From KKD: Ohio judge suspended for jailing civil litigants for no reason and acting like a complete jerk


CLEVELAND, Ohio — The Ohio Supreme Court on Tuesday kicked longtime Cleveland Municipal Court Judge Pinkey Carr off the bench and temporarily stripped her of her law license for committing a level of misconductthe majority of justices called “unprecedented.”

The justices voted 5-2 to indefinitely suspend the law license of Carr, the vivacious former assistant county prosecutor who ascended to judgeship in 2012 after helping send serial killer Anthony Sowell to death row.

Carr will be suspended from judicial office without pay. The state’s high court also on Tuesday ordered Carr to immediately “cease and desist” practicing law.

“Carr’s unprecedented misconduct involved more than 100 stipulated incidents that occurred over a period of approximately two years and encompassed repeated acts of dishonesty; the blatant and systematic disregard of due process, the law, court orders, and local rules; the disrespectful treatment of court staff and litigants; and the abuse of capias warrants and the court’s contempt power,” the Supreme Court opinion said. “That misconduct warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.”

The sanction is the most severe punishment the court can hand down short of disbarment.

Carr can apply to have the court reinstate her law license after two years, but she must first convince the justices that she has sufficiently addressed the issues that led the court to take her license.

The court’s majority handed down a more severe punishment than the two-year suspension sought by the court’s Board of Professional Conduct, which said that Carr “ruled her courtroom in a reckless and cavalier manner, unrestrained by the law or the court’s rules.”

Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and justices Patrick Fischer and Jennifer Brunner joined the court’s per curium opinion. First Ohio District Court of Appeals Judge Beth Myers and 10th Ohio District Court of Appeals Judge Lisa Sadler, who sat in place of justices Michael Donnelly and Melody Stewart, also joined the majority. Donnelly and Stewart, who are both from Cuyahoga County, recused themselves from hearing the case.

Justice Sharon Kennedy agreed with the findings of misconduct, but she wrote in a dissenting opinion that she would not have exceeded the conduct board’s recommendation of a two-year suspension. Justice Patrick DeWine joined Kennedy’s dissent.

The majority wrote in Tuesday’s opinion that the court has previously suspended sitting judges who committed a single act of misconduct. Carr’s misdeeds spanned two years and led to multiple people being wrongly arrested and deprived of their liberty, the majority of the justices wrote.

Carr, who had previously sought to explain her misconduct as the result of a mood disorder brought on by mistreated sleep apnea and menopause, asked the court to suspend her for two years with 18 months stayed.

Carr could not be reached for comment.

“We’re disappointed with the severity of the sanction,” Richard Koblentz, the attorney who represented her in her disciplinary case, told and The Plain Dealer.

Koblentz said that Carr apologized for her conduct and admitted to all of the misconduct she was accused of committing during the disciplinary process.

He said he did not know what Carr planned to do in the future.

Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine will appoint someone to take Carr’s seat until voters elect her replacement at a future election.

Carr’s legal troubles do not end there. Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost’s office confirmed to and The Plain Dealer that it has been appointed as a special prosecutor to review whether enough evidence exists to charge Carr with a crime.

It’s unclear how long that review might take.

Carr becomes the first practicing judge in Cleveland to be removed from her seat since 2014, when the Ohio Supreme Court temporarily suspended Angela Stokes while her disciplinary case was pending. Stokes later resigned and agreed to not run for judge again, and the court reinstated her law license in 2016.

Carr’s courtroom was empty shortly after 10 a.m. Tuesday. Her name was removed from the bench.

Pinkey Carr's name was removed from the bench in her Cleveland Municipal Courtroom on Tuesday
Pinkey Carr’s name was removed from the Cleveland Municipal Courtroom bench after the Ohio Supreme Court removed her from office Tuesday.Cory Shaffer,


The investigation into Carr began at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, when she held in-person hearings on March 16 and 17, despite an order from the court’s Administrative Judge Michelle Earley declaring that all such hearings would be postponed.

Carr, who mocked an attorney who admitted to being nervous about being in the courtroom, issued arrest warrants for more than a dozen people who didn’t show up.

After and The Plain Dealer reported about the hearings, Carr told Earley that she did not issue the warrants, according to authorities. She repeated that in an interview with WJW Channel 8.

Carr said she held the hearings for those defendants who showed up and were unaware that their hearings had been postponed. For those who didn’t show up, she said, she simply checked a box on court filings that indicated that they did not show up.

“As far as issuing warrants for their arrest? Absolutely untrue,” Carr told the TV station. and The Plain Dealer requested copies of video from Carr’s courtroom that showed her issuing arrest warrants for people who did not show up in the days before the interview and then immediately afterward.

The Supreme Court’s office of disciplinary counsel investigates allegations of misconduct against lawyers and judges. It opened an investigation into Carr that later expanded to her conduct over several years.

The examination found that Carr was jailing people in an effort to compel them to pay fines to make more money for the court. It also revealed that Carr once ordered a woman to spend 15 days in jail because the woman rolled her eyes and made disparaging remarks about Carr’s courtroom during a hearing. Carr berated the woman, held a contempt hearing, which she failed to recuse herself from, and mischaracterized her actions as a basis to send her to jail, the court found.

She negotiated plea deals with defendants on behalf of city prosecutors who were not present and then falsified journal entries that said prosecutors were involved — an act that the court’s majority said in its opinion could amount to the crime of falsification.

“The severity and scope of [Carr’s] judicial misconduct are unprecedented in Ohio,” the disciplinary counsel’s filing said.

Carr also initially misled her character witnesses and her psychiatrist by telling them that she was facing discipline because she did not check the correct box on a form that then triggered the warrants to be issued. After the disciplinary counsel filed an amended complaint, Carr acknowledged committing the misconduct.

Carr also entered the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, a treatment program for attorneys with substance abuse or mental health issues and began a mentorship program with Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Joan Synenberg. Carr sat in Synenberg’s courtroom and watched her demeanor.

Tuesday’s opinion noted that Carr’s attorneys had asked the court to find that negative stories in the press about Carr’s misconduct amounted to a sanction and counted as mitigating evidence.

The majority of the justices wrote that they “decline to find that truthful media reports of Judge Carr’s flagrant disregard of the administrative order suspending most courthouse activity in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic constitute” mitigating evidence.

