While this article gets a number of things wrong (juveniles can only be charged with juvenile deliquency NOT with any actual crime), this article does show several issues 1) no one really understands the Illinois Eavesdropping Act of 2014; 2) Adults in charge of children who don’t want to be held accountable may get an overzealous prosecutor to use it to quell 1st Amendment rights of children in the US and 3)  it’s a near impossible battle to charge anyone with using a cell phone to record an event, they’re so prevalent, we may as just forget that one.  But, if the principal didn’t want to be recorded, he should have just walked away and emailed the student and the student’s parents.

In reality, the principal is a public servant and as such, he should expect to be recorded. Most principals get paid handsomely for a 9 to 5 or 8 or 4 job, so I don’t have much sympathy.

in any case, here is one article on the event:

Illinois 13-year-old charged with eavesdropping felony for recording meeting with principal

Obviously when Boron grows up he needs to be a lawyer.

If you get a chance, fax or email the principal and tell him he’s wrong and to drop the charges.  What he did was utterly shameful.

https://hslda.org/content/docs/nche/000000/00000075.asp

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court Upholding Parental Rights as “Fundamental”

The Supreme Court of the United States has traditionally and continuously upheld the principle that parents have the fundamental right to direct the education and upbringing of their children. A review of cases taking up the issue shows that the Supreme Court has unwaveringly given parental rights the highest respect and protection possible. What follows are some of the examples of the Court’s past protection of parental rights.

In Meyer v. Nebraska,¹ the Court invalidated a state law which prohibited foreign language instruction for school children because the law did not “promote” education but rather “arbitrarily and unreasonably” interfered with “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life…” ² The court chastened the legislature for attempting “materially to interfere� with the power of parents to control the education of their own.” ³ This decision clearly affirmed that the Constitution protects the preferences of the parent in education over those of the State. In the same decision, the Supreme Court also recognized that the right of the parents to delegate their authority to a teacher in order to instruct their children was protected within the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment. ⁴

Furthermore, the Court emphasized, “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of the individual … to establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to his own conscience.”⁵

In 1925, the Supreme Court decided the Pierce v. Society of Sisters⁶ case, thereby supporting Meyer’s recognition of the parents’ right to direct the religious upbringing of their children and to control the process of their education. In Pierce, the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon compulsory education law which, in effect, required attendance of all children between ages eight and sixteen at public schools. The Court declared,

Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.⁷ [emphasis supplied]

In addition to upholding the right of parents to direct the upbringing and the education of their children, Piercealso asserts the parents’ fundamental right to keep their children free from government standardization.

The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excluded any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right and the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.⁸ [emphasis supplied]

The Supreme Court uses strong language in asserting that children are not “the mere creature of the State.” The holding in Pierce, therefore, preserves diversity of process of education by forbidding the State to standardize the education of children through forcing them to only accept instruction from public schools.

In Farrington v. Tokushige, the Court again upheld parental liberty by striking down legislation which the Court admitted would have destroyed most, if not all private schools. ⁹ The Court noted that the parent has the right to direct the education of his own child without unreasonable restrictions.¹⁰ In support of this assertion the Court explained,

The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the Almighty for beneficent purposes and its use may not be forbidden or interfered with by government — certainly not, unless such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or imperils the public safety. ¹¹

The parents’ right to instruct their children clearly takes precedence over the state’s regulatory interest unless the public safety is endangered.

Similarly, in Prince v. Massachusetts,¹² the Supreme Court admitted the high responsibility and right of parents to control the upbringing of their children against that of the State.

It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder.¹³ [emphasis supplied]

Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, emphasized that the state cannot interfere with the right of a parent to control his child’s education. ¹⁴ The Court stated that the right to educate one’s child as one chooses is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and applicable to the States by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.¹⁵

Forty-eight years after Pierce, the U.S. Supreme Court once again upheld Pierce as “the charter of the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.” ¹⁶ In agreement with Pierce, Chief Justice Burger stated in the opinion of Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972:

This case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the state, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring tradition. ¹⁷ [emphasis supplied]

This case involved a family of the Amish religion who wanted to be exempt after eighth grade from the public schools to be instructed at home. In its opinion the U.S. Supreme Court further emphasized that:

Thus a state’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children . . . This case involves the fundamental and religious future and education of their children. ¹⁸ [emphasis supplied]

Consequently, it is clear the constitutional right of a parent to direct the upbringing and education of his child is firmly entrenched in the U.S. Supreme Court case history. Furthermore, a higher standard of review applies to fundamental rights such as parental liberty than to other rights. When confronted with a conflict between parents’ rights and state regulation, the court must apply the “compelling interest test.” Under this test, the state must prove that its infringement on the parents’ liberty is essential to fulfill a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of fulfilling this state interest. Simply proving the regulation is reasonable is not sufficient.

Below are excerpts from over a dozen United States Supreme Court cases where, primarily in dicta, the Court has declared parental rights to be fundamental rights which require a higher standard of review (i.e. the “compelling interest test”).

1. Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 US 49, 65 (1973) 

In this case, the Court includes the right of parents to rear children among rights “deemed fundamental.”

Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by the 14th Amendment included only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing . . . cf . . . Pierce v. Society of Sisters; Meyer v. Nebraska . . . nothing, however, in this Court’s decisions intimates that there is any fundamental privacy right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty to watch obscene movies and places of public accommodation. [emphasis supplied]

2. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 US 678, 684-686 (1977) 

Once again, the Court includes the right of parents in the area of “child rearing and education” to be a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring an application of the “compelling interest test.”

Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Court has recognized that one aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment is a “right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy . . . This right of personal privacy includes the interest and independence in making certain kinds of important decisions . . . While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to marriage . . . family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923).’ [emphasis supplied]

The Court continued by explaining that these rights are not absolute and,

certain state interests . . . may at some point become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision . . . Compelling is, of course, the key word; where decisions as fundamental as whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests. [emphasis supplied]

3. Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464, 476-479 (1977)

We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge on the fundamental right recognized in Roe …
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy …

This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman’s right under the 14th Amendment. In Meyer v. Nebraska. . . the Court held that the teacher’s right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage in so to instruct their children were within the liberty of the 14th Amendment . . . In Pierce v. Society of Sisters . . . the Court relied on Meyer . . . reasoning that the 14th Amendment’s concept of liberty excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The Court held that the law unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of the children under their control …

Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions of constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent’s right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; in Pierce, the parent’s right to choose private rather than public school education. But neither case denied to a state the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action … Pierce casts no shadow over a state’s power to favor public education by funding it — a policy choice pursued in some States for more than a century … Indeed in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 US 455, 462, (1973), we explicitly rejected the argument that Pierce established a “right of private or parochial schools to share with the public schools in state largesse,” noting that “It is one thing to say that a state may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must as a matter of equal protection receive state aid” … We think it abundantly clear that a state is not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor a normal childbirth anymore than a state must so justify its election to fund public, but not private education. [emphasis supplied]

Although the Maher decision unquestionably recognizes parents’ rights as fundamental rights, the Court has clearly indicated that private schools do not have a fundamental right to state aid, nor must a state satisfy the compelling interest test if it chooses not to give private schools state aid. The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act simply reaffirms the right of parents to choose private education as fundamental, but it does not make the right to receive public funds a fundamental right. The PRRA, therefore, does not in any way promote or strengthen the concept of educational vouchers.

4. Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584, 602-606 (1979).

This case involves parent’s rights to make medical decisions regarding their children’s mental health. The lower Court had ruled that Georgia’s statutory scheme of allowing children to be subject to treatment in the state’s mental health facilities violated the Constitution because it did not adequately protect children’s due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed this decision upholding the legal presumption that parents act in their children’s best interest. The Court ruled:

Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) … [other citations omitted] . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 190.
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some parents “may at times be acting against the interests of their children” … creates a basis for caution, but it is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interest … The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” [emphasis supplied]

Parental rights are clearly upheld in this decision recognizing the rights of parents to make health decisions for their children. The Court continues by explaining the balancing that must take place:

Nonetheless, we have recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized (See Wisconsin v. Yoder; Prince v. Massachusetts). Moreover, the Court recently declared unconstitutional a state statute that granted parents an absolute veto over a minor child’s decisions to have an abortion, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976), Appellees urged that these precedents limiting the traditional rights of parents, if viewed in the context of a liberty interest of the child and the likelihood of parental abuse, require us to hold that parent’s decision to have a child admitted to a mental hospital must be subjected to an exacting constitutional scrutiny,including a formal, adversary, pre-admission hearing.
Appellees’ argument, however, sweeps too broadly. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child, or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. The same characterizations can be made for a tonsillectomy, appendectomy, or other medical procedure. Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgements concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgements … we cannot assume that the result in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, would have been different if the children there had announced a preference to learn only English or preference to go to a public, rather that a church school. The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the parent’s authority to decide what is best for the child (See generally Goldstein, Medical Case for the Child at Risk: on State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale LJ 645, 664-668 (1977); Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision — Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analyses, 62 Va LR ev 285, 308 (1976). Neither state officials nor federal Courts are equipped to review such parental decisions. [emphasis supplied]

Therefore, it is clear that the Court is recognizing parents as having the right to make judgments concerning their children who are not able to make sound decisions, includingtheir need for medical care. A parent’s authority to decide what is best for the child in the areas of medical treatment cannot be diminished simply because a child disagrees. A parent’s right must be protected and not simply transferred to some state agency.

5. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982)

This case involved the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirming the application of the preponderance of the evidence standard as proper and constitutional in ruling that the parent’s rights are permanently terminated. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, vacated the lower Court decision, holding that due process as required under the 14th Amendment in this case required proof by clear and convincing evidence rather than merely a preponderance of the evidence.

The Court, in reaching their decision, made it clear that parents’ rights as outlined in Pierce and Meyer are fundamental and specially protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court began by quoting another Supreme Court case:

In Lassiter [Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 37 (1981)], it was “not disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between a parent and a child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause”. . . The absence of dispute reflected this Court’s historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 14th Amendment … Pierce v. Society of Sisters … Meyer v. Nebraska.
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the state … When the state moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. [emphasis supplied]

6. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc., 462 US 416, 461 (1983)

This case includes, in a long list of protected liberties and fundamental rights, the parental rights guaranteed under Pierce and Meyer. The Court indicated a compelling interest test must be applied.

Central among these protected liberties is an individual’s freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life … Roe … Griswold … Pierce v. Society of Sisters … Meyer v. Nebraska … But restrictive state regulation of the right to choose abortion as with other fundamental rights subject to searching judicial examination, must be supported by a compelling state interest.[emphasis supplied]

7. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US 248, 257-258 (1983)

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision against a natural father’s rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses since he did not have any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child. The natural father was challenging an adoption. The Supreme Court stated:

In some cases, however, this Court has held that the federal constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those cases … the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed. Thus, the liberty of parents to control the education of their children that was vindicated in Meyer v. Nebraska … and Pierce v. Society of Sisters … was described as a “right coupled with the high duty to recognize and prepare the child for additional obligations” … The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v. Massachusetts … The Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” In these cases, the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to Constitutional protection … “State intervention to terminate such a relationship … must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause” Santosky v. Kramer… [emphasis supplied]

It is clear by the above case that parental rights are to be treated as fundamental and cannot be taken away without meeting the constitutional requirement of due process.

8. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 US 747 (1986)

The U.S. Supreme Court declared, “Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government … Griswold v. Connecticut … Pierce v. Society of Sisters … Meyer v. Nebraska.”

By citing Pierce, the Court included parental liberty in that protected sphere.

9. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537 (1987)

In this case, a Californian civil rights statute was held not to violate the First Amendment by requiring an all male non-profit club to admit women to membership. The Court concluded that parents’ rights in child rearing and education are included as fundamental elements of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.

The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights … the intimate relationships to which we have accorded Constitutional protection include marriage … the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters … [emphasis supplied]

10. Michael H. v. Gerald, 491 U.S. 110 (1989)

In a paternity suit, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

It is an established part of our constitution jurisprudence that the term liberty in the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom from physical restraint. See, e.g. Pierce v. Society of Sisters … Meyer v. Nebraska … In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a “liberty” be “fundamental” (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society.As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934). [emphasis supplied]

The Court explicitly included the parental rights under Pierce and Meyer as “fundamental” and interests “traditionally protected by our society.”

11. Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)

One of the more recent decisions which upholds the right of parents is Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, which involved two Indians who were fired from a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested “peyote,” a hallucinogenic drug as part of their religious beliefs. When they sought unemployment compensation, they were denied because they were discharged for “misconduct.”

The Indians appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals who reversed on the grounds that they had the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs by taking drugs. Of course, as expected, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the case and found that the First Amendment did not protect drug use. So what does the case have to do with parental rights?

After the Court ruled against the Indians, it then analyzed the application of the Free Exercise Clause generally. The Court wrongly decided to throw out the Free Exercise Clause as a defense to any “neutral” law that might violate an individual’s religious convictions. In the process of destroying religious freedom, the Court went out of its way to say that the parents’ rights to control the education of their children is still a fundamental right. The Court declared that the “compelling interest test” is still applicable, not to the Free Exercise Clause alone:

[B]ut the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections such as … the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.205 (1972) invalidating compulsory-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school.¹⁹ [emphasis supplied]

In other words, under this precedent, parents’ rights to control the education of their children is considered a “constitutionally protected right” which requires the application of the compelling interest test. The Court in Smith quoted its previous case of Wisconsin v. Yoder:

Yoder said that “The Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a charter for the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. And when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim … more than merely a reasonable relationship to some purpose within the competency of the State is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.” 406 U.S., at 233.²⁰ [emphasis supplied]

Instead of merely showing that a regulation conflicting with parents’ rights is reasonable, the state must, therefore, reach the higher standard of the “compelling interest test,” which requires the state to prove its regulation to be the least restrictive means.

12. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)

In Hodgson the Court found that parental rights not only are protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as fundamental and more important than property rights, but that they are “deemed essential.”

The family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is protected by the Constitution against undue state interference. See Wisconsin v Yoder, 7 406 US 205 …
The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” Parham, 442 US, at 603, [other citations omitted]. We have long held that there exists a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v Massachusetts …

A natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children free from undue state interference. As Justice White explained in his opinion of the Court in Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972) [other cites omitted]:

“The court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v Nebraska, … ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942), and ‘[r]ights far more precious … than property rights,’ May v Anderson, 345 US 528, 533 (1953) … The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v Nebraska, supra.” [emphasis supplied]

The Court leaves no room for doubt as to the importance and protection of the rights of parents.

13. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 US 398, 410 (1991)

In this case, the Supreme Court recognized the parents’ right to know about their child seeking an abortion. The Court stated:

In addition, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968) … We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between the parent and the child is Constitutionally protected (Wisconsin v. Yoder, Stanley v. Illinois, Meyer v. Nebraska) … “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom includes preparation for obligations the state can neither supply, nor hinder.” [Quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166, (1944)]. See also Parham v. J.R.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters … We have recognized that parents have an important “guiding role” to play in the upbringing of their children, Bellotti II, 443 US 633-639 … which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.

This Court clearly upholds the parent’s right to know in the area of minor children making medical decisions.

14. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 132 L.Ed.2d 564, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995)

In Vernonia the Court strengthened parental rights by approaching the issue from a different point of view. They reasoned that children do not have many of the rights accorded citizens, and in lack thereof, parents and guardians possess and exercise those rights and authorities in the child’s best interest:

Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination—including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians. See Am Jur 2d, Parent and Child § 10 (1987).

15. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

In this case the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion on parental liberty. The case involved a Washington State statute which provided that a “court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of the child, whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.” Wash. Rev. Code � 26.10.160(3). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Washington statute “unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.” The Court went on to examine its treatment of parental rights in previous cases:

In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children�Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right … to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. [emphasis supplied]

This case clearly upholds parental rights. In essence, this decision means that the government may not infringe parents’ right to direct the education and upbringing of their children unless it can show that it is using the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

Conclusion

The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently protected parental rights, including it among those rights deemed fundamental. As a fundamental right, parental liberty is to be protected by the highest standard of review: the compelling interest test.

As can be seen from the cases described above, parental rights have reached their highest level of protection in over 75 years. The Court decisively confirmed these rights in the recent case of Troxel v. Granville, which should serve to maintain and protect parental rights for many years to come.

Copyright 2003 Home School Legal Defense Association. Reprint permission granted.

Footnotes

1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

2. Id., at 402.

3. Id., at 401. Also see Bartles v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) where the Court reached a similar conclusion.

4. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 at 400.

5. Id., at 403.

6. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

7. Ibid at 534.

8. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 at 535.

9. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) at 298.

10. Id., at 298.

11. Farrington v. Tokushige, (9 cir.) 11 F.2d 710 at 713 (1926), quoting Harlan, J., in Berea College v. Kentucky 211 U.S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81.

12. Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

13. Ibid at 166.

14. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965) at 486.

15. Ibid.

16. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 233.

17. Ibid at 232. Burger further admonishes, “and when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.” (Yoder, at 233).

18. Id., at 214.

19. Id., 881.

20. Id., 881, ftn. 1. 

https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html

This is assuredly a national shame and these people need help.

Please pray for them and speak out against this tragedy.

However, the highlight of this URL is the following top comment:

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While our court system demands that elders be forced into nursing homes and Medicare/Medicaid only pays them, this is the result and it’s horrifying

this is but another reason our Guardianship system needs a complete overhaul and much, much oversight.  I wouldn’t even put a dog in on of these placees.

While the blogs and those who have been burned in gship and their family members and who have gone to mega media over and over again, only to find out they won’t report on this news, they and the media are threatened by the court system with lawsuits, this is for you.

This was published on June 3, 2018 and already has 1.7 million views and 3.9k comments

Thanks so much to Mr. John Oliver for doing this and bringing out an important problem in the US court systems.

It is everywhere across the nation.

Here is an interesting article with the basic law and then Kansas cases

Click to access Request_for_Comments_on_Guidelines_for_Judges_to_Restrict_Filings.pdf

and here is an excerpt.

Generally tho, when a judge issues a “cannot file” order, it just means you have to file a motion to file and declaration with your motion.

Most pro se litigants do not know this, so it stops them from filing 95% of the time and the judge’s problem is solved.

