to the matters addressed in this Post-Trial Motion, PENNY adopts and joins Tonny’s Post-Trial Motion filed on her behalf by attorney Jeffrey A. Ryva on March 21, 2023.
Denial of Defendants’ Discovery. One of the most egregious factors that denied Defendants a fair trial was the trial court’s refusal to allow Defendants to conduct meaningful discovery. The procedural history of this case – having been consolidated with both the guardianship case (21 PP 10) and the estate case (22 PR 10) – is convoluted at best. At any point in time prior to July 15, 2022 when Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, there had been some type of motion pending 2 which would impact the nature and scope of the various claims between the parties in the consolidated cases of 21 MR 21 and 22 PR 10. It was not until Defendants filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on July 15, 2022 – as opposed to filing another motion directed at the Second Amended Complaint – that the allegations of that complaint defined Plaintiffs’ cause of action against Defendants.1 However, the trial court had entered an Order following a June 24, 2022 hearing which closed discovery on August 1, 2022.2 The impossibility of completing discovery in two weeks is palpable. The trial court apparently believed that discovery in 21 MR 21 could, and should, have been conducted during the time when Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint were pending. This belief, however, is contrary to a later ruling following a hearing in 22 PR 12 wherein the court stated: Additionally, the Court made it clear that an extension in discovery would be granted in Knox County Case No. 22-PR-12 due to the Court not expecting the parties to continue with discovery when new Motions to Dismiss had been filed and encouraged the parties and attorneys to attempt to agree on a new discovery cutoff deadline.3 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Compliant in 21 MR 21 was denied on June 24, 2022. It defies logic how the trial court could recognize that discovery would not proceed while motions to dismiss are pending in the Estate case but expected discovery to be conducted in 21 MR 21 during the 17 months the case was on file prior to a 1 See Motion for Extension of Deadlines filed by Attorney Ryva on July 21, 2022 for the status of the discovery at that time. 2 See Order referencing a June 24, 2022 hearing which was not filed until August 4, 2022. 3 See Order entered November 1, 2022. 3 ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The trial court arbitrarily treated discovery in the two cases differently. It abused its discretion in doing so. The lack of discovery available to Defendants crippled their ability to defend the claims against them and denied them a fair trial. The only remedy is to vacate the verdict and grant Defendants a new trial to be held after proper discovery is conducted by both parties.
Penny’s First Motion to Continue Trial filed February 9, 2023. Attorney Theresa L. Sosalla entered her Appearance on behalf of Penny on January 18, 2023. It was anticipated that several motions relevant to clarifying trial issues would be resolved at that hearing. Unfortunately, due to technical problems in the courtroom, that hearing did not proceed as scheduled. The hearing was reset for February 17, 2023. Attorney Sosalla filed a Motion to Continue Jury Trial citing several legitimate reasons why it would be unfair and prejudicial to Penny if the jury trial remained on schedule to begin February 27, 2023. Consequently, Penny’s Motion to Continue was not resolved until 10 days prior to trial at the February 17 hearing; the trial court denied Penny’s motion without oral argument. “Discretion” is defined, in part, as “individual choice or judgment” or the “power of free decision or latitude of choice within certain legal bounds.”4 The Court summarily denied this motion without addressing the merits of the grounds cited for a brief continuance of the scheduled trial. There is nothing in the record upon which the rationale for this ruling can be determined other than Plaintiffs’ and the Court’s intractable desire to begin the jury trial on February 27, 2023. Plaintiffs cited no prejudice or hardship that would befall them 4 See Merriam-Webster online dictionary at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discretion. 4 if the jury trial were to be briefly continued. While the decision regarding whether to continue a scheduled trial is within the trial court’s discretion, that discretion must be exercised to promote the interests of justice. The decision to deny Penny’s motion to continue was not the result of a conscientious consideration of the relative hardships or prejudices between the parties. The Court exercised no discretion, which is an abuse of discretion and error that compels granting Defendants a new trial.