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From KKD: Sallas case is a travesty. Apparently now they sold Amelia’s car and pocketed the insurance money!




kenneth ditkowskyWed, Oct 12, 3:59 PM (20 hours ago)
to Katherine, Mary, Judiciary, USDOJ, Illinois, Iardc, Cook,, Ditkowsky, Dean, Janet, Joanne, Chicago, AP,, ADA,,, Tribune,, Rick,, Key, Jay,,, SUNTIMES, Brian, Aging.Ilsenior, Nasga,, Whistleblower, Janet, ABA, The, Aging, ABA, Sam, American,,,, Legal, Probate, Ray,, Robert, Senator, Richard, Ombudsman,, Fox, Kenneth, JANET, Suntimes, U.S., Janet, Whistleblower, FBI, Diana, Ed,, me, CFPB_Ombudsman,, Governor, McKnights, Chicago,, Rhode, WLS-TV, Cordero, Temple, Teena, CEAR, Mary, Chicagobar, The, American, AARP, American, American, Andy, Lanre, Breitbart, Loyola,, CFPB, Cook, Clerk, Crain’s, Human, Diane, Phi,,, International, Durbin, ACLU,,, ABA,, Esp, Federal, International,, Law, Scott,, Governor, National,, Inspectorsgeneral, Chicago, Joe, Janet,, STOP, International, Loyola, News, Ombudsman,,, Judicial, U.S., Ron

The double standard is alive and well in Illinois and in particular in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois cases of 1) In re: Amelia Sallas 07 P 5360, and 2) BYLINE BANK vs. Amelia Sallas 2019 CH 13960.

The Himmel case 125 Ill 2d 531 because it is a Supreme Court of Illinois decision,  is the gold standard and pursuant to the 14th Amendment to the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION the actions of all lawyers are subject to its dictates.  

Unfortunately, it appears affirmatively that corruption has raised its ugly head and in direct violation of the core values of both Illinois and the United States of America the regulators of the legal profession selectively apply not only the ethical considerations of the legal profession in a discriminatory manner, but also the RULE OF LAW.

Most prevalent in this corruption is the scandal involving FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE and in particular the cases of IN RE: AMELIA SALLAS 07 P 5360, and BYLINE BANK vs. AMELIA SALLAS 2019 CH 13960 pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

As the Supreme Court of Illinois has laid out the RULE OF LAW eloquently and in simple terms, I have copied the decision in full for you all to read.      Important parts are given emphasis to wit:

In Re Himmel

125 Ill. 2d 531 (1988)

533 N.E.2d 790

In re JAMES H. HIMMEL, Attorney, Respondent.

No. 65946.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 22, 1988.

Rehearing denied January 30, 1989.

*532 *533 *534 William F. Moran III, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

James H. Himmel, of Palos Heights, respondent pro se.

George B. Collins, of Collins & Bargione, of Chicago, for respondent.

Respondent suspended.

JUSTICE STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a disciplinary proceeding against respondent, James H. Himmel. On January 22, 1986, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint with the Hearing Board, alleging that respondent violated Rule 1-103(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) (107 Ill.2d R. 1-103(a)) by failing to disclose to the Commission information concerning attorney misconduct. On October 15, 1986, the Hearing Board found that respondent had violated the rule and recommended that respondent be reprimanded. The Administrator filed exceptions with the Review Board. The Review Board issued *535 its report on July 9, 1987, finding that respondent had not violated a disciplinary rule and recommending dismissal of the complaint. We granted the Administrator’s petition for leave to file exceptions to the Review Board’s report and recommendation. 107 Ill.2d R. 753(e)(6).

We will briefly review the facts, which essentially involve three individuals: respondent, James H. Himmel, licensed to practice law in Illinois on November 6, 1975; his client, Tammy Forsberg, formerly known as Tammy McEathron; and her former attorney, John R. Casey.

The complaint alleges that respondent had knowledge of John Casey’s conversion of Forsberg’s funds and respondent failed to inform the Commission of this misconduct. The facts are as follows.

In October 1978, Tammy Forsberg was injured in a motorcycle accident. In June 1980, she retained John R. Casey to represent her in any personal injury or property damage claim resulting from the accident. Sometime in 1981, Casey negotiated a settlement of $35,000 on Forsberg’s behalf. Pursuant to an agreement between Forsberg and Casey, one-third of any monies received would be paid to Casey as his attorney fee.

In March 1981, Casey received the $35,000 settlement check, endorsed it, and deposited the check into his client trust fund account. Subsequently, Casey converted the funds.

Between 1981 and 1983, Forsberg unsuccessfully attempted to collect her $23,233.34 share of the settlement proceeds. In March 1983, Forsberg retained respondent to collect her money and agreed to pay him one-third of any funds recovered above $23,233.34.

Respondent investigated the matter and discovered that Casey had misappropriated the settlement funds. In April 1983, respondent drafted an agreement in which Casey would pay Forsberg $75,000 in settlement of any *536 claim she might have against him for the misappropriated funds. By the terms of the agreement, Forsberg agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary action against Casey. This agreement was executed on April 11, 1983. Respondent stood to gain $17,000 or more if Casey honored the agreement. In February 1985, respondent filed suit against Casey for breaching the agreement, and a $100,000 judgment was entered against Casey. If Casey had satisfied the judgment, respondent’s share would have been approximately $25,588.

The complaint stated that at no time did respondent inform the Commission of Casey’s misconduct. According to the Administrator, respondent’s first contact with the Commission was in response to the Commission’s inquiry regarding the lawsuit against Casey.

In April 1985, the Administrator filed a petition to have Casey suspended from practicing law because of his conversion of client funds and his conduct involving moral turpitude in matters unrelated to Forsberg’s claim. Casey was subsequently disbarred on consent on November 5, 1985.

A hearing on the complaint against the present respondent was held before the Hearing Board of the Commission on June 3, 1986. In its report, the Hearing Board noted that the evidence was not in dispute. The evidence supported the allegations in the complaint and provided additional facts as follows.

Before retaining respondent, Forsberg collected $5,000 from Casey. After being retained, respondent made inquiries regarding Casey’s conversion, contacting the insurance company that issued the settlement check, its attorney, Forsberg, her mother, her fiancé, and Casey. Forsberg told respondent that she simply wanted her money back and specifically instructed respondent to take no other action. Because of respondent’s efforts, *537 Forsberg collected another $10,400 from Casey. Respondent received no fee in this case.

The Hearing Board found that respondent received unprivileged information that Casey converted Forsberg’s funds, and that respondent failed to relate the information to the Commission in violation of Rule 1-103(a) of the Code. The Hearing Board noted, however, that respondent had been practicing law for 11 years, had no prior record of any complaints, obtained as good a result as could be expected in the case, and requested no fee for recovering the $23,233.34. Accordingly, the Hearing Board recommended a private reprimand.