Summary of Authorities for Judges Considering
Whether to Restrict Court Filings
This document, which was prepared by the Kansas Supreme Court Access to Justice
Committee, is intended to be a summary of current case law and legislation about restricting
court filings submitted by abusive litigants. The Summary of Authorities does not constitute a
rule or order of the court.
I. Constitutional Right of Access to the Courts.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides a right of access to the courts, which
includes access by inmates. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). This right is neither
absolute nor unconditional. A litigant has “no constitutional right of access to the courts
to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Holt v. State, 290 Kan. 491, 500,
232 P.3d 848 (2010). Yet, “[l]itigiousness alone will not support an injunction restricting
filing activities.” Tripati v. Beamani, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989). Federal courts
have recognized a court’s inherent power to control the actions of abusive litigants “by
imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.” Ford v. Pryor, 553
F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Citing these Tenth Circuit
decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that Kansas district courts have inherent
power to impose carefully tailored restrictions on abusive litigants in appropriate
circumstances and has authority to direct a district court clerk to refrain from filing
pleadings in such cases. Holt, 290 Kan. at 500-02.
This Summary of Authorities reviews Kansas law for a judge of the district court
to consider when encountering a litigant who repeatedly files frivolous, malicious, or
duplicative pleadings. The court will need to evaluate several issues to determine
whether filing restrictions are justified, to fashion appropriate restrictions for an abusive
litigant, and to enforce those restrictions. The designation of a litigant as abusive should
be an extraordinary remedy to be used in the most extreme cases.

II. Are Filing Restrictions Justified?
A judge of the district court may, upon his or her own motion, make a
determination that an individual is an abusive litigant and make restrictions on filings in a
particular case or future cases. The court must first determine whether filing restrictions
are justified for a particular litigant. While some states have a statutory framework
defining restrictions,1
Kansas does not. Instead, except for certain habeas corpus filings,

1
The number of states with statutory provisions is difficult to establish. Some statutes relate specifically to inmate
filings and others have been held unconstitutional. Cf., Mulroony, Amanda L.B., Indiana’s “Three Strikes” Inmate
Litigation Limitations: 2009 Legislation Does Not Hit a Home Run, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 957 (2011). State statutes not
limited to inmate filings include: CAL. CCP. CODE § 391 (vexatious litigant is a person filing 5 cases in 7 years all
decided against the litigant); FL Civil Prac.§ 68.093 (vexatious litigant is a person filing 5 or more cases in previous
5 years that are decided against the litigant); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634J-7 (vexatious litigant); Ohio Rev. Code §
2323.52 (vexatious conduct defined); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051, et seq. (procedure to
determine if vexatious litigant, prohibit filings, and place on state list of vexatious litigants).

2 Rev. 6/5/2015
a Kansas court must turn to case law for guidance about what circumstances justify
imposition of filing restrictions.
A. Civil cases in Kansas courts: Does a pattern of litigation activity justify
restrictions?
1. Kansas Appellate Courts.

The Kansas Court of Appeals has held a court should consider
whether a litigant’s “pattern of litigation activity” justifies imposing filing
restrictions, noting numerous factors may be considered depending upon
the circumstances. State ex rel. Stoval v. Lynn, 26 Kan. App. 2d 79, 82,
975 P.2d 813, 815, rev. denied 267 Kan. 890 (1999) (hereinafter Lynn).
Paraphrasing, the court held that a “pattern of litigation activity” justifies
imposition of filing restrictions if:
(a) a litigant files numerous pleadings,
(b) the pleadings are manifestly abusive toward the court or another
litigant, and
(c) prior pleadings have not been successful for the litigant.

The court found a pattern of litigation activity justified imposing
filing restrictions where numerous cases were filed in state district court
(eight are listed) seeking information to support a litigant’s pending direct
criminal appeal. Lawsuits filed against the victim of rape charges,
witnesses, police investigators, prosecutors, judges, and a juror’s spouse
were held to be abusive and an attempt to harass those being sued. Lynn,
26 Kan. App. 2d at 79-82.
2. United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas has held
that several factors are relevant in deciding future restrictions are
appropriate, including:
(a) a litigant’s history of litigation and particularly whether this history
entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits;
(b) a litigant’s motive in pursuing litigation, such as whether the
litigant has an objective good faith expectation of prevailing;
(c) whether a litigant is represented by counsel;
(d) whether a litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or
has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and court
personnel; and
(e) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the court and
other parties.

3 Rev. 6/5/2015
An injunction issued by a federal district court was approved that
restricted filings “where the litigant’s abusive and lengthy history of
filings was properly set forth” in the court’s decision. United States v.
Kettler, No. 90-3011, 1991 WL 94457 at *6 (10th Cir. June 3, 1991).
The Kansas federal district court has stated that the most important
question in deciding if an injunction can issue restricting filings is
“whether the litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to
continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.” Landrith
v. Schmidt, No. 12-2161-CM, 2012 WL 5995342 at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 30,
2012) (Landrith). The Court entered an injunction against a disbarred
Kansas attorney who had filed multiple unsuccessful cases against
individuals involved in his disbarment proceedings, including the panel
that heard the proceedings, witnesses, and investigators. The restrictions
adopted are set forth later in this Summary of Authorities. See also, Salem
v Kansas, Case No. 15-2209-CM (D. KS March 26, 2015), Slip Op. pages
21-22 (filing restrictions recommended where 27 cases filed in 3 months
with many duplicative parties named).

Statement of Andrew Joseph Ostrowski

I submit this statement in the matter of the 302 petition, and commitment, of Amy Kush.

I have known Amy for several years as a facebook friend, not knowing anything about her or where she was from.

She reached out to me a couple months ago concerning a mortgage foreclosure matter for any suggestions I had for her, her knowing that I have a background as a lawyer, and have talked a lot about mortgage foreclosures and the court system.

I went to Amy’s house on Monday, May 14, 2018 to look at some of her documents, to see if I could provide her any direction, or suggestions as to anything else she could do to address the situation.

Amy was very stressed about the impending June 1, 2018 sheriff’s sale, as she felt that it was wrongful, and she did not get a fair chance to present her claims in court. I did not observe her disposition on May 14, or the previous week when I first met her, as being any different than any other of the many persons I have met over the years who have been dealing with the tremendous stress of having a foreclosure looming over them while feeling that they have not been provided due process by the courts. In fact, Amy was very engaging, and even took some time to read some Bible passages to me, as I knew from viewing her facebook posts that she is a woman of faith.

On Monday, May 14, when I was there to pick up/look at some documents, Amy showed me and separately handed me a letter she had sent, or was going to send, and insisted that I and the other person I was with read it. This, I believe, is the letter that was the subject of the 302 affidavit.

I did read it, in its entirety, and I told her immediately that it was a very bad idea to send the letter, and it put her at risk of inviting some intrusion or other, because of the wording she used. I believe I specifically said “you can’t send this letter.”

As I understood it, she was asserting some biblical right under the Book of Ezekiel, I believe, in defense of her due process rights, and it contained something about a “warning of death,” and had it in bold letters. I believe she used those words because she felt that her mandate was to express it as expressed in the Bible passages to which she was referring. I have not gone and looked at any of these passages.

I told her at least 5 times that she should not send the letter as it stood, because I believed it would reasonably cause the recipient(s) some concern as to whether it was threat of physical harm, and would justify a further inquiry into it, and that I did not support her sending the letter as it was written, and that I wanted no part of any of it, and my admonitions were echoed right down to forecasting that the sheriff would be contacting her if she sent it.

I further did an assessment of her myself as to whether she presented any threat of harm. I asked her if she was planning to do anything affirmative to anyone that came upon her property, and I even asked her if she had any weapons of any sort in her home. She said answered negatively to both questions, and I did not observe any signs in her home of any such things – all of the items and materials around her house had messages of love and peace, and Jesus, etc..

The following Monday, as I recall, Amy filed a document in the Luzerne County courthouse, and messaged me when she got home and told me she was stopped by the sheriff’s deputies, and asked about her letter.

I believe it was a proper and reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, and I told her that specifically, and further reminded her that it was very bad judgment on her part to send the letter. I was actually surprised that they just let her go as she explained to me, because I do believe that further inquiry into it was a duty on the part of law enforcement under the circumstances, and remain of that opinion.

I also believe that, under all the circumstances, the detention of her for purposes of conducting a more thorough evaluation, whether through the law enforcement process, or through the mental health process, was fully proper and I, too, remained bothered by the lack of judgment she displayed in sending it, even though I do not believe the words themselves present any threat to anyone, and I did not believe that she presented such a risk to anyone.

I believe, based upon my own observation, that Amy was very distressed about her foreclosure, and that her lack of judgment in sending the letter resulted from that stress, together with her rigidity in matters of biblical interpretation.

Other than that one exercise of poor judgment, Amy was otherwise fine in all respects, though, in my opinion, she possesses some eccentricities, and unique world views that are not in the mainstream, but are all within the realm of the human condition, and that nothing I have observed suggests that she is any threat of harm to anyone, as her guiding ethics are the Love and Peace of God, and she grounds that in the Bible.

I will be available, and request the opportunity, to testify at any further proceedings in this matter.

