First I know you are all waiting to read:
The Response Brief filed by the ARDC to KDD’s Motion for a Supervisory Order filed at SCOI
Finally, I have to hand it to the Administrator, the ARDC seems to be getting better at understanding there are different types of speech and different levels of protection under the First Amendment to the US Constitution. They actually said for the first time ever that my speech is not commercial speech or advertising nor have I been charged with violating any client confidence–and that’s because I religiously ask the poster permission to post and if they want the post redacted or anonymous, I will do that for them. The ARDC still isn’t where they should be, but there seems to be hope on the horizon. I chalk that up to the detailed, you just can’t screw it up step by step instruction guide to constitutional rights and free speech set forth in the Horace Hunter case, so I have to just thank atty Hunter again for braving it out for all us attys in VA>
The Administrator’s Answer to KDD’s Petition to the Ill. Supreme Ct. for a Supervisory Order under Rule 383 is a great one. Still, the SCOI only receives about 200 such petitions per year (as should be because the petition basically is saying that a court or tribunal is acting so way out of line it is actually far exceeding its authority).
Motions to disqualify an attorney based upon a “conflict” are hardly if ever granted. This Complaint is for BLOGGING. Imagine that–blogging. It is not about stealing, failing to appear in court, failing to write a brief, motion or reply, failing to tell a client what is going on–it’s about blogging. Bloggin, one would think, should be put in the category of “priority Z” with the ARDC. Instead, because it’s obviously stepping on toes, denoting severe aberrations and corruptions in the court room, complete with published evidence thereof, and numerous uninvestigated serious citizen complaints, some how it has risen to “priority A” with the ARDC, and yet the ARDC does not understand how, from the get go, it appears to only bespeak of the corruption talk the ARDC is feverously attempting to quash or censor.
Getting back to Motions to Disqualify counsel of record. Like it or not, those are very, very serious and rarely granted in any courtroom I have ever been in. In all but a very few instances, they are a waste of time and money. And in my case, they are deja vu, with my first bogus disqualification in the Mary Sykes case because I merely notarized a document. Attorneys notarize documents all the time and as a matter of routine, and often between squabbling parties. It means nothing. Really. All the notary is supposed to be saying by performing the notarial act is that s/he knew or confirmed the ID of the person signing the document. It does not mean the person underwent a complete psychiatriac exam, a physical exam, took a driver’s road test, or qualified for any task–other than to put pen to paper and sign.
Next, you look at a complaint about blogging. This time the ARDC finally cited the correct standard for my speech–it has to be completely fabricated or made up in order to qualify under the standard “false or made with wanton and reckless disregard for the truth.” In my case, tons of evidence is already on the blog–esp. about the Sykes case. I got the declarations, I got transcripts, the case files–everything and all was published. Why the ARDC can even say this without an LOL ROF, 4PIA it was done without a scintilla of actual evidence is beyond anyone’s imagination. The Sykes case is well documented, well published, well explored on the blog. I can’t think of anything I have left out–and yet the ARDC continues to read my conclusions on one part of the blog (the case is corrupt and without jurisdiction and running for 3.5 years) while on the other part of the blog, all the documents, the transcripts, the pleadings, the declarations and affidavit mean nothing or are allegedly left unread by the ARDC. I don’t know how much more you can possibly publish about a topic.to prove the ARDC is simply full of it with respect to a “scintilla of evidence”. I don’t have a scintilla, as my daughter would say, I have “crap tons” of it. (She made up the following scale of how much something is “crap tons”, “sh** tons” and even “f*** tons” but I can publish that, now can I?” She generally uses these phrases when referring to how much homework or chem lab reports to do, but I digress.)
Here are my comments about the ARDC response:
The Administrator clearly has an interesting take on the entire proceeding.
With respect to your motion to dismiss, I think the Sup.Ct. would more likely make up a new rule that a respondent gets to file a Motion to Dismiss, rather than strike that step. As you point out Ken, it makes no sense not to allow Respondents to file Motions to Dismiss. MTD’s are very important on a number of levels and one is to narrow the issues for trial, and provide for greater judicial economy. I believe they are an important step in every trial court or tribunal process and they should never be skipped, as you have noted.
It is interesting that for the first time, the Administrator actually acknowledges that my speech is not commercial speech nor did I violate any client confidentiality. (Para 10)
Paragraph 15–Mr. Ditkowsky would perform as an “unsworn witness” rather than counsel and THAT would disqualify him? That’s new law. Never heard of it.