Upon the Administrator’s exceptions to the Hearing Board’s recommendation, the Review Board reviewed the matter. The Review Board’s report stated that the client had contacted the Commission prior to retaining respondent and, therefore, the Commission did have knowledge of the alleged misconduct. Further, the Review Board noted that respondent respected the client’s wishes regarding not pursuing a claim with the Commission. Accordingly, the Review Board recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

The Administrator now raises three issues for review: (1) whether the Review Board erred in concluding that respondent’s client had informed the Commission of misconduct by her former attorney; (2) whether the Review Board erred in concluding that respondent had not violated Rule 1-103(a); and (3) whether the proven misconduct warrants at least a censure.

As to the first issue, the Administrator contends that the Review Board erred in finding that Forsberg informed the Commission of Casey’s misconduct prior to retaining respondent. In support of this contention, the Administrator cites to testimony in the record showing that while Forsberg contacted the Commission and received a complaint form, she did not fill out the form, return *538 it, advise the Commission of the facts, or name whom she wished to complain about. The Administrator further contends that even if Forsberg had reported Casey’s misconduct to the Commission, such an action would not have relieved respondent of his duty to report under Rule 1-103(a). Additionally, the Administrator argues that no evidence exists to prove that respondent failed to report because he assumed that Forsberg had already reported the matter.

Respondent argues that the record shows that Forsberg did contact the Commission and was forwarded a complaint form, and that the record is not clear that Forsberg failed to disclose Casey’s name to the Commission. Respondent also argues that Forsberg directed respondent not to pursue the claim against Casey, a claim she had already begun to pursue.

We begin our analysis by examining whether a client’s complaint of attorney misconduct to the Commission can be a defense to an attorney’s failure to report the same misconduct. Respondent offers no authority for such a defense and our research has disclosed none. Common sense would dictate that if a lawyer has a duty under the Code, the actions of a client would not relieve the attorney of his own duty. Accordingly, while the parties dispute whether or not respondent’s client informed the Commission, that question is irrelevant to our inquiry in this case. We have held that the canons of ethics in the Code constitute a safe guide for professional conduct, and attorneys may be disciplined for not observing them. (In re Yamaguchi (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 417, 427, citing In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567.) The question is, then, whether or not respondent violated the Code, not whether Forsberg informed the Commission of Casey’s misconduct.

As to respondent’s argument that he did not report Casey’s misconduct because his client directed him not *539 to do so, we again note respondent’s failure to suggest any legal support for such a defense. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, is duty-bound to uphold the rules in the Code. The title of Canon 1 (107 Ill.2d Canon 1) reflects this obligation: “A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession.” A lawyer may not choose to circumvent the rules by simply asserting that his client asked him to do so.

As to the second issue, the Administrator argues that the Review Board erred in concluding that respondent did not violate Rule 1-103(a). The Administrator urges acceptance of the Hearing Board’s finding that respondent had unprivileged knowledge of Casey’s conversion of client funds, and that respondent failed to disclose that information to the Commission. The Administrator states that respondent’s knowledge of Casey’s conversion of client funds was knowledge of illegal conduct involving moral turpitude under In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 49, 54. Further, the Administrator argues that the information respondent received was not privileged under the definition of privileged information articulated by this court in People v. Adam (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48, cert. denied (1972), 409 U.S. 948, 34 L. Ed. 2d 218, 93 S. Ct. 289. Therefore, the Administrator concludes, respondent violated his ethical duty to report misconduct under Rule 1-103(a). According to the Administrator, failure to disclose the information deprived the Commission of evidence of serious misconduct, evidence that would have assisted in the Commission’s investigation of Casey.

Respondent contends that the information was privileged information received from his client, Forsberg, and therefore he was under no obligation to disclose the matter to the Commission. Respondent argues that his failure to report Casey’s misconduct was motivated by his respect for his client’s wishes, not by his desire for financial *540 gain. To support this assertion, respondent notes that his fee agreement with Forsberg was contingent upon her first receiving all the money Casey originally owed her. Further, respondent states that he has received no fee for his representation of Forsberg.

Our analysis of this issue begins with a reading of the applicable disciplinary rules. Rule 1-103(a) of the Code states:

“(a) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 1-102(a)(3) or (4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.” 107 Ill.2d R. 1-103(a).

Rule 1-102 of the Code states:

“(a) A lawyer shall not (1) violate a disciplinary rule; (2) circumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another; (3) engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; (4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; or (5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 107 Ill.2d R. 1-102.

These rules essentially track the language of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, upon which the Illinois Code was modeled. (See 107 Ill.2d Rules art. VIII, Committee Commentary, at 604.) Therefore, we find instructive the opinion of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that discusses the Model Code’s Disciplinary Rule 1-103 (Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-103 (1979)). Informal Opinion 1210 states that under DR 1-103(a) it is the duty of a lawyer to report to the proper tribunal or authority any unprivileged knowledge of a lawyer’s perpetration of any misconduct listed in Disciplinary Rule 1-102. *541 (ABA Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1210 (1972) (hereinafter Informal Op. 1210).) The opinion states that “the Code of Professional Responsibility through its Disciplinary Rules necessarily deals directly with reporting of lawyer misconduct or misconduct of others directly observed in the legal practice or the administration of justice.” Informal Op. 1210, at 447.

This court has also emphasized the importance of a lawyer’s duty to report misconduct. In the case In re Anglin (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 531, because of the petitioner’s refusal to answer questions regarding his knowledge of other persons’ misconduct, we denied a petition for reinstatement to the roll of attorneys licensed to practice in Illinois. We stated, “Under Disciplinary Rule 1-103 a lawyer has the duty to report the misconduct of other lawyers. (107 Ill.2d Rules 1-103, 1-102(a)(3), (a)(4).) Petitioner’s belief in a code of silence indicates to us that he is not at present fully rehabilitated or fit to practice law.” (Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d at 539.) Thus, if the present respondent’s conduct did violate the rule on reporting misconduct, imposition of discipline for such a breach of duty is mandated.

The question whether the information that respondent possessed was protected by the attorney-client privilege, and thus exempt from the reporting rule, requires application of this court’s definition of the privilege. We have stated that “`(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.'” (People v. Adam (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48 (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)), cert. denied (1972), 409 U.S. 948, 34 L. *542 Ed.2d 218, 93 S. Ct. 289.) We agree with the Administrator’s argument that the communication regarding Casey’s conduct does not meet this definition. The record does not suggest that this information was communicated by Forsberg to the respondent in confidence. We have held that information voluntarily disclosed by a client to an attorney, in the presence of third parties who are not agents of the client or attorney, is not privileged information. (People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252, 295, cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 836, 104 S. Ct. 2364.) In this case, Forsberg discussed the matter with respondent at various times while her mother and her fiancé were present. Consequently, unless the mother and fiancé were agents of respondent’s client, the information communicated was not privileged. Moreover, we have also stated that matters intended by a client for disclosure by the client’s attorney to third parties, who are not agents of either the client or the attorney, are not privileged. (People v. Werhollick (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 459, 462.) The record shows that respondent, with Forsberg’s consent, discussed Casey’s conversion of her funds with the insurance company involved, the insurance company’s lawyer, and with Casey himself. Thus, under Werhollick and probably Williams, the information was not privileged.