Andrew Joseph Osrowski

From Joanne:

I am trying to get the fax and email of the judge so everyone might respond.  Please, if you have any info on false psych holds, get the name, fax and email of the director of the facility AND the name and fax of the judge involved so people can respond.

Since there is little or no oversight in the court system (less than 1% of all judges are ever removed from the bench for wrongful conduct after complaints are filed), you the public has the right to turn to the media (blogs) to get this done.

Help me help you all.  We must protect our still fragile democracy in the US

While I have not seen the letter, unless it contained a direct and imminent threat and she had the tools to carry it out, confirmed in the letter, she had a 1st Amendment right to write whatever her heart dictated, including very strong Bible passages, as a woman of faith, even if they were in bold.  F that nonsense.  She had a foreclosure, what do you think she was feeling at the time.  At least she was being honest about her situation.

This is an excellent video showing how hospitals are now fixing cases of med mal to blame parents and then the parents cannot sue and they lose custody of their child.

What utter nonsense.

Great job on the video, mom.

City Council
Darryl Moore 510 981 7120
Council Member, district 2

ACTION CALENDAR
October 18, 2016
To; Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From:  Darryl oore
Subject:  Resolution to Fix Probate Court and Investigate
Council member Darryl Moore
Mayor Tom Bates
Council member Kriss Worthington
Examining Alameda County Probate Court Process, Including
Consideration of Establishing A Grand Jury to Investigate
RECOMMENDATION:
Adopt a Resolution requesting an examination of the way in Which the probate courts in
Alameda County function and the City Clerk send copies of the resolution and agenda
item to the Alameda County District Attorney Nancy O’Malley, Alameda County
Supervisor Keith Carson, Assembly member Tony Thurmond, and State Senator Loni
Hancock.
BACKGROUND:
The Berkeley City Council was recently approached by a group consisting of dozens of
African American families that feel that they have been unfairly treated by the probate
court system and, as a result, lost significant portions of their respective Inherited
assets.
Some of the concerns raised by local African American families include the folIowing:
When there are issues with an estate, the matter of disbursing the proceeds of the
estate is typically assigned to a probate court. Differences of opinion in selecting an
heir as the Special Administrators or Managing Trustees of the Living Trust or Will can
often lead the probate judge to assign a court-appointed attorney to function In this role,
These court-appointed attorneys often accumulated significant fees that are assessed
as a lien against the assets of the will or living trust. As a result, there is an implicit
incentive for the court-appointed attorney to sell assets as to extract their payment. The sale of said assets can often be done hastily, at below-market-value, to encourage a quick sale. Those sales are often done without consideration by the court appointed trustee or special administrator to whether or not the heirs of the estate may desire to purchase the asset. As a result of those aforementioned factors, heirs are often unable to purchase the assets of the estate and are often saddled with significant costs liened against assets of the estate. When the assets are disbursed to the heirs, the costs incurred can often approach 30-50% of the estate value.
We request that the District Attorney of Alameda County impanel a grand jury to
investigate the way in which the probate court system functions to determine whether
certain groups are disproportionately affected compared to others and how the system
can be improved for all families,

IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED:

WHEREAS, questions have been raised about whether certain groups are
disproportionately affected compared to other groups; and
WHEREAS, as a result, a group of local African American families feel as though issues
related to the probate court system are magnified for their community. including the
following; and
WHEREAS, differences of opinion in selecting an heir as the Special Administrators or
Managing Trustees of the Living Trust or Will can often lead the probate judge to assign
a court-appointed attorney to function in this role; and
WHEREAS. court-appointed attorneys often accumulated significant fees that are
assessed as a lien against the assets of the will or living trust; and
WHEREAS, as a result, there is an implicit incentive for the court-appointed attorney to
sell assets as to extract their payment; and
WHEREAS, the sale of estate assets can often be done hastily, at below-market-value,
to encourage a quick sale; and
WHEREAS, the sale of estate assets are also often done without consideration by the
court-appointed trustee or special administrator to whether or not the heirs of the estate
may have a desire to purchase the asset; and
WHEREAS, costs incurred on the estate can approach 30-50% of the value; and
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Berkeley that the
Council requests that the Alameda County District Attorney empanel a grand jury to
review the process in which probate is administered to determine whether people of color and/or women may be being disproportionately affected by the probate court system and whether improvements can be made to correct the system for all families and become more equitable

From Joanne:

I think this is a wonderful declaration of rights for what is really happening in our nation’s court system and it has to end.  The poor and minorities and brown and black people are affected the worse by  all of the perfidy, legerdemain and mendacity which runs amok.

We must insist on accountability and oversight from committees who have members who are tested for psychopathy with a PET brain scan first.

We are all tired of the lies, deceptions and theft of our loved ones and their assets.

JoAnne

http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/386454-former-kentucky-judge-given-20-years-in-prison-for-human-trafficking

A former Kentucky judge has been sentenced to 20 years in prison on human trafficking charges.

Timothy Nolan, a 71-year-old former Campbell County district judge, pleaded guilty to human trafficking and other felony sex crimes involving minors, according to multiple reports.

Nolan is also a conservative political activist and worked on President Trump’s campaign in Kentucky during the 2016 presidential race.

Nolan apologized and vowed to seek treatment during his sentencing hearing on Friday after prosecutors read statements from the nearly 20 teen victims, many of whom were under 16 years old, according to The Associated Press.

Nolan previously forced a delay in the sentencing by firing his attorneys and attempting to withdraw his guilty plea in a “wild” court hearing in March, according to The Cincinnati Enquirer.

http://www.tampabay.com/ex-kentucky-judge-sentenced-to-prison-for-human-trafficking-ap_national2a7f3b5e3c384fb8a2c224cd02e341c7

http://www.tampabay.com/ex-kentucky-judge-sentenced-to-prison-for-human-trafficking-ap_national2a7f3b5e3c384fb8a2c224cd02e341c7

NEWPORT, Ky. (AP) — A former Kentucky judge and conservative political activist has been sentenced to 20 years in prison after pleading guilty to human trafficking and other sex crimes.

A special prosecutor said Tim Nolan, 71, targeted young women, gave them opioids and threatened to withhold the drugs or call law enforcement if they didn’t perform sex acts.

News outlets report that prosecutor Barbara Whaley read statements from some of the women. Seven of the 19 victims were under 16 years old.

Nolan fired his attorney in March and tried to withdraw his guilty plea.

On Friday, he apologized in court and promised to seek treatment.

does this sound familiar to anyone?

https://www.wxyz.com/news/local-news/investigations/oakland-county-probate-judges-hire-attorney-under-criminal-investigation

PONTIAC, Mich. (WXYZ) – She was terminated from her position by the Attorney General and she was at the center of a 7 Action News investigation. So why are taxpayers now paying the salary of this local lawyer?

A criminal investigation was launched after we exposed how some public officials and real estate brokers were cashing in on probate estates, often leaving rightful heirs with very little.

• 7 Action News Investigation prompts probate law change, protects heirs
• Probate public officials terminated, resign after 7 Action News investigation
• Attorney General, Chief Probate Judge want new rules in wake of 7 Action News Investigation
• AG suspends Macomb probate public administrator, leaders want law changed

So why is one of the public officials being investigated by Oakland County — now working for Oakland County’s Probate Court?

The 7 Investigators first exposed probate attorney Barbara Andruccioli a year ago.

“How can the taxpayers have any confidence with you working here,” asked 7 Investigator Heather Catallo.

“Really, I think you probably need to talk to the judges,” said Andruccioli.

Andruccioli was a partner at Kemp Klein law firm. She was also an Attorney General-appointed Public Administrator:  a public official with the authority to open probate estates after someone dies if there are no heirs available.

Court records show Andruccioli teamed up with real estate broker Ralph Roberts and his companies to open those estates, sell the homes, and cash in.

We uncovered court filings that show Andruccioli and one of Roberts’ companies, Probate Asset Recovery, were billing for thousands of dollars, while the actual heirs ended up with very little.

“They should be held accountable,” Joanne Zaremba told Catallo in 2017.

Until the 7 Investigators got involved, Zaremba had no idea that Andruccioli had opened an estate in her late mother’s name, even though under the law, Andruccioli had a duty to find the heirs.

After our investigation, Attorney General Bill Schuette terminated Andruccioli as a Public Administrator. And that’s not all:  the FBI and Oakland County Sheriff’s detectives raided Ralph Roberts offices, and launched a criminal probe into the Public Administrators.

So why did the Oakland County Probate judges recently hire Andruccioli as the Probate Register for the county?

“How can the taxpayers have any confidence — when you’re now under criminal investigation — with you working in this court,” asked Catallo.

“That’s not true,” said Andruccioli.

“It struck me as the wolf guarding the hen house,” said Oakland County Treasurer Andy Meisner.

Oakland County Clerk Lisa Brown described her reaction when she first heard that the judges from the Probate Court (which Brown and Meisner do not oversee) hired Andruccioli: “Shock, absolute shock and bewilderment…  So out of having a wonderful pool of applicants, why would you choose this person who has a cloud over them?”

In the wake of our reporting, Brown and Meisner successfully fought to change the state laws that allowed this probate practice to go on.  Neither can understand why the four Probate judges would hire Andruccioli.

“It’s natural that people that work together are going to get to know each other and establish relationships,” said Meisner. “The unusual part is when those relationships and friendships result in inappropriate preference, self-dealing, and lack of due process.”