Subpoenas to Witnesses. The issue of Penny’s outstanding subpoenas issued to several trial witnesses in early January, 2023 was scheduled to be resolved at the January 18, 2023 hearing. Those subpoenas directed the recipients to appear for depositions on written questions and directed them to produce certain documents on a specified date. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Subpoenas and Attachments and simultaneously contacted each of these witnesses to circumvent their compliance and prevent Defendants from obtaining necessary information regarding these witnesses’ anticipated testimony at trial. See letter attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Penny’s Second Motion to Continue Trial filed February 15, 2023. The court also unfairly treated Penny from the standpoint of her medical condition. The court was presented with some evidence of Penny’s inability to come to court for the jury trial. The court denied a continuance but significantly compounded the problem during a large part of the jury trial. Eventually, the court began to go on the record to say Penny appeared through her attorney, Ms. Sosalla. But before that, on numerous occasions in the presence of the jury, the court noted that Penny “fails to appear.” There is no rule or other requirement that a litigant in a civil case appear at trial in the absence of an order 5 compelling her to do so. Repeatedly stating that Penny “fails to appear” gave the impression that Penny did not care or at least allowed the jury to speculate why she was not present. The court probably used the failure to appear language a dozen or more times as the parties were reintroduced each time after a break of any kind. This could have been cured to some extent by saying something once and then noting all parties present with and through counsel as previously noted. Even when Penny’s counsel objected once, the court disagreed and said it would (and did) keep commenting that Penny had failed to appear. Penny’s physical impairment caused by a medically diagnoses condition prevented her from attending the trial. Her absence from jury selection prevented her from providing insight into which juror may have a propensity toward bias against her. In addition, her absence prevented her from rebutting certain unanticipated testimony from Plaintiffs’ witnesses which prejudicially impaired the jury’s ability to effectively perform the important “fact finding” function that is the foundation of the jury trial system. See Affidavit of Penny J. Williamson, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Subpoena to the Diocese — The jury ruled for Plaintiffs on liability very late on Friday March 10, 2023. Until then, there was no right to get the same jury to consider whether punitive damages should be awarded. This second part of the trial commenced at 9:00 a.m. Monday March 13, 2023. On the intervening Saturday, a subpoena was issued to the Diocese as follows: TO: Russ Courter, or any knowledgeable financial person from the Diocese conversant with the items and documents set forth below c/o John Robertson its counsel of record by email. YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and testify as a witness and authenticate the documents described below on Monday March 13, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. before the 6 Honorable Judge Curtis Lane at the Knox County Courthouse, 200 S. Cherry Street. Galesburg, IL 61401. And to bring all documents related in any way to the claim being made that day for punitive damages including but not limited to at least any expenditures made in connection with such claim, whether detailed invoices or indicia of payment thereof, and a statement of net worth of the Diocese as of January 1, 2021, January 1, 2022 and now and an account monthly of all revenues received and expenses paid from January 1, 2021 through the present date. A check for appearance and mileage will be tendered on arrival of the witness at court, due to timing issues. YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR IN RESPONSE TO THIS SUBPOENA WILL SUBJECT YOU TO PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Any witness shall respond to any lawful subpoena of which he or she has actual knowledge, if payment of the fee and mileage has been tendered. Supreme Court Rule 237(a). Here, Defendants acted as quickly as possible to demand, as they were entitled to, evidence of the financial status of the Diocese. This Court properly instructed the jury to consider the financial vulnerability of all plaintiffs. The financial position of the Diocese was therefore relevant. The problem occurred when the Diocese produced neither Father Brokaw nor the subpoenaed Mr. Courter Monday nor any of the subpoenaed financial information. This left the jury with no direct evidence of the financial wherewithal of the Diocese. The Diocese clearly was aware of the subpoena through counsel and that they would receive a check for appearing Monday morning. No motion to quash was filed over the weekend or Monday morning. Notably, Plaintiffs had abandoned their request for punitive damages, only having brought it back into the case once this Court said Defendants were entitled to a jury trial. And discovery had closed before they had an opportunity to do so.
But, the Court simply said that the subpoena could not be enforced because it had not been served three days before the time when compliance was demanded. The 7 Court did not cite any rule to support this decision. It conflicted with governing Supreme Court Rule 237(a). There does not appear to be any local rule that could trump an inconsistent Supreme Court Rule on the subject. See Phelan v. Groeteke, 293 Ill. App. 3d 469 (1997) (local rule requiring compliance within two days invalid when Supreme Court Rule allowed three). The court should have enforced rather than effectively quashing the subpoena related to this important issue.
Defendants’ Offers of Proof Regarding the Diocese Use of Funds — Another error involved the Court denying the offer of proof made by Defendants that sought testimony about the Diocese. One area of inquiry was whether the Diocese had contributed any part of the $346,000 received directly from the POD accounts when Stegall passed to contribute towards or defer expenses related to Stegall’s non-rifle club property. Another subject was whether the Diocese had donated from POD funds or had plans to donate from the alleged other 1.5 million dollars to the charities (NRA, VA or Red Cross) Stegall supposedly told Brittany Miller specifically he wanted to benefit from his estate. Plaintiffs harped constantly on the notion that Defendants would just glom onto the property, suggesting they would sell it, rather than as Tonny testified they would remain stewards of it by caring for the land and donating to several charities as Stegall had requested. Defendants were entitled to try to flip the script and argue that the church not only had not done anything regarding the property and did not share or plan to share Stegall’s largesse with anyone else. The jury never heard a word about what the church would do. This was erroneous and unduly prejudicial. 8
The court’s ruling was that the idea of a monument or plaque put up to honor Stegall and what the Diocese did with the $346,000 for him personally was irrelevant. As stated, even this was erroneous. The offer of proof though was not limited in this fashion. Defendants were also talking about using POD funds on and towards Stegall’s farm acreage and whether it would honor his wishes about donating to other charities. These were the particular areas of relevance, yet the court never allowed the jury to consider them.
Court’s Own Knowledge and Affiliation with Catholic Church — The Court also significantly erred when it brought its own knowledge outside the record into the proceeding. The transcript reveals that the court injected its own knowledge about such matters as follows: “[T]o me that would be counter to what the Roman Church does because we don’t have any idols outside of the Heavenly Father.” On its face, this statement strongly suggested an association between the court and church that had never been disclosed to Defendants that should have been. Defendants would have had a right to move for automatic substitution of judge after Judge Rasmussen left the case. Or perhaps there would have been grounds to request voluntary recusal or to petition to substitute for cause or even supplement one of the other such motions.
There is case law on potentially biased judges which apply the same test as for a jury. In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d 357 (1956), is one example. The Supreme Court noted that it did not in fact even hold or intimate that the particular commissioner was infected, consciously or unconsciously, with prejudice or affected by other motivation against the Respondent. The ruling was based upon the classic principle of jurisprudence, that no 9 man who has a personal interest in the subject matter of decision in a case may sit in judgment on that case. The opinion goes on to note that the same rules would apply to any venireman in a jury trial. See also Bender v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioner of Dolton, 254 Ill.App.3d 488 (1993) (such personal interest requiring disqualification does not have to be a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case; it need not be pecuniary at all; it need only be an interest which can be viewed as having a potentially debilitating effect on impartiality).