Though respondent repeatedly asserts that his failure to report was motivated not by financial gain but by the request of his client, we do not deem such an argument relevant in this case. This court has stated that discipline may be appropriate even if no dishonest motive for the misconduct exists. (In re Weinberg (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 309, 315; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283.) In addition, we have held that client approval of an attorney’s action does not immunize an attorney from disciplinary action. (In re Thompson (1963), 30 Ill. 2d 560, 569; People ex rel. Scholes v. Keithley (1906), 225 Ill. 30, 41.) We *543 have already dealt with, and dismissed, respondent’s assertion that his conduct is acceptable because he was acting pursuant to his client’s directions.

Respondent does not argue that Casey’s conversion of Forsberg’s funds was not illegal conduct involving moral turpitude under Rule 1-102(a)(3) or conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under Rule 1-102(a)(4). (107 Ill.2d Rules 1-102(a)(3), (a)(4).) It is clear that conversion of client funds is, indeed, conduct involving moral turpitude. (In re Levin (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 77, 88; In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 49, 54.) We conclude, then, that respondent possessed unprivileged knowledge of Casey’s conversion of client funds, which is illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, and that respondent failed in his duty to report such misconduct to the Commission. Because no defense exists, we agree with the Hearing Board’s finding that respondent has violated Rule 1-103(a) and must be disciplined.

The third issue concerns the appropriate quantum of discipline to be imposed in this case. The Administrator contends that respondent’s misconduct warrants at least a censure, although the Hearing Board recommended a private reprimand and the Review Board recommended dismissal of the matter entirely. In support of the request for a greater quantum of discipline, the Administrator cites to the purposes of attorney discipline, which include maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and safeguarding the administration of justice. The Administrator argues that these purposes will not be served unless respondent is publicly disciplined so that the profession will be on notice that a violation of Rule 1-103(a) will not be tolerated. The Administrator argues that a more severe sanction is necessary because respondent deprived the Commission of evidence of another attorney’s conversion and thereby interfered with *544 the Commission’s investigative function under Supreme Court Rule 752 (107 Ill.2d R. 752). Citing to the Rule 774 petition (107 Ill.2d R. 774) filed against Casey, the Administrator notes that Casey converted many clients’ funds after respondent’s duty to report Casey arose. The Administrator also argues that both respondent and his client behaved in contravention of the Criminal Code’s prohibition against compounding a crime by agreeing with Casey not to report him, in exchange for settlement funds.

In his defense, respondent reiterates his arguments that he was not motivated by desire for financial gain. He also states that Forsberg was pleased with his performance on her behalf. According to respondent, his failure to report was a “judgment call” which resulted positively in Forsberg’s regaining some of her funds from Casey.

In evaluating the proper quantum of discipline to impose, we note that it is this court’s responsibility to determine appropriate sanctions in attorney disciplinary cases. (In re Levin (1987), 118 Ill. 77, 87, citing In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323.) We have stated that while recommendations of the Boards are to be considered, this court ultimately bears responsibility for deciding an appropriate sanction. (In re Weinberg (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 309, 314, citing In re Winn (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 334, 337.) We reiterate our statement that “`[w]hen determining the nature and extent of discipline to be imposed, the respondent’s actions must be viewed in relationship “to the underlying purposes of our disciplinary process, which purposes are to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, to protect the administration of justice from reproach, and to safeguard the public.” (In re LaPinska (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 461, 473.)'” In re Levin (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 77, 87, quoting In re Crisel (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 332, 343.

*545 Bearing these principles in mind, we agree with the Administrator that public discipline is necessary in this case to carry out the purposes of attorney discipline. While we have considered the Boards’ recommendations in this matter, we cannot agree with the Review Board that respondent’s conduct served to rectify a wrong and did not injure the bar, the public, or the administration of justice. Though we agree with the Hearing Board’s assessment that respondent violated Rule 1-103 of the Code, we do not agree that the facts warrant only a private reprimand. As previously stated, the evidence proved that respondent possessed unprivileged knowledge of Casey’s conversion of client funds, yet respondent did not report Casey’s misconduct.

This failure to report resulted in interference with the Commission’s investigation of Casey, and thus with the administration of justice. Perhaps some members of the public would have been spared from Casey’s misconduct had respondent reported the information as soon as he knew of Casey’s conversions of client funds. We are particularly disturbed by the fact that respondent chose to draft a settlement agreement with Casey rather than report his misconduct. As the Administrator has stated, by this conduct, both respondent and his client ran afoul of the Criminal Code’s prohibition against compounding a crime, which states in section 32-1:

“(a) A person compounds a crime when he receives or offers to another any consideration for a promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosecution of an offender. (b) Sentence. Compounding a crime is a petty offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 32-1.)

Both respondent and his client stood to gain financially by agreeing not to prosecute or report Casey for conversion. According to the settlement agreement, respondent would have received $17,000 or more as his fee. If Casey had satisfied the judgment entered against him for failure *546 to honor the settlement agreement, respondent would have collected approximately $25,588.

We have held that fairness dictates consideration of mitigating factors in disciplinary cases. (In re Yamaguchi (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 417, 428, citing In re Neff (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 20.) Therefore, we do consider the fact that Forsberg recovered $10,400 through respondent’s services, that respondent has practiced law for 11 years with no record of complaints, and that he requested no fee for minimum collection of Forsberg’s funds. However, these considerations do not outweigh the serious nature of respondent’s failure to report Casey, the resulting interference with the Commission’s investigation of Casey, and respondent’s ill-advised choice to settle with Casey rather than report his misconduct.

Accordingly, it is ordered that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Respondent suspended.

The foregoing decision is the LAW OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.    Unfortunately, like so much of the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW the law applies to only those who have no clout (i.e., influence – especially political or judicial influence).      Thus, when Lanre Amu reports that Judge X has a conflict of interest and is on the Board of Directors of the defendant, and her brother is the defendant’s attorney, even though CRAINS CHICAGO BUSINESS independently makes the identical averment, Amu is declared a danger to the public and is disciplined.

In the Sallas cases cited supra the Guardianship scandal is highlighted!      The all-out full court press to facilitate the HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN GRANDMA is exposed.      The mandate of Himmel is ostentatiously ignored.      Let me provide you with an example.