The Probate Register oversees the daily operations of the Probate Courts Estates and Mental Health division.

Chief Probate Judge Kathleen Ryan would not talk to us on camera, but she did tell 7 Action News that the decision to hire Andruccioli as the Probate Register of the court was unanimous among all four judges and she said, “we’re confident in our hire.”

Judge Ryan also confirmed they hired Andruccioli at the top of the county pay scale, at $102,650.  Also, in the past Andruccioli has given small campaign contributions to two of the judges who hired her (Judge Ryan and Judge Jennifer Callaghan), but Judge Ryan says that had no bearing on the hiring decision.

“I think it is a slap in the face to a lot of people,” said Brown. “It reduces confidence that justice will be served here.”

Officials from both the Oakland County Prosecutor’s office and Sheriff’s office tell the 7 Investigators that the criminal probe into the probate scheme and the Public Administrators is ongoing.

County officials such as the Clerk, the Treasurer and the County Executive do not have control over who the judges hire.

If you have a story for Heather, please email her at hcatallo@wxyz.comor call 248-827-4473.

http://www.dailyprogress.com/newsvirginian/news/national/kasem-speaks-against-elder-abuse/article_25857078-570d-11e8-8156-8f7f83c9abcd.html

WEYERS CAVE — Kerri Kasem, daughter of late Top 40 DJ Casey Kasem, visited the area on Wednesday to speak on elder abuse. Kerri spoke at the 7th annual training of the Greater Augusta Coalition Against Adult Abuse on Wednesday.

The conference was at the Plecker Workforce Center at Blue Ridge Community College. The day started with the film EDITH + EDDIE – A Story of Love and Elder Abuse.

Next, Kasem presented “Isolated: How Casey Kasem’s Family fought, changed the law, and survived.”

Kasem is an American radio personality. She hosted Sixx Sense and The Side Show Countdown with Nikki Sixx.

Kasem and her siblings were banned from seeing or talking to their father, Casey, in the last years of his life. He was isolated and no law prevented the abuse.

Kasem told her family’s story of the struggle to see her father. She talked about early warning signs of abuse, prevention and offered tips on how law enforcement and Adult Protective Services should approach these cases for the victim’s rights to be protected.

“I learned very quickly there are no laws in the U.S. protecting adult children,” she said. “There needs to be stronger laws in this country protecting our elderly.”

Kasem fought to see her father and eventually created the Kasem Cares Visitation Legislation. The bill “provides an open path for family members to ask the court to rule on visitation without incurring the enormous expense and time that comes with a challenge to guardianship or conservatorship,” the website explains. It has passed in 12 states.

Casey Kasem passed away on June 15, 2014 — that day is World Elder Abuse Awareness Day and Father’s Day.

During her fight, many people reached out to her via letters saying they were going through the same situation. She hopes the legislation and the Kasem Cares Foundation will help other people.

“I knew there were so many families going through this,” she said. “I couldn’t let them go through that. I knew I had to do something. That’s why I created Kasem Cares.”

The GACAAA conference continued throughout the day with “Making Sense of Cents” with Stephanie Painter, Bank Secrecy Act Manager, and Jordan Weatherholtz, fraud analyst with Dupont Community Credit Union; “SSA Fraud Overview,” with Gavi Simms and David Voland, special agents with the Social Security Administration Office of Inspector General and “The Derailing of End of Life and Estate Plans: My Mother’s Story of Undue Influence,” with Vera Hailey, magistrate.

For more information on Kasem Cares, go to kasemcares.org.

From Joanne;

While I applaud Kerri’s dedication to allowing children legislation to see parents in guardianship, this legislation still requires a lawyer and court approval== and in Illinois, children are still being banned from seeing their elderly parents in a gship.  It’s the courts and not the laws that are the problem. jmho.

https://setexasrecord.com/stories/511420179-houston-federal-judge-allows-state-judge-to-be-sued

Looks like Texas is paving the way for Illinois:

http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Forms/approved/divorce/divorce.asp

I think this is a great idea and putting them on the internet is an even better idea.

Now we need standard forms to defend against abusive probate, theft in estates and defense of mortgage foreclosure.

Approved Statewide Forms – Divorce, Child Support, and Maintenance Forms

The following forms have been approved for use by the Supreme Court Commission on Access to Justice and are required to be accepted in all Illinois courts. The forms are ADA accessible, and you can handwrite or type into the PDF form.

You will need Adobe Acrobat or free Adobe Reader XI or higher in order to save completed forms.

Dissolution of Marriage/Civil Union (Divorce with Children)

Child Support and Maintenance

Dissolution of Marriage/Civil Union (Divorce No Children)

Financial Affidavit (Family & Divorce Cases)

https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/fan-19-first-amendment-news-law-prof-contests-ban-on-note-taking-in-courtroom.html

FAN 19 (First Amendment News) Law Prof. Contests Ban on Note-Taking in Courtroom

BY RONALD K.L. COLLINS · JUNE 11, 2014

https://www.abc10.com/mobile/article/news/local/abc10-originals/the-problem-with-family-court/103-550687204

Procedural right to Due Process–parents rights under state kidnap

The right to procedural due process is implicated where a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is concerned. Board of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth, 408 US 564 (1972). The crux of procedural due process is the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67 (1972).

The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions as to the companionship, care, custody and management of their children, which right is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65-66 (2000). As a result, there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth amendment is implicated whenever the government seeks to separate a parent from his or her child, and due process principles generally require the right to notice and a hearing before children are separated from their parents. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997). The separation does not have to be carried out with force for due process to be implicated; instead, duress or coercion will be sufficient, such as where a social services worker threatens to place the children in foster care if the children are not “voluntarily” placed outside of the home with family or friends. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3rd. Cir. 1997); Dupuy v. Samuels, 462 F.Supp.2d 859 (ND.Ill. 2005), aff’d, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006).

However, where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a child is in “imminent danger” of serious harm, a pre-deprivation hearing is not required. Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739. In such a case, several courts have determined that a post deprivation hearing must be afforded within 72 hours, even if such a hearing has not been requested by the family. Patterson v. Armstrong County Children and Youth Services, 141 F.Supp.2d 512, 531-39. (WD Pa. 2001). Some courts have permitted slightly longer or required slightly shorter periods depending on the circumstances. Berman v. Young, 291 F.3D 976, 985 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that 72 day delay was “rather outrageous” but finding no damages), Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Circ. 1994)( concluding that 75 hour delay was constitutionally permissible but was “near, if not at, the outer limit of permissible delay between a child’s removal from his home and judicial review. A delay of this length, absent extraordinary circumstances, for example, cf. County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 1670 (“bonafide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” must be shown to justify delay greater than 48 hours), most certainly would be difficult to justify under either the statute or the Constitution (if it could be justified at all) where a removal is effected other than during, or shortly prior to, a weekend, as the Commonwealth has recognized through its statutory scheme. We are not prepared to say, however, that a delay of this length over an ordinary weekend is so offensive to principles of fairness as to require its invalidation under the Constitution.
The state’s removal of a child from his parents indisputably constitutes an interference with a liberty interest of the parents and thus triggers the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are few rights more fundamental in and to our society than those of parents to retain custody over and care for their children, and to rear their children as they deem appropriate. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554-55, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573-74, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). To say that “the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality), as the Supreme Court often has said, see e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2341-42, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) Page 343 (plurality); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2110, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), borders on understatement. The unitary family is the foundation of
society. Through the intimate relationships of the family, our children are nurtured, tutored in the values and beliefs of our society, and prepared for life. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (“[P]arents generally ‘have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.’ “) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535, 45 S.Ct. at 573). Through these relationships,
our children–indeed, we, as parents–are strengthened, fulfilled and sustained. The bonds between parent and child are, in a word, sacrosanct, and the relationship between parent and child inviolable except for the most compelling reasons. Where the state seeks to interfere with these “essential,” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. at 626, or “fundamental,” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S.Ct. at 1394, parental rights, its action must satisfy the procedural strictures of the Due Process Clause. Cf. id.; Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Due process, however, does not always require prior process. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 1787, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (“An important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Real Property, — U.S. –
—, —-, 114 S.Ct. 492, 501, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (hearing may be postponed until after the event in extraordinary situations) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1995, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)). And, as appellants concede, it is well-settled that the requirements of process may be delayed where emergency action is necessary to avert imminent harm to a child, see Weller v. Dep’t of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir.1990); Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1329 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1108, 109 S.Ct. 3161, 104 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1989); Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir.1988); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir.1985); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir.1977), provided that adequate post-deprivation process to ratify the emergency action is promptly accorded. See Weller, 901 F.2d at 396; Hennepin County, 858 F.2d at 1329.

https://amp.usatoday.com/amp/13259199

https://us-u.openx.net/w/1.0/pd?plm=6&ph=bbb82fae-1d27-4d90-bb10-e24164ecd7bc

Immunity lets bad judges off hook for bad behavior
Wayne County Circuit Judge Wade McCree testifies in Washtenaw Circuit Court in Ann Arbor, Mich, on Tuesday, May 21, 2013. During his misconduct hearing, McCree talked about his affair with Geniene La’Shay Mott who appeared as a witness in a child-support case in his court.
Wayne County Circuit Judge Wade McCree testifies in Washtenaw Circuit Court in Ann Arbor, Mich, on Tuesday, May 21, 2013. During his misconduct hearing, McCree talked about his affair with Geniene La’Shay Mott who appeared as a witness in a child-support case in his court.
AP
TRESA BALDAS | DETROIT FREE PRESS | 7:25 am EDT July 28, 2014
DETROIT — Wade McCree Jr. lost his job, but he won’t lose his shirt.