The first canon of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct says: “A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE JUDGE’S ACTIVITIES.” Comment [5] explains: “The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s … impartiality … as a judge.” Specific rules say this:
RULE 2.11: DISQUALIFICATION (A) A judge shall be disqualified in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to, the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. … (4), The judge while a judge or a judicial candidate,* has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. [Emphasis added.] 10
COMMENTS [1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(l) through (6) apply. [2] A judge’s obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed. [5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification. [Emphasis added.]
While certainly no litigant ever wishes to be in this predicament, these points must be preserved. The Court should have never kept this case from the beginning. Defendants had no idea at the outset that this Court had any affiliation with the Catholic Church. This should have been disclosed as Comment [5] to Rule 2.11 mandates. It should be beyond obvious from Defendants’ voire dire of jurors on their associations that they would have exercised their right to automatic substitution of judge as soon as Judge Rasmussen exited the case. His directive was to see if Judge Lane and all parties consented. Defendants would not have even had to use a substitution of judge motion since they would not have consented at such a time.
There is also the issue which again needs to be raised no matter how distasteful it may be doing so. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a newspaper article containing a statement made by the Judge Lane when he was running for office about his Catholic upbringing. This affiliation with the Catholic Church, whether ongoing or in the 5 Article available at: https://www.cantondailyledger.com/story/news/local/2014/03/09/curtis-lane-ninth-judicial-circuit/38366626007/. 11 past, should have been disclosed to the parties before Judge Lane took over the assignment of this case. Not doing so violated the rules governing candidates not making statements appearing to rule on way.
At a minimum, even if there was no such affiliation, the court clearly brought its own knowledge of religion into the equation. A court cannot do so, plain and simple. It has long been the law that a judge cannot bring in matters outside the record through personal knowledge only. Streeter v. Streeter, 43 Ill. 155, 167 (1867). This itself was error.
Judge Lane first heard any aspect of these proceedings on January 10, 2022. Apparently set at that time were a Motion to Certify for Appeal a certain question Judge Rasmussen had answered; a Petition for Rule Show Cause concerning confusion over date on which Defendants would be deposed; and a status regarding discovery and deposition deadlines and related processes. Judge Lane obviously knew from having read part of the file beforehand, and knowing the Catholic Diocese was a party, that he was entering a highly contested case between parties to include the Catholic Church. There was an initial discussion about whether Judge Rasmussen intended to keep the case; it appeared that he concluded that as long as counsel and Judge Lane agreed that Judge Lane would take the remainder of the case other than the Motion to Certify question. There was no disclosure about any association Judge Lane may have had with the Catholic Church. Defendants themselves were not present for the January 10, 2022 proceedings.
Defendants did not actually know of the hearing and were entitled to be present for the discussions that took place on January 10, 2022, in various terms. These 12 included whether to agree to have Judge Lane even take over the case, Judge Rasmussen having stated that Judge Lane and all parties agreed with Judge Lane to do so. Moreover, discussions ensued about whether any written discovery would be conducted and how many depositions were to be taken. Defendants’ then attorney remained mute when the Court asked if any written discovery was still to occur (the Court hearing nothing closed all written discovery immediately) and how many depositions would be taken, with those of Defendants, Dr. Hershkowitz, and Attorney Steve Holland even being discussed. Had Defendants known of these matters, they would have insisted on a broader form and extent of discovery and depositions. That would have also been the time to discuss expert witness disclosures and other matters. Nothing of this sort was ever mentioned.
In connection overall with the denials of continuance and stay motions, Defendants believe it prudent to return to that hearing transcript. It is obvious from any reading of what occurred on that date was that Judge Lane had, at the very beginning, became completely consumed with getting the case tried, with little discovery, as soon as possible. A number of times the Court referenced that the case was simple and that pretty much any attorney of any kind could try it quickly and appropriately. This course of events began right from the start, with the trial court never wavering from its view to push the case to conclusion, no matter what, at the earliest date.
That transcript also reflects an astonishing example of the Court jumping to conclusions. Without even being asked, Judge Lane required that the Court Order for the new deposition date for Defendants include language that not only must they physically appear at the date, time, and place set forth, but that if they did not appear that they 13 would have no right whatsoever to provide testimony on their own behalf at trial. That unsolicited ruling set the stage for what occurred later in the jury trial. When called as an adverse witness by Plaintiffs, the Court threatened Tonny with having all of her testimony stricken if she would not answer questions in the way the Court thought they should be answered. As stated in other recent motions, this was improper. If this was just the wrap up of the die being cast from the beginning, the first day Judge Lane heard anything about the case prejudging what would happen if for any reason, legitimate or otherwise, Defendants failed to appear a second time for deposition. Illinois case law clearly stated that Orders barring or striking testimony are the last resort to be used. Here, the Court, before even hearing the pending Rule to Show Cause and Attorney’s Fee claim, which ultimately did and would include testimony justifying why the first deposition date was missed due to confusion.