Amongst the Laws of the State of Illinois are two major statutes that address Guardianship, and the relationship of the world with a person allegedly protected by Guardianship.     755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b provides the Court with the authority and the criteria for appointing a guardian, to wit:

   (b) Guardianship shall be utilized only[1] as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual's actual mental, physical, and adaptive limitations. The order shall conform with Sections 11a-12 and 11a-14.
(Source: P.A. 102-72, eff. 1-1-22.)

The words: “only to the extent necessitated by the individual's actual mental, physical, and adaptive limitations “are consistent with the 14th Amendment limitations on Guardianship and assure society unequivocally that Guardianship will not be human trafficking.     Unfortunately, such is exactly what has occurred because Himmel and the authorizing statute have been ignored.     In fact, what has happened is the Court and Mr. Sallas (in the Sallas cases) have been and are being held hostage.

On January 25, 2018 according to the sworn pleadings filed in the Circuit Court by the Byline Bank in case 2019 CH 13960 the Byline Bank in direct violation of the provisions of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 22 had Mrs. Sallas, a person for whom a Guardian had been appointed due to the court order finding her to be disabled, sign COMMERCIAL LOAN documents connoting an approximately $175,000.00 loan balance secured by her home in Skokie, Illinois.

Amongst the Laws of the State of Illinois was 755 ILCS 5/11a – 22 which in words and phrases stated:

 (755 ILCS 5/11a-22) (from Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-22)
    Sec. 11a-22. Trade and contracts with a person with a disability.
    (a) Anyone who by trading with, bartering, gaming or any other device, wrongfully possesses himself of any property of a person known to be a person with a disability commits a Class A misdemeanor.
    (b) Every note, bill, bond or other contract by any person for whom a plenary guardian has been appointed or who is adjudged to be unable to so contract is void as against that person and his estate, but a person making a contract with the person so adjudged is bound thereby.
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)

On February 15, 2018 the record in case 2007 P 536o reveals that attorneys for Charles P. Golbert appeared before the Honorable S. Boliker, one the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois and by Petition informed the Court that their ward had a loan with the Byline Bank in the amount of approximately $175,000.00 and they had negotiated an extension on the loan that was beneficial to their ward.

The representation was a bold-faced prevarication!     The Guardian knew of should have known that 3 weeks earlier, in direct violation of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 22 the Byline Bank had secured the signature of Mrs. Sallas well knowing of the criminality of said act.     There was no current negotiation at said time – in fact, the criminal act had been completed!     The Guardian, its attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and the hanger on attorneys who for some reason appear and participate in this Guardianship proceeding in direct contravention of the marital and other rights of Mrs. Sallas’ spouse of more than 50 years ALL HAD KNOWLEDGE that at some relevant time of the CRIMINAL ACTS of the Byline Bank and the morally reprehensible concealment of them by Mr. Charles P. Golbert, It is suggested that each of attorneys participated in the 'cover up' and violation of FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE LAWS including section 22.

It is suggested that the actions of Byline Bank in addition to violating 755 ILCS 5/11a – 22 the very same actions may have violated other Federal and State Criminal acts including but not limited to Mail and Wire fraud.    OF COURSE, the disciplinary process did not and apparently does not apply to any of these special judicial souls!     Even the verified complaint filed by the BYLINE BANK in case 2019 CH 13960 did not induce any of the high moral criteria mandated by the guardian, the Judges involved, or any of the other attorneys hanging around the FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE proceedings going on in the Cook County Circuit Court.

The outrageous domestic terrorism of record in case 07 P 5360 and 2019 CH 13960 continued unabated augmenting itself as Mr. and Mrs. Sallas refused to attorn to their fates!     Cries for H E L P  were and are ignored, and today, Mrs. Sallas, who prior to being victimized by the violation of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 22 had all her teeth, was mobile, and had the companionship, love, and marriage relationship with her husband of more than ½ a century, today is monitored so that she cannot talk to her husband, and unvetted people who desire to talk with her (such a Journalist JP).    Vivacious Amy Sallas no longer is mobile and has had her teeth removed.        Indeed, in case 07 P 5360 the Guardian stands guard to make certain that no reasonable, necessary, or beneficial activity should befall Mrs. Sallas.    (Judge Boliker, has been heard to proclaim that Mrs. Sallas has not been deprived of her liberty and her family can visit at will – Mr. Sallas apparently even after half a century is not included in the definition of family, even though 100% of the family savings and family assets are MARITAL PROPERTY and earned by the joint efforts of both parties to the marriage.)

Very troubling is tomorrow’s MOTION filed by the Guardian.   To be candid – it has all the same attributes as the MOTION brought before Judge Boliker on February 15, 2018.     

Pursuant to Himmel, and as a compliance by all the individuals who manifest a desire for the RULE OF LAW to prevail in the Courthouse we submit to LAW ENFORCEMENT, and the disciplinary commissions the following facts, to wit:

In 2018 as part of the unwanted, un=necessary, unauthorized ex=parte, ultra vires, effective only in the limited jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois secret dissolution of marriage of Sallas, the guardian filed a claim that a vehicle (marital property) was stolen.    A claim was made and approximately $4000.00 was recovered the guardian.

As the vehicle was not stolen and the Guardian was so informed, it was inevitable that at some point in time the vehicle would be noticed by local law enforcement.     Indeed, it was and was - even though not missing or stolen – was towed and sits now drawing storage charges.    It appears that even though the vehicle is clearly marital property and the Guardian’s authority could not and was not extended to marital property the motion seeks to address the vehicle’s future without addressing the clear ULTRA VIRES conduct of the guardian and the fact that falsely reporting marital property stolen was neither reasonable, necessary, or beneficial to Mrs. Sallas.    In fact, the action of the Guardian is an infringement on the property rights of Mr. Sallas.   The vehicle (as the 8 million plus in savings that has disappeared as the result of this guardianship) is in fact marital property that the parties earned over the past 50 plus years by their joint efforts.

The Guardian, in my estimation appears to be appearing before Judge Boliker to exert undue influence on her to retro=actively obtain her signature on a Court order that can be used to exonerate the knowing and wrongful filing of a false insurance claim, fraudulent claiming that marital property (over which the guardian could not and was not given authority) had been stolen.

Pursuant to the requirement of 18 USCA 4 and the Illinois Supreme Court decision of HIMMEL (the opinion being reproduced supra) the actions of Guardian and co-conspirators is reported to LAW ENFORCEMENT and to the disciplinary authorities.     If HIMMEL has meaning and is not just patently deceptive cake dressing the gambit of the Guardian will be investigated and dealt with.   

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT even though it appears that the Guardian acts as if it were the alter-ego of the ward, it is not.   It is limited by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the words of 755 ILCS 5/11a – 3b.        

Guardianship shall be utilized only as is necessary to promote the well-being of the person with a disability, to protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual's actual mental, physical, and adaptive limitations.