The disgraced judge — who once texted a shirtless photo of himself to a female court bailiff — had an affair with a woman while overseeing her child custody case, had sex with her in his chambers and sexted her from the bench.

But he can’t be sued for money damages over any of that because judges are immune from civil lawsuits — a well-established doctrine that has many in the legal profession demanding change, arguing the McCree case highlights a pervasive problem in the justice system: judges getting away with bad behavior on immunity grounds.  (Note however, the plaintiff was the woman’s boyfriend, and not herself, so that probably made a difference.  It is doubtful that boyfriends and husbands would have standing to sue the judge.  I would hope that the woman would have standing, but in this case it appeared the Judge was favoring her, not demanding she have sex for custody or child support).

“There has to be a point where there is no immunity for judges. When we’re told that certain government officials are off limits — it undermines public confidence in government,” said Connecticut civil rights attorney Norm Pattis, author of “Taking Back the Courts,” a 2011 book that documents flaws in the justice system.

“I don’t think anybody should be above the law, least of all those who administer it,” said Pattis, who called the immunity doctrine “a crazy rule” and the McCree case “outrageous.”

“It’s sort of a medieval relic to suggest that the king can do no wrong, so why sue them,” Pattis said.

And McCree did plenty wrong, said Detroit attorney Joel Sklar. He’s preparing to take the McCree case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has long held that judges are immune from lawsuits for their acts and decisions, even unconstitutional ones. The idea is to help judges stay impartial.

Last Monday, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals cited that philosophy in concluding that McCree could not be sued by the father of his mistress’ child, even though his actions were “often reprehensible.”

The ruling baffled Sklar. He represents the father, Robert King, who claims McCree denied him access to a fair and impartial judge by having an affair with Geniene La’Shay Mott when she sued King over child support. King claims McCree’s decisions — such as placing him on a tether — were influenced by his “sexual desires” and that his rulings unfairly favored his mistress.

“This conduct is absurd,” Sklar said. “It’s so beyond description. A judge uses his chambers to have sex with a litigant? … If this isn’t too far, what is too far?”

Consistent rulings

Sklar is facing an uphill battle.

Over the last several decades, federal courts nationwide have consistently ruled against plaintiffs who tried to sue judges for civil damages over decisions they made or misconduct issues. The courts granted immunity to judges under the guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court,which established the judicial immunity doctrine in 1967 when it ruled that a Mississippi justice of the peace was immune from a civil rights suit for trying to enforce illegal segregation laws.

The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue again in 1978, when it blocked a lawsuit against an Indiana judge who had authorized the sterilization of a mentally handicapped 15-year-old girl at her mother’s request. The girl, who didn’t learn she was sterile until she got married — she was told she had an appendectomy — sued on due process grounds, but lost.

The high court essentially has held that anything a judge does in his or her capacity as a judge is covered under the immunity clause. But if, for example, a judge unlawfully fires someone, that’s not covered because because hiring or firing is not considered a judicial activity.
This conduct is absurd. A judge uses his chambers to have sex with a litigant? … If this isn’t too far, what is too far?
DETROIT ATTORNEY JOEL SKLAR
Meanwhile, only a handful of judges nationwide have been successfully sued for civil rights violations — none in Michigan. One such case involved a Tennessee juvenile court judge who was accused of violating the civil rights of three women by sexually assaulting them and threatening to take their kids away if they didn’t give in. In 1996, the 6th Circuit denied him judicial immunity from civil liability.

Those cases are very rare.

Freedom from fear

According to legal experts, it has long been recognized that in order for judges to be able to make impartial decisions, without fear of repercussions, they need to be immune from lawsuits.

“We don’t want judges looking over their shoulder, being worried about being sued by litigants. And we don’t want litigants being able to take judges to court for everything they think they’ve done wrong,” said Michael Crowell, a public law and government professor at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

But just because you can’t sue judges for money damages doesn’t mean they can get away with bad behavior or an unfair decision, Crowell said. He noted that judges who engage in misconduct can be removed from the bench — as McCree was. The Michigan Supreme Court removed him from the bench in March and suspended him without pay for six years, just in case he is re-elected to office this fall.

Crowell said that judges can be criminally prosecuted if their conduct is bad enough. Or a litigant unhappy with a judge’s decision can use the misconduct as grounds for an appeal.

“Judicial immunity protects a judge from being sued … but that doesn’t get the judge off the hook altogether,” Crowell said, noting he’d be “very surprised” if the U.S. Supreme Court takes the McCree case.

Loosening the immunity doctrine would trigger a tsunami of lawsuits against judges, discourage appeals and strip judges of their independent decision-making authority — all of which would hurt the justice system, said Sheldon Nahmod, a constitutional law and civil rights professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law.

“The Supreme Court does not really need to get into this,” he said.

2 Tennessee cases

Judicial immunity is a sore spot for Stuart James, a civil rights lawyer in Chattanooga, Tenn., who is handling two civil suits against state judges — one of whom escaped liability recently. That case involved a judge accused of propositioning a woman for sex in exchange for him issuing a warrant for some individuals she claimed attacked her.

In February, a federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that even if the judge did ask her for sex, he was protected by the immunity doctrine. The judge, however, lost his job and was indicted on criminal charges. He just can’t be sued for money.

That’s not enough for James. He believes that if a judicial panel has removed someone from the bench for misconduct, the immunity defense shouldn’t hold up anymore.

“If your conduct was so reprehensible that you’re being taken off the job … I think they should be monetarily liable,” James said. “That’s the way our justice system works. Victims should be compensated for what’s been done with them.”

As for the immunity doctrine, he said: “There’s gotta be a change … because unfortunately, there are a lot of bad judges.”

https://us-u.openx.net/w/1.0/pd?plm=6&ph=bbb82fae-1d27-4d90-bb10-e24164ecd7bc

https://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/s/cookie_push.html#aHR0cHM6Ly9jbS5pcGlueW91LmNvbS9nZG4vY21zLmdpZj9nb29nbGVfZ2lkPUNBRVNFQm9mWHhrSzl0clVvMkZFQUNOdHlIMCZnb29nbGVfY3Zlcj0xJmdvb2dsZV9wdXNoPUFITkYxM0p0dTlSWVNfbjdmTFRkOVV5cEtSMS1tLV9fbENXazRMMVc3Q3hGZ1dMLQ==,aHR0cHM6Ly9jbS5nLmRvdWJsZWNsaWNrLm5ldC9waXhlbC9hdHRyP2Q9QUhORjEzSUloeGNwd01WZm14Y0lnMDJWWnVoRzMwVWNVdW50

Supervised Visitation
Supervised visitation is only appropriate where a parent poses a severe threat or
harm to a child.
A Sampling of Cases on Restriction of Visitation:
T.M., In re, 706 N.E.2d 931, 302 Ill.App.3d 33, 236 Ill.Dec. 57 (Ill. App. 1 Dist., 1998)
(Sexual assault/fondling and alcoholism by step father)
In re Marriage of Chehaiber, 334 Ill. Dec. 408 (2nd Dist. 2009):
“A court shall not restrict a parent’s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 2008)
A parent, by statute, is entitled to a hearing before visitation is restricted in any manner.
In re Marriage of Anderson, 130 Ill. App. 3d 684 (2nd Dist. 1985)
With respect to the restriction of visitation, the endangerment standard is an
onerous one (In re Marriage of Hanson (1983), 112 Ill.App.3d 564 , 568, 68 Ill.Dec. 268 ,
445 N.E.2d 912 ; In re Marriage of Neat (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1046 1048, 57 Ill.Dec.
413 , 428 N.E.2d 1093 ), and is more stringent or exacting than the best interest standard
( 84 Ill.App.3d 901 , 907, 40 Ill.Dec. 197 , 405 N.E.2d 1289 ; Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 40, par.
607(c), Supplement to Historical and Practice Notes, at 27 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1983);
see 101 Ill.App.3d 1046 1048, 57 Ill.Dec. 413 , 428 N.E.2d 1093 ).

Where the custodial parent seeks to restrict visitation rights, he or she bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the existing visitation seriously endangers the child.
(Griffiths v. Griffiths (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 126 , 129, 82 Ill.Dec. 220 , 468 N.E.2d 482 ; 101
Ill.App.3d 1046 1048, 57 Ill.Dec. 413 , 428 N.E.2d 1093 ). It should be noted that there
were allegations of sexual abuse by the father.
The August 10 order clearly restricted the respondent’s visitation with Marc. The
trial court did not make the requisite finding that the visitation would seriously endanger Marc’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 607(c)), but rather found that the restriction in visitation was in “the best interests of the minor child”. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in restricting the
respondent’s visitation rights. See In re Marriage of Solomon (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 901 ,
907, 40 Ill.Dec. 197 , 405 N.E.2d 1289 ;

Pleasant v. Pleasant, 256 Ill. App. 3d 742 (1st Dist. 1993)
Allegations of sexual abuse.
In re Marriage of Lombaer, 200 Ill. App.3d 712 (1’1 Dist. 1990)
Mother being in hospital and refusing to take medication insufficient to restrict her
visitation.
The standards within section 602 provide that the court shall determine custody
in [200 Ill.App.3d 723] accordance with the best interest of the child giving
consideration to:
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest;
(4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and
(6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s potential
custodian, whether directed against the child or directed against another person
but witnessed by the child.