Motions for Substitution. Throughout the pre-trial proceedings, the Court repeatedly demonstrated its lack of impartiality toward Defendants’ interests in this litigation. Two separate Petitions to Substitute Judge for Cause were filed prior to trial.6 These Petitions set forth numerous instances of objectionable conduct directed toward Defendants which called into question the Court’s ability to make rulings based solely on the facts and law. Instead, this conduct created, in the least, an appearance of impropriety demonstrating its prejudice against Defendant. While this conduct was inappropriate at the time, the revelation of the Court’s affiliation with the Catholic Church in the midst of trial sheds new light on the motivation – whether conscious or unconscious 6 See Petitions filed April 27, 2022 and October 31, 2022. 14 – for the Court to enter rulings favorable to Plaintiffs and adverse to Defendants. Despite Defendants’ attempts to bring this disturbing conduct to the attention of the Court by filing the Petitions to Substitute, the animosity of the Court directed at the Defendants and their counsel continued unabated. The resulting appearance of bias and impropriety casts the judiciary in such a negative light that it is impossible to state that Defendants received a fair trial.
Jury Room Not Soundproof. Tonny’s post-trial motion addressed the disturbing fact that the juror room was not soundproof. Not only could the jurors have heard what was going on in open court at the times when the Court removed them, there was another problem. The jurors used the same hallway and elevators/stairs as the parties, counsel, witnesses and general public did. There was a time that attorney Robertson was heard in front of a waiting witness or at least the general public casting negative aspersions on Defendants. In short, the jury was susceptible to exposure to information which was neither appropriate nor intended to be provided to them. It is impossible to cure the prejudicial impact these improprieties had on the jury’s verdict other than by granting Defendants a new trial.
Attorney Fee Bills. The Court erred in admitting the attorney’s fees bills and submitting them to the jury. The exhibits clearly included work assertedly performed for the 22 LA and guardianship cases, a separate insurance coverage case and the probate matter itself. It was up to Plaintiffs to put in an accurate recitation of fees for this case. Even the jury instruction given on punitive damages limited the harm alleged to for just this case, 21 MR 21. Mercado v. Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 196 Ill. App. 3d 483 15 (1990), reversed a fee award for failure to provide a clear and proper breakdown of recoverable fees. The Court went on to note that if fees are caused to be incurred and litigated over elsewhere, this is reason to reverse as well. Our jury compounded the error by obviously awarding punitive damages exceeding even the amount of fees that included those themselves unrecoverable as stemming from other litigation. Plaintiffs specifically contended they at least should be made whole and have attorney’s fees paid. This is not an abstract or de minimus point. As shown in Tonny’s affidavit, noting Defendants could not make the calculation at trial when large packets of fee bills with hundreds of entries were dumped on them, the fees for other matters amounted to over $110,000 Also, the Court should not have allowed all the billings for the Church and Rifle Club while Stegall was still alive. They did not have standing until he passed. The Court had previously erred in not dismissing those entities for lack of standing then. This error was exacerbated by then allowing billings for this improper period to be submitted to the jury.
The Court erred in admitting the Plaintiffs’ attorneys fee bills and submitting them to the jury. The exhibits clearly included work assertedly performed for other cases pending between the parties, including the guardianship case and the probate matter. It was up to Plaintiffs to put in an accurate recitation of fees for this case. Even the jury instruction given on punitive damages limited the harm alleged to for just this case, 21 MR 21. Mercado v. Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 196 Ill. App. 3d 483 (1990) reversed a fee award for failure to provide a clear and proper breakdown of recoverable fees. The Court went on to note that if fees are caused to be incurred and litigated over elsewhere, this is reason to reverse as well. The jury compounded the error by obviously 16 awarding punitive damages exceeding the amount of fees that included those themselves unrecoverable as stemming from other litigation. Plaintiffs specifically contended they at least should be made whole and have attorney’s fees paid. This is not an abstract or de minimus point. As shown in Tonny’s affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit D, Defendants could not make the calculation at trial when large packets of fee bills with hundreds of entries were dumped on them on the morning of the trial on punitive damages. Also, the Court should not have allowed all the billings for the Church and Rifle Club while Stegall was still alive. They did not have standing until he passed. The Court had previously erred in not dismissing those entities for lack of standing then. This error was exacerbated by then allowing billings for an improper time period to be submitted to the jury. 27. Juror Misconduct — Two jurors (Epkins and Surface) submitted jury questionnaires stating they had not been convicted of a criminal offense. Attached as Exhibit B are documents showing otherwise. Defendants would have used challenges under the statute for cause (see 705 ILCS 305/2 (a) (3) requiring jurors be: “Free from all legal exception, of fair character, of approved integrity, of sound judgment, well informed, and able to understand the English language, whether in spoken or written form or interpreted into sign language.”) 28. Alternatively, if Defendants had accurate information regarding these jurors’ criminal history, then they would have used peremptories on them in the alternative. See Donough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). It directly addresses lying about a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court held that a new trial would be 17 required if the movant establishes that the juror actually lied, and that the juror would have been dismissed for cause if they answered truthfully.
Juror Bias Due to Association with Diocese Healthcare Institutions. A juror’s knowledge of, or association with, a party is a quintessential example of grounds to remove that juror for cause. Defendants repeatedly raised the issue of various juror’s association with the Diocese of Peoria through his or her affiliation with healthcare facilities that fall within the Catholic Healthcare Ministry of the Diocese. See Exhibit E from the Diocese of Peoria website which acknowledges its affiliation with many OSF7 healthcare facilities. The prospective juror’s connection to the Diocese often involved their employment with institutions inseparable from the Diocese, i.e., OSF facilities or Catholic Charities. Defendants should have been allowed to remove such jurors for cause and not be required to use peremptory challenges in their efforts to select a fair and impartial jury.