It is axiomatic that the guardian even within the parameters of section 3b is still limited to actions that are: 1) reasonable, 2) necessary, and 3) beneficial to the ward.     Filing false insurance claims or the cover-up of wrongful actions in my humble opinion does not meet that criterion.   

[1] When a guardian is appointed, the ward does not forfeit all her rights, privileges and immunities.    The word may be adjudicated to have certain disabilities.    Under the 14th Amendment to the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION only as in regard to these specific disabilities (if any) does the guardian obtain any jurisdiction.    The free will of the ward (as well as all rights, privileges and immunities) are retained.    No forfeiture can occur because of disability as disability is NOT A CRIME.   

Thus, the appointment of a guardian is limited strictly to assisting the ward on as is 1) necessary, 2) reasonable, and 3) actually beneficial to the ward.   The guardian does not become the alter-ego of the ward, nor is the guardian given carte blanc to run roughshod over the savings and assets of the ward.    Certainly, the guardian has no authority whatsoever to in any way exercise any dominion or control over the assets of the ward’s spouse.   Property remains intact and marital property remains out of reach of the Guardian, unless special circumstances exist that are adjudicated in accordance with due process protections before the Domestic Relations division upon property, complaint, notice and hearing.    IN SIMPLE WORDS – the guardian is not the alter-ego of his ward and does not become the reincarnation of the ward.   The guardian’s authority is strictly limited.

Ken Ditkowsky

kenneth ditkowskyWed, Oct 12, 5:28 PM (18 hours ago)
to Dean, Janet, Ditkowsky

I was thinking that this e

From TW: Law firm had duty to file gship to protect client’s interest in settlement proceeds

NOVEMBER 9, 2021

Law Firm Had A Duty To Notify Probate Court of Client’s Disability

By The Clinton Law Firm

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In Estate of Christo v. Law Offices of Thomas Leahy, 2021 IL App (1st) 200575-U, the Appellate Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of a law firm in a legal malpractice case filed by the Public Guardian. The Leahy Firm had represented Barbara Rose Christo, Peter Christo and Fay Christo in a wrongful death action arising out of the death of their father, Thomas Christo.

The case settled and each plaintiff received approximately $550,000. The complaint alleged that Peter Christo misappropriated the funds belonging to his sister, Barbara, who was disabled. The legal malpractice complaint alleged that the Law Firm was aware that Barbara had significant intellectual disabilities but it failed to seek a guardianship for Barbara or otherwise protect her interest in her share of the settlement funds.

After a bench trial the trial court ruled in favor of the Law Firm on all claims holding that the Law Firm met the duty of care and that Barbara could not prove proximate causation. Barbara appealed on several grounds. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment on the ground that the trial court had misstated the evidence, in particular the testimony of a Doctor who testified that Barbara was disabled.

The court held that there was sufficient evidence introduced in the record that Barbara was disabled, the Law Firm should have known she was disabled and that the Law Firm had a duty to inform the trial court of Barbara’s disability.

Comment: this case is significant as it makes it clear that a law firm has a duty to inform the court if its client has an intellectual disability.

Should you have a question about a legal malpractice case, do not hesitate to contact us.

Attorney tells judge that judge is being biased and unfair and is disciplined for 9 months

See attached links to pleadings.

link to decision of review board:

link to Petition for Writ of Cert to SCOI:

From the Review Board board decision:

The Administrator charged Respondent with the following misconduct: (1) in representing
a client, engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal; (2) making a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge; and (3) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rules 3.5(d), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
The Administrator presented testimony from Respondent as an adverse witness. The
Administrator’s Exhibits 1-13 were admitted into evidence. (Tr. 16). Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented Michael Fields as a character witness. Respondent’s Exhibits 1.1-1.3, 2.1-2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 5.9, 5.10, 5.28, 5.30, 5.31, 5.33-5.38, 6.1-6.3, 9.23, 10.1-10.5, 11.3, 11.5, 11.7, and 11.8 were admitted into evidence. (Tr. 487-521).1
The Administrator bears the burden of proving the charges of misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Thomas, 2012 IL 113035, ¶ 56. Clear and convincing evidence
constitutes a high level of certainty, which is greater than a preponderance of the evidence but less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477, 577 N.E.2d 762 (1991). The Hearing Board assesses witness credibility, resolves conflicting testimony, makes factual findings, and determines whether the Administrator met the burden of proof. In re Winthrop, 219 Ill. 2d 526, 542-43, 848 N.E.2d 961 (2006).
Respondent is charged with making false or reckless statements impugning Magistrate
Judge Finnegan’s integrity, engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, and engaging
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rules 3.5(d), 8.2(a) and
A. Summary
The Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent sent three
emails to Magistrate Judge Finnegan’s email account containing statements about Magistrate Judge Finnegan’s integrity that were false or made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. By sending the inappropriate emails, particularly after being instructed not to do so, Respondent engaged in conduct that disrupted the tribunal and prejudiced the administration of justice.
B. Admitted Facts and Evidence Considered
Respondent has been licensed to practice in Illinois since 2006. She is also licensed in
Texas and Michigan. (Tr. 54-55).
Barry Epstein hired Respondent in 2012 to represent him in a dissolution proceeding filed
by Paula Epstein. In 2014, Respondent filed a complaint on Barry’s behalf in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Paula and her attorney, Jay Frank, violated federal law by accessing Barry’s private emails without his authorization. (Tr. 55). Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan (Judge Finnegan) supervised discovery in the federal proceeding. Judge Finnegan maintained an email account known as the “proposed order account”.
The charges before us arise from three email messages Respondent sent to the proposed order account and others involved in the Epstein proceedings. (Tr. 56).
Respondent sent the first email at issue on April 18, 2017, after Judge Finnegan denied her
emergency motion for an extension of time to take Paula’s deposition. Respondent sent the email to the proposed order account, opposing counsel Scott Schaefers, and Scott White, the courtroom deputy. It stated as follows in relevant part:
Today in court, no matter what I said to you, you had already made up your mind,
and even questioned my sincerity with regard to my preparation for upcoming trial.

. . . since the beginning, you never seem to doubt anything he [Schaefers] says, as
you appear to doubt me. Still, I stated to you in open court that “I don’t want to be
hated” for doing my job, but it sure seems that way, as I never get a break. Scott is
the lucky guy who senses same as he can just pick up the phone to call you knowing
he will get his way…or for so-called the Posner Defense2.