In re Marriage of Neat, 428 N.E.2d 1093, 101 Ill.App.3d 1046, 57 Ill.Dec. 413 (Ill.
App. 1 Dist., 1981)
Mother’s demeanor in court (swaying, glazed eyes) insufficient to restrict or terminate
visitatin. “(c)ourts are reluctant to deny all visitation rights because of the underlying rationale that parents have a natural or inherent right of access to their children and that the sound public policy of this State encourages the [101 Ill.App.3d 1049] maintenance of strong inter-family relationships, even in post-divorce situations. Only very extreme circumstances require and allow the trial court to permanently deprive a parent of visitation.” 54 Ill.App.3d at 1015, 12 Ill.Dec. 680 , 370 N.E.2d 303 .
In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 246 Ill.App.3d 628, 186 Ill.Dec. 257 (Ill. App.
4 Dist., 1993 )
Both parties violent. Custody awarded to mother. Father awarded reasonable visitation.
Taraboletti v. Taraboletti, 56 Ill. App. 3d 854, 14 Ill. Dec. 350, 372 N.E.2d 155 (1978)
Termination of visitation rights: The testimony at the trial on the merits in the original
divorce produced the following facts: That the defendant had threatened to kill her
daughter, Carla, on a number of occasions; that defendant threatened to push her
daughter, Carla, down a flight of steps; that defendant threatened to kill her husband,
the plaintiff, and had struck him at various times; that defendant had tried to strike
plaintiff and plaintiff’s mother with an automobile; that plaintiff was fearful for the
children’s safety when they were with the defendant; and that the defendant did not
rebut any of this evidence against her. At the proceeding on the defendant’s petition to
change custody from plaintiff to herself, the following evidence was presented:
defendant had chased the plaintiff with a pan of boiling water while the children were
present; that defendant had struck plaintiff’s car with a garden rake while the children
were present; that during a confrontation, one of the minor children, David, age 10,
warned his father that the defendant was going to “kick him in the crotch”, that
defendant did strike plaintiff below the belt while the children were present and that
police assistance was required; that on another occasion defendant struck the plaintiff,
knocking off his glasses, and ripping his shirt,… Holding: visitation terminated for
defendant. Affirmed.

From Joanne;

I am publishing this because I am getting  a lot of complaints that parties are losing custody based on the following: child not attending day care (shouldn’t a pre school kid be with a parent while the other one works?  this isn’t school, it’s preschool); mother gets supervised visitation with a supervisor at $50 per hour when she makes minimum wage, which means the court has basically told her no visitation. What is wrong with these judges? and the GALs seem to be behind all of the problems.

As of the writing of this post today, Dorothy Brown’s records are not online.

DuPage county does not allow laptops or cell phone in the court house (why is that?)

The Cook County satellite courts do not allow cell phones or laptop in the courthouse (why is that?)

As a result, it looks like something really, really fishy is going on in Illinois.

In an open and democratic country all court records, including appellate court records and briefs (why rewrite a brief, just get one case that has already explored the issue, why rehash the past, when in fact we should be advancing the law).

In an open an democratic country, you should be able to bring your laptop into court and take notes, blog or whatever.  You can’t do that in Illinois.  We have an US and Illinois constitution but apparently those stop working when you cross the courtroom door threshold.

So if you get a chance today, please write your elected or appointed Clerk of Court and demand that they make all court records available for cheap or free.

From Google:  Dorothy Brown Clerk of Court

Address: Richard J Daley Center, 50 W Washington St, Chicago, IL 60602

Ask her to get all court records online and only charge 8 cents per page or less like Pacer does in Federal Court.  It’s kind of like blackmail when the taxpayer owns the court documents, and then they want to sell them back to you at 25 cents a page or more. those are YOUR documents.  Ask her to permit the use of cell phones and laptops in the courtrooms because that’s provided for under the US and Illinois constitutions.

For Federal Appellate records, apparently the Federal Documents services used to do this, but now all records are online.  Pacer goes back to 2000 for every appellate case, so check there for old briefs and records.

Please write the clerks of court for each Illinois Appellate court and demand they put all briefs and motions online for the public to see.

1st District Appellate
Clerk’s Office

(no name on website for clerk)
160 North LaSalle St.
Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 793-5484 
Office Hours: 8:30 – 4:30
2nd District Appellate
Clerk’s Office

Mr. Robert Mangan, Clerk
Appellate Court Building
55 Symphony Way
Elgin, IL 60120
(847) 695-3750
Office Hours: 8:30 – 4:30
3rd District Appellate
Clerk’s Office

Ms. Barbara Trumbo, Clerk
1004 Columbus Street
Ottawa, IL 61350
(815) 434-5050
Office Hours: 8:30 – 4:30
4th District Appellate
Clerk’s Office

Ms. Carla Bender, Clerk
201 West Monroe Street
P.O. Box 19206
Springfield, IL 62794-9206
(217) 782-2586
Office Hours: 8:30 – 4:30
5th District Appellate
Clerk’s Office

Mr. John Flood, Clerk
14th & Main Street
Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
(618) 242-3120
Office Hours: 8:30 – 4:30

Also write the presiding judge,  Illinois Supreme Court

Mr. Lloyd Karmeier

Ms. Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk

Clerk’s Office – Springfield
Supreme Court Building
200 E. Capitol Springfield, IL 62701
(217) 782-2035

If anyone can call and get their email addresses, that would be great too!

Joanne

http://www.walb.com/story/38134389/i-dont-know-what-to-do-im-in-georgia-canadian-womans-snap-goes-viral-after-arrest

what is it about the name “Cook County” that just implies gross incompetence?

COOK CO., GA (WALB) –

“OK, I’m in the back of a police car, I’m in cuffs.,” said Emily Nield as she sat in the back of a Cook County deputy’s vehicle.

Emily, a Canadian woman, posted a Snapchat video from the back of a Cook County Sheriff’s vehicle last month after she was arrested for not having a valid driver’s license.

Emily told deputies she had a valid Canadian driver’s license but said they put her in handcuffs anyway.

Interstate 75 brings approximately one million travelers through Cook County each month. With those travelers, law enforcement regularly encounters individuals who are engaged in crimes such as identity theft and will have on their person a license that is not their(‘s) or of those stolen or illegally reproduced. That is why we follow Georgia DDS guidelines and request a passport or visa to verify their identity. – Capt. Brent Exum of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office

Emily’s Snapchat went viral after her arrest on April 2 and she has done several interviews with Canadian media telling her story.

Emily was driving back to Tennessee from Florida when she was pulled over by a Cook County deputy for speeding.

The deputy asked for her driver’s license and Emily, a Canadian citizen, showed the officer her Ontario license. But the deputy told her, it wasn’t valid.

“I was confused. It was so loud at the side of the highway I thought I had misheard her,” explained Emily.

The deputy asked Emily to pull out an original copy of her passport, something Emily said she doesn’t keep on her. Next thing she knew, she was in handcuffs.

Below is a WALB digital exclusive uncut interview with Emily:

“I’ve never been arrested, I’ve never been in cuffs,” said Emily in her Snapchat from the deputy’s vehicle.

After the arrest, Emily said she was told she would have to pay the almost $900 bond in cash or stay in jail until a June court date.

The Cook County Sheriff’s Office, in a statement released Monday night, said that’s not true.

On CBC Toronto, it was reported that had Ms. Nield not post a cash bond she would have been in jail until June 12. That is not correct. Georgia law states that any individual who is arrested on a non-warrant is entitled to a first appearance hearing to be advised of their rights and bond within 48 hours of arrest. It is important to note that despite the driver’s license issue, Georgia law allows law enforcement officers to require the posting of a cash bond for non-residents even for the offense of speeding because their driver’s license cannot be displayed in lieu of bail. – Cook County Sheriff’s Office

Without the cash, Emily said she felt trapped.

“Eventually they just let me pay in debit because I was telling them the only way I can pay in cash is if you have an ATM inside the jailhouse,” explained Emily.

Finally, Emily said a deputy looked up the law and released her.

“I was able to drive an hour north and then I checked into a hotel, I needed to shower jail off me ’cause I was fingerprinted, mugshot, I wore orange,” said Emily.

The Cook County Solicitor Matthew Bennett did say he dropped the license charge against Emily. He said the confusion was from Emily telling the deputy she lived in Tennessee, where she would have to register for a Tennessee license.

After reviewing the facts of the case and in consultation with the arresting agency, I chose not to prosecute the case and entered a nolle prosequi. The probate court worked with Ms. Nield’s attorney to have her record restricted and sealed. The confusion that arose in this case was the fact Ms. Nield stated she lived in Tennessee. Non-permanent residents in the United States legally are permitted to get a Tennessee driver’s license or ID card that expires at the end of their visa. – Bennett

But Emily told WALB that her license is valid six months after leaving Canada and that she had left the country on February 4.