Substitution of Judge Motions — In addition to the arguments above made concerning the Court not advising Defendants at the outset that he had an affiliation with the Catholic Church, such that they would not have consented to Judge Lane when Judge Rasmussen indicated he would step aside if Judge Lane and all parties consented, or could have used a substitution of judge as a matter of right, the Court erroneously denied the motions for cause as well. For reasons stated in those motions, either or both substitution motions should have been granted. Especially egregious was the fact that the second one was filed by Penny pro se, and the Court struck it with prejudice, with no right 7 Information available at: https://cdop.org/ministries/catholic-healthcare-ministry/medical-facilities-within-the-catholic-diocese-of-peoria/. 18 to amend, on technical or procedural grounds, not substance, without allowing Penny to even argue her motion at all. The Court said there was no proper verification but there was an electronic one. Even if it was not in proper form, the appropriate ruling should have been to give leave to cure it within 7 days or in open court right then.
Additional Court Involvement – A separate case is pending before Judge Rasmussen with Defendants here Plaintiffs there against Messrs. Haynes, Hessler and Blake. It involves the purported will of Stegall of July 6, 2020. A hearing occurred in that matter before Judge Rasmussen on April 12, 2023. Defendants attended. Judge Lane appeared in the courtroom gallery for a significant part of the hearing, even though that case is not assigned to him. In addition, Defendants learned that attorney Robertson was also present although he does not represent a party to that case. And, moreover, Robertson advised Tonny’s counsel that he and Paul Mangieri who represents Haynes in that case met with Judge Lane who advised that he was directing them to get a hearing set in the 21 MR 21 case on any filed motions other than the actual post-trial motions of Defendants. The motions on file then all depended upon the enforceability of the judgment on the jury verdict which was already stayed by Tonny’s having filed a post-trial motion the day after the judgment.
Sanctions Rulings Defendants were sanctioned erroneously. On one occasion, attorney Mangieri even stated that he only believed Attorney Vizciano should be sanctioned. But the Court ordered sanctions against Defendants, thereby again showing prejudice against them. Defendants incorporate by reference all arguments made by them in written submissions and on the record. Specifically, Tonny had difficulty hearing, as 19 reflected by the Court numerous times during trial, and this led to her not deciphering the difference between the two banking institutions that generated the dispute.
CUMULATIVE ERROR. While any one individual error alleged in Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions may not be sufficiently prejudicial to the Defendants, the cumulative effect of these errors denied Defendants’ right to a fair trial. Marriage of Sadovsky, 2019 IL App (3d) 180204 (favorable ruling on husband’s petition to terminate maintenance was reversed and remanded for new trial when trial court exceeded its discretion in excluding expert testimony as discovery sanction and refusing to consider statutory factors in ruling on petition to terminate maintenance). In Sadovsky, the appellate court acknowledged that reversal of a judgment based on evidentiary errors is rare, yet it is appropriate when the errors are substantially prejudicial so as to affect the outcome of the case. Id. at ¶ 24 (“Although a single error may not warrant reversal, several evidentiary errors may require a new trial.”). In the current litigation, the alleged errors far exceed those which lead to a new trial in Sadovsky. These errors fall into the following general categories: A. Improper limitations on discovery. B. Judicial bias and abuse of discretion. C. Juror bias. D. Prejudicial errors in admission of evidence favorable to Plaintiffs and the exclusion of evidence favorable to Defendants. E. Prejudicial rulings allowing the amendment of Plaintiffs’ pleadings against Defendants. F. Prejudicial rulings allowing Defendants to present evidence for assessment of punitive damages. G. Improper instructions to the jury as a consequence of such prejudicial rulings. 20 In light of the cumulative effect of the numerous errors and abuses of discretion in the trial court’s rulings throughout this litigation, it cannot be said with any confidence that Defendants received a fair trial. The only remedy is to vacate the verdict and grant Defendants a new trial to be held after proper discovery is conducted by both parties.
Wrap up. WHEREFORE, Defendants Tonny and Penny Williamson respectfully request that the Court GRANT them the relief herein requested, vacate the jury verdict and punitive damages awards and set this matter for retrial following Respectfully submitted, PENNY J. WILLIAMSON, Defendant By: Theresa L. Sosalla ARDC: 6220454 SOSALLA LAW, LLC 1800 3rd Avenue, Suite 404 Rock Island, IL 61201 TEL: TEL: 309 -794 794-3212 32123212 FAX: FAX: FAX: FAX: FAX: 309 -788 788-9332 93329332 email: email: attorney@ravenclawyer.com
The real question is now will attorney/former judge Bulkeley retract that article when presented with the facts before him.
We are still waiting on all the trial transcripts. But in case anyone has any doubt that Fred didn’t absolutely love these two elderly Christian women, here is the video evidence:
The decision was fair and well reasoned. The estate of Mordecai Faskowitz (the murderer) will NOT benefit from the horrendous stabbing death of Marjorie Ivy! (Not long before their deaths, Miriam Solo Greenfield prepared testamentary documents leaving Mordecai’s assets to her son. Miriam Solo was the sister of Mordecai.) Mordecai stabbed poor Marjorie 40 times, slit her throat and then “sliced her” to be sure she was dead.
Some important excerpts from this case:
On October 3,2013, during a well-being check, Chicago police officers discovered the body of Marjorie G. Ivy (“Decedent” or “Marjorie”). It was later determined that her death was the result of homicide committed by her long-term partner, Mordechai Faskowitz (“Mordechai”). The criminal court proceeding found that Mordechai was not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) for causing Marjorie’s death.
On May 16, 2014, Judge Karen O’Malley (“Judge O’Malley”) named Marjorie’s nephew, Christopher Ivy (“Petitioner” or “Ivy”), the Independent Administrator of her Estate. Marjorie died intestate, leaving several nieces and nephews as her heirs at law. However, prior to her death, she named Mordechai as a beneficiary on a number of assets.