It’s not fair that my client (and I) is [sic] being treated badly for suing his wife/ex
wife, and everyone is protecting Paula – why? Since when does “two” wrongs make
a “right”? [sic] How am I to prove my case if I am not given a fair chance to do
my work, properly.
(Adm. Ex. 1).
The following day, Judge Finnegan instructed Respondent that the parties were not to use
the proposed order account to argue the merits of a motion, share their feelings about a ruling, or talk generally about the case with her. She told Respondent her email was improper and directed her not to send any such emails in the future. (Adm. Ex. 1). Respondent received and understood
Judge Finnegan’s instructions. (Tr. 69-70).
On June 15, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to extend discovery and for leave to depose
Jay Frank. Judge Finnegan denied the motion. Allison Engel, Judge Finnegan’s law clerk, emailed a copy of Judge Finnegan’s order to Respondent and Schaefers at 6:37 p.m. on June 23, 2017. Two hours later, Respondent sent an email to Engel, Schaefers, and the proposed order account which stated as follows, in relevant part:
I’m very upset, I do not agree with Judge Finnegan’s order and I will depose the
former co-defendant, Jay Frank, despite the fact this court is protecting him and his
co-conspirer! Scott Schaefers had no standing to challenge my subpoena to depose
Jay Frank! I’m entitled to depose him! And I will call him to testy [sic] at trial to
show the world what a corrupt lawyer he is! And the judges who protect this
criminal by squeezing the discovery deadlines!!! No no no!
This is outrageous order of Judge Finnegan and it will be addressed accordingly!
Judges are helping the criminal to escape punishment by forcing to shorten all
This Judge is violating my client’s rights first by the truncated discovery deadlines
and now helping Plaintiff to escape punishment for wrongs she committed!
I’m outraged by the miscarriage of justice and judges are in this to delay and deny
justice for my client!
I’m sickened by this Order!!!
(Adm. Ex. 2).
On June 26, 2017, Respondent sent another email to Engel, Schaefers, and the proposed
order account, which stated as follows in relevant part:
Plaintiff’s motion is not late just because this court decided not to extend discovery
deadlines, to protect the Defendant! I have asked this court numerous times for an
extension of all cutoff deadlines, without avail. Take this into account when
drafting your flawed order.

For anyone to insult me in this degree calls questions [sic] this court’s sincerity and
veracity. How dare you accuse me of not having looked at the SC docket regularly.

How do you know I did not see the SC order???? Where do you get this
information? Exparte communications with Defendant’s attorney, Scott? –
smearing dirt behind my back?
The more I read this order, again and again, I am sick to my stomach, and I get
filled with anger and disgust over this ‘fraudulent’ order by this court!

You both, Allison and J. Finnegan, have done me wrong, and depicted me very
poorly in your public order. How dare you do that to me?!
What goes around comes around, justice will be done at the end! I wonder how you
people sleep at night? Including Scott! (Adm. Ex. 3).
On June 27, 2017, Judge Finnegan entered an order admonishing Respondent for violating
her directives related to the proposed order account and making highly inappropriate statements.
Judge Finnegan directed Respondent to immediately cease all email communication with her and her staff. (Adm. Ex. 4).

End pertinent portions

I just don’t understand why the judge had to file a disciplinary complaint over 3 emails which simply pointed out that Attorney Lane believed that the Judge was favoring opposing counsel over her client. It is not uncommon for judges to take a husband’s side over the wife’s side or vice versa, but that should not happen. And in reality, the discovery period was in fact uncommonly short. That should not happen either.

We all know what to do when someone emails you and you don’t like the person, their email, their opinions and even the horse they rode in on. You block them. It takes only two key strikes, click on block and confirm and you’re done. Even children as young as 5 know how to do this. But this judge can’t do tht and just move on? Obivously she has an ego problem, is in fact biased and a goddess complex where she can’t ever be criticized but she will wait and listen for criticism and then file a bar complaint against the attorney that is merely pointing out flaws in what the judge is doing.

Judges cannot and should not be immune from criticism. They are not supposed to read books or watch the news, so who will them them when they are clearly out of bounds and no one is noticing it.

And in addition, they were all lawyers, and you cannot insult a lawyer, no matter how hard you try. They got the no criticism vaccine soon as they took their judicial oath.

If this judge does not like an attorney’s emails, she has the right to block her. No judge has to listen to anything from an attorney that is not in a pleading.

As for routine scheduling matters, the judges shouldn’t be getting into that either. They all have assistants.

Three emails criticizing a judge over bias should also be a constitutional right.

The first amendment grants the right to criticize your government, with almost no exceptions.

Free speech is subject to the standard of “strict scrutiny” which requires:

  1. a compelling govt interest (and exactly what is compelling about controlling anyone’s right to criticize a judge regarding bias?)
  2. That there is no lesser restrictive means to controlling the speech (assuming that there is a compelling reason in the first place). Certainly there is an easy, simple means for judges to control speech they don’t like, it’s called blocking an email.
  3. That the action taken will be effective and will work.

Attorneys do not lose their ability to criticize a judge just because they have a law license.

The 9 month discipline is insane in light of the fact the judge could have easily blocked the attorney and let the judge’s assistant deal with the attorney. These emails were directed to the judge’s assistant regardless. The assistant’s job clearly is not to relay complaints to the judge, she should direct the attorney instead to the (worthless) JIB or Judicial Inquiry Board. And then they will contact the Judge about the complaints, but isn’t this the same thing? Does it really matter that one step was skipped in all of this.

In any case, this whole matter is ridiculous and should have never happened in the first place. Attorney Lane apologized to the Judge but the Judge never apologized to Lane about reporting her over 3 emails that she didn’t have to read or see, that was her choice. Bad choice.

But the real upshot in all of this is that attorneys routinely steal thousands of dollars from the public, do nothing and then client complains to the ARDC and the ARDC does absolutely nothing. Cases in point: Anthony Phillips paid attorney Joanne Bruzgul some $22k for a probate case. She filed a fee petition for $60,000 and got paid in full. Anthony Phillips should have been refunded $22k by Bruzgul and he sent a complaint and a demand for an accounting from the ARDC. ARDC does bupkis; 2) In the estate of Alice Gore attorney Miriam Solo wants to be paid $60k, but the estate has already been looted and down to zero. So she gets the probate court to rubber stamp a false judgment (alleging daughter stole $60k from the accounts, but the accountings do not show any theft), so what does the ARDC do about the fake $60k judgement? again nada and zilch; 3) in the infamous Mary Sykes case, the estate is looted, but attorney Peter Schmeidel has a legal bill for $260k, so what does he do? Another fake judgment against daughter Gloria Sykes alleging she stole $260k from the estate, but she didn’t steal anything, these were insurance proceeds from a policy she paid for, on a house that was hers for mold damage and breast cancer she got from the mold.

Attorneys steal all over the place, but go complain to the ARDC and what will you get? zilch and zero.

Make a federal district court judge shed a tear over 3 emails complaining of bias and improper conduct by a judge, what do you get? 9 months of discipline.