Emily said that despite what happened, she doesn’t have any hard feelings against the sheriff’s office or the state of Georgia.

“The Cook County judge and the probate court were amazing. Everyone I dealt with in Georgia was amazing in helping this case be dismissed and I cannot thank them enough,” said Emily.

Emily told WALB that she doesn’t plan to file a lawsuit against the sheriff’s office.

After Emily’s Snapchat video went viral, the Canadian Consulate reached out to Cook County officials for a conference call on Tuesday.

Below is a press release from Cook County about the conference call between the Canadian Consul General and Cook County officials:

ADEL, GA – Tuesday, May 8, 2018, Canadian Consul General Nadia Theodore and Cook County, Georgia officials meet via conference call to discuss how the parties could move forward in the wake of an incident involving a Canadian citizen.

Cook County Sheriff Douglas Hanks, Capt Brent Exum, and Judge Chase Daughtrey participated in the meeting with Ms. Theodore, which she initiated, to discuss best practices for law enforcement officers and Canadian citizens that visit Georgia. As a result of the meeting, Cook County Officials assured Canadian travelers that Georgia is open for business, their citizens would be treated with respect, due process would be afforded to it citizens, and any non-citizen who is arrested would be able to contact their regional consulate.

“Today’s meeting highlights what can be achieved when lines of communication are open. I appreciate Consul General Theodore listening to our thoughts, suggestions, and remedies as it relates to travelers from our respective countries. I look forward to future dialogue with the Canadian government on important issues such as these.” stated Judge Chase Daughtrey.

“The men and women of my office are dedicated public servants. They are taught to be professional and courtesy. As I explained to Consul General Theodore, her citizens will be treated with respect and dignity and will be treated no different than that of Americans or any other person whom we come into contact with.” remarked Sheriff Douglas Hanks.

from Joanne:

And I thought Canada was our 51st state, so much for being friendly to Canadians.

It’s hard to believe that a police officer would not know that a Canadian license is completely valid in the US

feel free to download and use on your case.

Don’t forget if the police or DCFS show up to grab your kid, they have to have a warrant unless there is imminent danger of serious injury or death. That means someone is hold a gun to their head, not that the child is thin or malnourishment is alleged, they re dirty or unkempt, etc.

This is too horrible for words.  How can such neglect and abuse happen?

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6174393/rebecca-zeni-carers-warned-scabies-eating-her-to-death/

STAFF at a care home were told not to touch an elderly former model’s scabies-infested hand in case it fell off, her family have claimed.

Disturbing pictures show how Rebecca Zeni, 93, was “eaten alive” by a horrifying outbreak of scabies which led to her dying from septicemia in June, 2015.

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Scabies is an agonising and maddeningly itchy skin condition caused by parasitic mites which burrow into the skin and lay eggs before feasting on the body.

Rebecca’s relatives are now suing Pruitt Health – who own the Shepherds Hill Nursing Home in LaFayette, Georgia – for neglect.

The family’s lawyer Mike Prieto claims that staff at the home were told “not to touch Zeni’s hand” over fears “it might fall off her body.”

He told 11ALIVE.com: “I don’t understand how you can allow a human being to suffer needlessly.

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One of the horrifying photographs released shows the elderly woman’s hand which appears to have turned black, is covered in dead skin and has long overgrown finger nails.

Rebecca, who was once a glamorous model working in New York, was placed in the home in 2010 after she was diagnosed with dementia.

It has emerged that state health officials knew of the outbreak of scabies but never investigated the problem or inspected Shepherds Hill.

Car pulls out in front of lorry causing pile-up – but who was in the wrong?

The condition is curable with a permethrin cream which needs to be applied at regular intervals for at least a week and maybe more depending on how bad it is.

Dr Kris Sperry, a forensic pathologist, who has studied Rebecca’s autopsy report said her case was “one of the most horrendous things I’ve ever seen in my career as a forensic pathologist.”

He added: “I would seriously consider calling this a homicide by neglect” while admitting that the 93-year-old would have suffered a painful death.

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/05/02/police-use-taser-on-tennessee-nurse-after-allegedly-punched-officer-in-face.html

As I have been told by hospital staff, never get between a son and his mother.  If a relative dies, and there are men around, everyone is quickly shuffled off to the basment to be with the body. Why?  While women will cry, men tend to like to punch out walls and throw chairs. That’s how they grieve.

In any case, I find the following report fairly shameful:

Cops use Taser on nurse who refused to leave emergency room

Raw video: Tennessee police use stun gun on hospital nurse after he allegedly refused to leave emergency room in Chattanooga.

Police officers shocked a Tennessee nurse with a Taser on Thursday after he refused to leave a hospital and then punched an officer in the face, court documents show.

Roger Davis, 42, was charged with “two counts of assault, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct” after he allegedly refused to leave the emergency room at Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga after his medical colleagues asked him to leave. Davis is an employee of the hospital but it’s unclear if he was on duty, ABC News reported.

Police used a Taser on Roger W. Davis last week after he refused to leave the Erlanger Hospital.  (Hamilton County Jail )

Chattanooga Officers Sarah Rogers and her partner, referred to as “Officer Woody” in a court document, responded to a call from the hospital regarding Davis. Rogers said she asked Davis to speak lower and said he would have to leave if he continued to raise his voice.

Davis reportedly replied: “Then do it.” The officer told him to leave the building but he did not, the arrest affidavit said.

 

“At this point I placed my hand on his arm to escort him out the door. As I did this, Mr. Davis started swinging his arms in an attempt to keep me from making him leave,” Rogers said.

“I attempted to take Mr. Davis into custody. Mr. Davis continued swinging his arms and fists at one point punching Officer Woody in the face, busting his lip.”

Davis was told to “put his hands behind his back and to quit fighting the police” but refused to, officials said. He also told officers to “go head” and use a stun gun. The officers tried to use the “take-down technique” but were unsuccessful, police said.

“I pulled my Taser. I placed it on Mr. Davis’ chest and advised three times if he would not stop resisting … I would deploy my Taser,” Rogers said. “Mr. Davis finally rolled over on his stomach and we were able to place him into custody.”

A video of the incident shot by a witness showed Davis refusing to comply with officers. Ethan Raymond, the person who shot the video, said he believed the officer was provoking the nurse.

“When they pulled out the taser, that’s when the nurse said he had a heart condition,” Raymond told News Channel 9.

 

“[Rogers] was way out of line,” Raymond said. “I just know what I saw was the cop that’s supposed to diffuse it and instead she was the aggressor, from what I saw.”

The hospital released a statement thanking officers for “containing the situation.”

“Erlanger would like to thank our associates, security and the Chattanooga Police Department for containing the situation that occurred on the evening of April 26. Because of their diligence, patient care in the emergency department was in no way impacted as a result of this isolated incident,” the statement read.

http://www.kget.com/news/homicide-news/murdered-girl-was-a-foster-care-runaway-who-no-one-reported-missing/695773519

BAKERSFIELD, CALIF – For many, adding to the tragedy of 15-year-old Stacy Duke’s murder is knowing she was here in Bakersfield seemingly alone. The teen’s older brother says she was loved, but she had a difficult life. He says Stacy did what she had to do in order to survive.

Adam Pittman says his sister’s short life was filled with struggle as she was born into the foster care system. “Foster care, it’s not what you want to know in life, not what you want to learn…how to run the government or how the government can run you”, says Pittman.

He says he and Stacy’s mother had four children, but they never all lived together at once, they were always in and out of the system. He says the family is originally from San Bernardino.  He says his mother loved them, but she struggled with addiction.

He says Stacy’s dream was to get out of foster care and go back home. “She just wanted to live with her family again and be with her family.”

Pittman says he last spoke to his 15-year-old sister around 4 months ago. She told him she was safe, living in Bakersfield with a boyfriend. “She called me personally and said ‘I’m on the run, I don’t want to be in foster care anymore, I don’t want to be in a foster home’. She was doing everything she had to do to survive as a homeless teen.”

Pittman says he is also homeless, living in Los Angeles. He says he disagreed with her decision to runaway and urged her to go back, but he admits he understands why she ran.

“She expressed to me every time she got to talk to me, ‘I hate where I live, I hate that I’m in the foster care system’. You don’t see the neglect from families who act like they care about you, but in the end they’re only there for that $900 check they get at the end of the month”, says Pittman.

He says their mother is in prison on drug charges, but will be getting out soon and was planning on taking care of Stacy when she did. He says he would do anything for just one more moment with his little sister. “To tell her she is strong, stronger than I was ever, just to be by her side and tell her she is loved, that’s all I want…I wish I could’ve…that’s my regret.”

But Pittman says he knows Stacy knew her family loved her and thought about her everyday. Since learning his sister was strangled to death inside a Bakersfield garage, he’s struggled with his emotions, but says he forgives his sister’s killer, because that’s what she would’ve wanted.

“My sister, she lived from the heart, she loved from the heart. She never hated people. She hated situations and circumstances, but she never hated people”, says Pittman.

Bakersfield Police say Stacy Duke was reported missing from group homes numerous times throughout the years, but no one had reported her missing this last time she ran away.