In June 2018, Judge O’Malley granted Ivy’s motion for summary judgment. Judge O’Malley ruled that Mordechai was ineligible to inherit under the Slayer Statute because, in order for Mordechai to claim the NOR! defense in the criminal case, the State was required to prove each element of each offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. Judge O’Malley reasoned that since Mordechai was determined to be NOR! for first degree murder, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding as to whether he intentionally and unjustifiably caused Marjorie’s death.
The appellate court disagreed. The appellate court found that, for purposes of the Slayer Statute, the criminal court did not rule as to whether Mordechai “intentionally” caused Marjorie’s death. See Ivy v. Faskowitz (In re Estate a/Ivy), 2019 IL App (1st) 181691 , ~85. Specifically, the criminal court did not identify whether Mordechai intended to kill Marjorie, cause great bodily harm, and/or if he knew that his acts would cause her death. Id. at ~47 . The matter was remanded to this Court for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at ~87. While on appeal, Mordechai died on May 15, 2019, and Judge O’Malley was re-assigned to the Law Division since the case was remanded. Accordingly, this Court has decided several issues on remand.
First, this Court disqualified Miriam Solo Greenfield (“Solo”) from serving as the Estate of Faskowitz’s (“Respondent” or “Faskowitz’s Estate”) attorney and witness. Solo is Mordechai’s sister and the Executor of his last will and testament. Further she provided testimony at this trial and one of her children is the sole beneficiary of Faskowitz’s Estate, which stands to benefit from Ivy’s Estate.
Portions of the criminal trial transcript that contain stipulated statements from Dr. Christiana Floreani ‘s (“Dr. Floreani”) were admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 (“Pet. Ex. 7”). Dr. Floreani is a psychiatrist who was ordered by the criminal court to evaluate Mordechai. Pet. Ex. 7, p. 150-51. Her evaluation consisted of interviewing Mordechai and Solo, and reviewing police reports, other psychiatric evaluations, medical records, and Mordechai ‘s own handwritten documents. Jd. at 151.
A Certified copy of Solo ‘s response to Independent Administrator of the Estate of Ivy ‘s First Set of Requests to Admit was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. Mordechai ‘s Last Will and Testament was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Mordechai executed his will on May 4, 2019 and died on May 15, 2019. (notice how close those dates are together and do not forget that Solo drafted these documents and further that Mordechai was in Elgin mental institution at the time that he signed these documents). He named Solo ‘s son, Avrohom Soloveichick, as his sole beneficiary. Finally, the Verified Motion to Spread Death of Record of Mordechai Faskowitz was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5.3
C. Examination of Miriam Solo Greenfield Solo is Mordechai’ s sister and the independent executor of his last will and testament. Id. 167 -68. Her son, A vrohom Soloveichick, is the sole beneficiary of Mordechai’ swill. Id. at 260-
Solo testified to her experiences with Mordechai’s ongoing mental health issues. She reported Mordechai’s symptoms started in his late 20s, but he had “his first break with reality”when he started acting erratically and ranting about various delusions at a bar mitzvah. Id. at 178-80. These breaks with reality included paranoid delusions about the Irish mafia, skinheads, demons, the CIA, and the FBI. Id. at 180. Mordechai stated that everyone should eat raw rats to prevent the evils of the world. Id. at 177. Shortly thereafter, Mordechai was hospitalized and it became clear that his mental health symptoms improved with medication. Id. at 179-80.
Solo testified that sometime either before or after the hospitalization, she received a “science fiction letter” from Mordechai that contained his ongoing delusions about skinheads, the government, and Satan cultists. Id. at 180-81. Mordechai hand wrote the letter, copied it, and sent it out to about 70-80 people, including prominent religious figures . Id. at 181 .
In 2003 Mordechai was involuntarily hospitalized after he crashed his car due to the belief that the CIA was chasing him. Id. at 222. Mordechai remained hospitalized until 2010, when he was able to get an apartment through Thresholds’ rehab facility. Id. at 223. Solo stated that around this time, Mordechai was back to his normal self. !d. at 224. In June 2013, Solo reported that Mordechai’s demeanor was calm and happy. Id. at 230-
In August 2013, Solo received a second letter (“Respondents Exhibit 1”) from Mordechai that was almost identical the previous letter he sent out.4 Id. at 185. This letter did not mention 4 lnitially Mordechai ‘s Estate offers the 20 13 letter as exhibit as Respondent Exhibit 2 (Transcript, p. 183), but later clarifies that this letter is Respondent’s Exhibit I (Transcript, p. 246). Additionally, Respondent or the court reporter is confused on whether the second of Mordechai ‘s two letters was written in 2013 or 2003. the word demon or Marjorie ‘s name. Id. at 263. Solo was concerned by the letter and tried to contact Mordechai. Id. at 227. She was unable to contact Mordechai until late August when her friend found him wandering the streets. Id. at 227-28. Solo testified that Mordechai was agitated and pacing, “smelly, dirty, and had lost weight.” !d. at 230, 232. Solo reported that Mordechai refused to answer whether he was taking his medication. Id. at 232. She attempted to call Thresholds but was unable to get through so Mordechai stayed at her house for a few weeks. Id. at 234-37. While at her house, Mordechai ‘s condition did not improve, and he would call Solo hundreds of times a day because he believed people were “tapping the phones.” id. at 235-37. In early September of 2013, Mordechai left Solo’s home after one of her sons returned home to celebrate an upcoming Jewish holiday. Id. at 240. Solo testified that Mordechai believed that her son had to leave because he was an evil force. Id. at 239. Sometime after Mordechai left, Solo discovered that he was hospitalized, but she was unable to obtain information as to why. Id. at 242. Mordechai called Solo after he was discharged from the hospital, but told her that he escaped and then began ranting about his ongoing delusions including that Marjorie was overtaken by evil force. Id. at 243-44. Solo testified that she was contacted by the hospital Mordechai was staying at after he killed Marjorie. Id. at 245-46. She reports that Mordechai was refusing to eat, unless he was brought raw rats. Id. at 246. Solo testified that when she finally got to speak with Mordechai he seemed paranoid and confused. Id. at 247 By the time of the criminal trial in 2016, Solo stated that Mordechai was taking his medication and had “calmed down.” Id. at 248. Solo reported that she had a conversation with Mordechai about killing Marjorie, 12 “[h]e talked about that he was insane when he had done this, that he didn’t realize what he was doing, that he loved [Marjorie], that he never would have hurt her, that his delusions were caused because he couldn’t get his meds.” Id. at 251.