And the way the ARDC goes on and on about how the statements were false (no, they were not, the ARDC wasn’t there) and impugned the integrity of the court (which likely had no integrity in the first place) and “disrupted” a tribunal (really? two keystrokes to hit the block feature? really?) is beyond the pale.

Everyone should have the free and open right to criticize a judge when she wanders into the territory of patent bias and corruption.

Now that should be protected speech.

And the ARDC should get off it’s duff and stop attorneys from openly stealing thousands from clients and the public.

We all know what’s going on. Neither judges nor the ARDC can hide their currying favor with judges, hiding obvious crimes and gross failure to protect the public.

Indigent woman in Jamestown Tennessee needs help with laundry!

Please email me or Sonya if you can help her with her laundry. Her employer has told her she must wear freshly laundered clothing to work and she has no car or laundry facilities that are near and/or she can afford and walk to. She has lower hip and back pain when she walks. If anyone can reach out to her and help her, please email her at thank you for reading this and thinking about helping her

Information on Probate Victim’s Group in LA

From DA, 9/18/22

Prob a t e Cou rt Vict im Support Group
It is true that there is trauma when you are a petitioner, respondent, defendant and/or plaintiff in Court. Your trauma is NOT unique, and you are NOT alone. We are here with you in the dark, on the phone, in your closet crying, in your bed unable to get out, we are here.
Do you have proof that your lawyer lied court appointed attorney lied to the Court, no matter
how big or small? You are not alone. Do you feel your rights have been violated? You are not alone. Attorneys appointed to your case work for the ward. When the appointed attorney
misrepresents to the Court that is punishable by the law. Report the attorney to the authorities as an upstanding citizen. Soon enough the authorities will investigate the lawless as they should.
Did you know that you have a right to have a fair and unbiased investigation in your case by the attorney appointed in your case?
Did you know that according to this law you have a right to due process? 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Right to Family – Due Process)
Did you know according to this law you have a right to parent your children. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.702 (1997), Prob. Code, §§ 1510, subd. (a), 1514, subds. (a), (b). In Vaughan: The trial court denied the [grandparents’] petition because the mother had not intended to abandon the children. [Vaughan, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1055 at 1056, emphasis added]
Did you know according to this law you have a right to be a family? 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Right to Family – Equal Protection) Prob. Code, §§ 1510, subd. (a), 1514, subds. (a), (b). In Vaughan: The trial court denied the [grandparents’] petition because the mother had not intended to abandon the children. [Vaughan, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1055 at 1056, emphasis added] this also covers elderly parent with an adult child Petitioning to be their caregiver.
Did you know the higher court has decided that state court has no authority to separate siblings without a medical professional opinion documenting the effects of that separation. [Williams supra, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808 at 809] In re Marriage of Williams, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 923, 924 (2001) (“Williams”) and Guardianship of Vaughan, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1055, 1056, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 217 (2012) (“Vaughan”).
Let us begin with Williams, a case in which: [A]ppellant father appealed an order of the Santa Barbara County Superior Court (California) permitting two of four children to move out of the state with respondent mother. [Williams, supra, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808 at 809]
In Williams: The lower court ordered that the oldest child and the youngest child could move to Utah with appellant, while the middle children were to remain in California with respondent. Appellant argued that the lower court abused its discretion because it separated siblings from each other. Respondent argued that the lower court abused its discretion with respect to the middle children because there was no basis for distinguishing between them and their siblings.
The instant court concluded that the lower court abused its discretion because the record did
not show compelling circumstances warranting the separation of the siblings, as there was no evidence in the record of the impact that separation would have on these children. In the
absence of such evidence, the instant court could not affirm the lower court’s order even on the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Williams, supra, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808 at 809, emphasis added]
Williams reversed thus refusing to separate the children. The matter was remanded for
reconsideration in light of the new rule the court announced, i.e., that in the absence of
evidence regarding the effect of separation on the children, it is an abuse of discretion to
separate them. Turning to Vaughan, that case too is easily distinguishable from this case. In Vaughan, Appellants, two minor children, sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Trinity County (California), which denied a petition by respondent grandparents for a probate guardianship over the children pursuant to Prob. Code, §§ 1510, subd. (a), 1514, subds. (a), (b). In Vaughan: The trial court denied the [grandparents’] petition because the mother had not intended to abandon the children. [Vaughan, supra, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1055 at 1056, emphasis added] In Vaughan, the Court had to balance between parental rights versus the children’s apparent preference to live with their grandparents. While the Court presumably considered the children’s wishes, it was parental rights that carried the day, as was appropriate. A parent’s right to the care and companionship of his or her child is a fundamental constitutional right. See e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).


If you need someone to talk to and you feel alone. Text Donecia Augustus (310) 663-9527 – we have a group of parents and victims of Probate Court Abuse, if we can help you or support you, we will.
The Justice Channel –
The Ugly Judge –
Court Victims National Data Base –
This flyer is not intended to be legal advice. We strongly recommend consulting with an attorney licensed in your state or area.

Defective Samsung Refrigerators–Cooling Tower Freezing Repeatedly and/or Ice Maker Freezing Over

If you have a Samsung Refrigerator and the ice maker and/or the cooling tower is freezing over repeatedly, call 1-800-SAMSUNG and demand a full refund. You may have to talk to 2 or 3 agents to get a promise of a refund, but keep on calling them back. Mention to the agent on the phone that these problems with their refrigerators are all over the internet, they are common and you want your money back. Buy something else. If you don’t receive a full refund in 4 to 6 weeks, go ahead and sue them in small claims court. These refrigerators are a defective product in a defective condition. You will want to mention your state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act and/or Consumer Fraud Act in your complaint. You can sue the store, the distributor and the manufacturer (Samsung). If you have any repair bills, food spoilage receipts or drug spoilage receipts, bring these to court and the judges will typically reimburse you for these damages. Most states allow you to collect extra damages and attorneys fees, if the conduct is contemptuous, and this certainly is. You might have the right to a jury trial. You can sue for breach of contract, consumer fraud, etc. Ask for punitive damages and attorneys fees in the complaint because the defects are well know and Samsung has not solved the problem in years. If you have problems drafting a complaint, let me know and I will draft a general one for and publish it on this blog so you can see a sample complaint for your state( in the US court system only). These refrigerators cost $3,000 to $5,000 out of the box, and there is no reason they should not function perfectly well for 8 to 10 years minimum.

If you want to try to fix your refrigerators yourself, there are plenty of good videos on on how to correct problems such as: cooling tower freezing over, ice maker freezing over, drain clogged, etc. has repair kits for these problems now. Call them and watch their youtube videos.

Good luck. Leave comments and feedback below.