On Solo’s behalf, she made the (very weak argument as follows):
Solo testified to Mordechai ‘s history with mental illness and the delusions he had close to the time of Marjorie’s death. She testified Mordechai stated that Marjorie was taken over by evil force. Solo’s testimony is consistent with the accounts given by Dr. Floreani, Dr. Seltzberg, and Theoharopoulos. [Faskowitz’s Estate makes an argument regarding an affidavit by Solo as well as her responses to interrogatories. While the estate contends that these documents are in the record, neither of these documents, were entered into evidence during bench trial.]
Section 2-6 of the Illinois Probate Act (“Slayer Statute”) states, in pertinent part, as follows: A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any other capacity and whether the property, benefit, or other interest passes pursuant to any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance. The property, benefit, or other interest shall pass as if the person causing the death died before the decedent, provided that with respect to joint tenancy property the interest possessed prior to the death by the person causing the death shall not be diminished by the application of this Section.
Further, evidence of Mordechai’s awareness that he killed a person can be found in Harrington’s testimony. Harrington testified that Mordechai asked him “to come pick up a killed body.” Transcript, at 49 & 52-53. When Harrington responded that the police needed to be called, Mordechai stated he did not want the police involved and hung up. !d. at 50-51.
In conclusion, the court stated:
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Mordechai Faskowitz intentionally and unjustifiably killed Marjorie Ivy. Accordingly, Mordechai and his estate are barred under the Slayer Statute from receiving any benefit or distribution from the Estate of Marjorie Ivy.
Judge McGuire made the correct decision. In no way should Mordecai’s sister and her child benefit from the horrendous slaying death of poor Marjorie Ivy.
And the amount distributed to the relatives of Marjorie Ivy in no manner can ever compensate for such a horrid, horrid death.
And finally, I find it to be way to much of a coincidence that 1) Mordecai isn’t taking his meds and his sister Solo knows but does not make sure he stays safe in a facility; 2) Mordecai’s sister Solo prepares testamentary documents for Marjorie leaving everything to Mordecai, who in turn leaves his estate to Solo’s disabled son; 3) the documents are prepared and Marjorie is murdered; 4) Mordecai is placed in Elgin psych hospital where he signs documents to leave his estate to Solo’s disabled son; 5) Mordecai soon dies.
Anyone notice a pattern here?
Remember Solo was involved in a questionable estate in Florida which was investigated by the Florida ATG where Mordecai was the forgotten child who was not left a dime. (Elsewhere on this blog)
Now we have the Majorie Ivy questionable estate where two people died.
Solo is currently involved in the Estate of Ralla Klepak, another interesting case.
And I’m just noticing the facts. Nothing more. You my dear reader can draw your own conclusions.
As many of you are well aware, having no access to court documents, even the docket sheet is a serious and flagrant method of corruption. Changing the docket sheet and verbiage allows corruption to flourish.
This is especially crucial when 95% of all Illinois counties do not have their court documents on line. Insist that this change. It is not at all difficult to put all documents, not just the docket sheet online.
Here is the link to the 9th judicial court circuit in Illinois and no one has been able to link to it since 2 days.
5534 N. Milwaukee Ave JoAnne Denison, Executive Director Chicago, IL 60630 Cell Phone 773-255-7608 ph 312-553-1300 http://www.justice4every1.com fax 773-423-4455 JoAnne@Justice4Every1.com A social Justice Services NFP
Sheriff Dart Cook County Sheriff’s Offices Cook County, IL via email CCSO@ccsheriff.org
RE: Wrongful Eviction of Dean Sallas 4110 Suffield Court, Skokie, IL Illinois Appellate Case No. 1-22-1111
Dear Sheriff Dart;
I am currently receiving many complaints from ordinary citizens and taxpayers that your offices recently wrongfully evicted Mr. Dean Sallas, age 86, from his home in Skokie Illinois, where he has lived for decades.
This is apparently part of a loosely organized criminal scheme operating out of Probate Court with Judge Boliker as one of the principals, and Elizabeth Cassanova, and attorney from the Office of Public Guardian–an agency well known to take advantage of Illinois senior citizens, force them into nursing homes against their will and then to loot their estates (e.g. case of Lucille Valentino). The history of this agency is extremely poor, and the Probate Court is not much better.
The Record on Appeal together with the brief clearly shows a pattern of ignoring the rights of Dean Sallas and his wife Amelia Sallas and that the eviction which your employees performed under your direction and control, resulted in the false eviction of this man in the dead of winter during freezing temperatures.
The harrowing story in detail of what happened to Amelia and Dean Sallas in Probate and Foreclosure is repeated in several posts on the above cited blogs.
I am herewith demanding that you: 1) provide immediate suitable housing to Mr. Sallas 2) fix up the home of Mr. Sallas at 4110 Suffield Court and return him there as soon as it is suitable clean and ready for his and his wife’s occupancy.
Very Truly Yours,
/s/JoanneDenison/ Joanne Denison, Executive Director, Justice 4 Every1, NFP cc: Chicago FBI, marygsykes.com blog and justice4every1.com blog, Facebook, Twitter, etc.
Yesterday the appellate brief was finally filed by Dean Sallas, 86 years old and in extremely poor health. He has been involuntarily separated from his wife of more than 50 years by the Cook County Guardian’s Offices.
Judge Boliker of the 18th floor Daley Center is involved. Elizabeth Cassanova is involved. Sheriff Dart forcibly and wrongfully evicted Dean Sallas from the home he lived in in Skokie for decades. From Guardianship to Foreclosure and Chancery, Dean didn’t stand a chance with the all pervasive corruption.
I am herewith demanding that Boliker, Cassanova and Dart immediately provide housing for Dean and fix up him home and return him there. There is no excuse for all of this disgusting, horrid and very, very corrupt behavior.
The ARDC does nothing in Cook County, the JIB does nothing. But right now we have living proof of their corruption, an 86 year old husband and father whose life has been utterly destroyed by a Probate judge, the Office of Public Guardian and the Chancery Division, and then there is Sheriff Dart, always ready to send out his minions, goons and thugs to forcibly evict an 86 year old man in frail health who can barely walk.
This is one of the most digusting cases I have ever seen.
And this IS EXACTLY WHY I AM NOT LICENSED TODAY. I am honest about these cases, I run an honest blog and the ARDC hates it. They let corrupt and criminal attorneys run amok at all turns.
I have been told that I CANNOT BE A LICENSED ATTORNEY AND RUN A BLOG that truthfully reports on corrupt cases where attorneys freely dip into the honey pot and steal from Illinois consumers. Ken Ditkowsky also reports on the pervasive corruption, writes reports and letters to the Illinois authorities and the ARDC and JIB and for that reason, HE CANNOT BE A LICENSED ATTORNEY. Attorney Lane Amu reported on corruption where reported a corrupt sitting Illinois Judge and HE CANNOT BE A LICENSED attorney because he reports corruption and complains about it vociferously. He has tried to get his license back, but he cannot get it back.
Attorney Nejla Lane told a judge’s law clerk that her judge in Federal District Court that she is emotionally distraught that the judge does not want to follow Illinois Appellate law and her client is suffering because of it, and she received a 6 month suspension from both the Federal Court System and the State court system.
Anthony Phillips paid attorney Joanne Bruzgul some $20,000 and then got paid in full by probate and refused to provide an accounting and refused to return the overpayment. The ARDC dismissed his complaint. Anthony Phillips complained and his complaint was dismissed.
Recently, attorney Sharon Corse took some $17,000 out of her IOLTA trust account, without a court order, but a court order was required, and she too was told to return that money and she refused.
Today, Judge Michael Forti told Esther Zepeda that she could not reopen a fake $5,800 judgment from the law firm of attorney Tiffany Hughes who handwrote on a client retainer account that she could charge $200 per week until the bill was paid off. The client found more witnesses that TH offices does this frequently and the client found new case law that Illinois Courts cannot be a party to such fraud, and a 1401 proceeding could be used to open a fake judgement even years later. Judge Forti ignored all this and told poor Esther to “be sure to file your Notice of Appeal timely”. What a jerk!
By the way, here is the case, if you have to open up one of the many, many fake judgments issued by these corrupt judges and courts:
Clark v. Lay, 2022 IL App (4th) 220101 (Ill. App. 2022)
Recently, in the Williamson case in Knox County, the (lying) jurors came back with a verdict against Tonny and Penny Williamson to clear the way for a fake judgment that the Catholic Peoria Diocese and Galesburg Rifle Club could take some 150 acres of farmland and timberland away from them, again, in a corrupt probate proceeding. Numerous jurors lied on their juror forms that they had not been arrested, when in fact they had been arrested. One worked for OSF Hospital in Galesburg, an entity that was part of the corruption because OSF allegedly was sending out visiting nurses to care for elderly Fred Stegall, but during that time he was actually found filthy, had not bathed, there was no decedent food in the home, the bread was moldy, the milk sour, meat weeks old, flies everywhere–in January, old trash everywhere. So why did Judge Lane turn down a request to exclude her for cause?
The jury deliberated 5 min and turned over all that farmland to the plaintiffs. No discussion needed apparently.
Next the jury awarded $600k in punitive damages despite the fact that all Tonny and Penny Williamson did was take care of Fred Stegall the last year of his life. They actually spent over $60k on him when the probate court never gave him a dime of his own money for living expenses. The accounting on that case is a funky as weeks old hamburger filled with flies found in his refrigerator and the rotting bags of trash in his kitchen filled with flies.
As the investigation continues there is a lot more to come on that case.
But if you want the courts in Illinois cleared up, start with the ARDC and demand they remove everyone invoved in my case and the cases of Nejla Lane, Ken Ditkowsky and Lare Amu. The list of honest attorneys in Illinois is assuredly dwindling.
MaryGSykes.com 