The ARDC primarily cites the Palmisano case for it’s position in this regard. But Palmisano clearly states:
If Palmisano had furnished some factual basis for his assertions, then we would need to determine whether either the Constitution or principles of sound judicial administration permit a sanction–for an attorney is not absolutely liable for every statement that turns out to be incorrect. It would unduly quell investigation and exposure of corruption to disbar an attorney who publicized suspicious conduct, just because the suspicions were dispelled. Palmisano lacked support for his slurs, however. Illinois concluded that he made them with actual knowledge of falsity, or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. So even if Palmisano were a journalist making these statements about a public official, the Constitution would permit a sanction. False statements, made with reckless disregard of the truth, “do not enjoy constitutional protection.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). See also Harte- Page 488
Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2681-82, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2790-91, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985) (same conclusion for claim based on right to petition for redress of grievances). Federal courts are no more willing to tolerate repeated, false, malicious accusations of judicial dishonesty than are state courts. Selection of the sanction is a subject on which appellate review is deferential. Gouiran, 58 F.3d at 56; cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).
It is indeed interesting that the ARDC finally has admitted that there are in fact different types of speech (non commercial (opinions and blogs), commercial (atty ads), and highly regulated–for example drug inserts), it just has to take the next step and properly complete the analysis.
In the Palmisano case, the court found that atty Palmisano made the allegations of corruption because he lost cases in front of these judges. HOWEVER, Atty Denison has not lost any cases in front of Justices Connor, Stuart or any other judge. She is sitting as a mere observer or court watcher, and in addition, she has backed up her allegations with court transcripts, pleadings, declarations and affidavits from those with personal knowledge of the facts of the transactions–all on the very same blog. Again, the ARDC apparently can read portions of the blog in which Atty Denison states that certain courtrooms are and have been operating without jurisdiction for years, but then the ARDC falls short of reading–let alone investigating, the numerous pieces of evidence published on the blog together with numerous citizen complaints that have been left uninvestigated by the ARDC.
Whether or not the ARDC “may require attorneys to speak with greater care and civility than is the norm in political campaigns” is not the question in this case. Atty Palmisano DID in fact appear before the judges he accused of being corrupt, and he lost cases in front of the judges and he further apparently published no blog with no additional supporting documents, pleadings, transcripts, affidavits and declarations, let alone allowed numerous citizens to come forward with their complaints against the miscreants or “judicial officials” involved in the suspect or corrupt actions complained of. The letters he sent out were just that–letters without appropriate supporting documentation, ie, transcripts, affidavits, declarations, pleadings, citizen interviews and confirmations. It is clear from the opinion, had he based his letters on some scintilla of actual evidence, the disciplinary proceedings against him would have not had the outcome they did.
It is further interesting that the ARDC says that Hunter is not binding. It is a well reasoned, well thought out decision by the Virginia Supreme Court and cannot be completely ignored by the ARDC. The ARDC does not argue that First Amendment US Constitutional protections may vary from state to state, nor does it show how the Virginia state bar must be comprised of some wilder bunch of attorneys who may be mouthier than their Illinois counterparts. I’m not exactly sure about what they are saying. Is it because they assume VA has med MaryJane and IL does not? I’m not sure.
With respect to ¶ 15 of the Administrator’s Response, the “unsworn” witness acting as an attorney is a specious argument and not found in any case law, nor has the ARDC cited any relevant case law.
*** End of My Comments***
Now for Ken’s Reply to the ARDC:
No testimony has been taken or received at this point in time in the proceedings before the Illinois ARDC. That said, the movant has presented this Court with the significant documentation necessary to inform the Court as to the factual basis of its motion and plea. The plea is for this Court to order an investigation of the fact that more than one senior citizen has been in derogation of its ruling in Steinfeld (citation infra) and a comprehensive protective plan enacted by the Illinois Legislature (citation infra) separated from her liberty and property by a Court lacking in jurisdiction.
As noted in the Motion for a Supervisory order, the movant has presented affidavits of disinterested persons (disinterested in the JoAnne Denison matter) that connoted the most important reason for the granting of the supervisory order and ordering of a Honest comprehensive investigation of the Mary Sykes and similar cases. These affidavits have not been contested.
Contrary to the impression attempted to be conveyed by the Administrator, the reason for the Petition for a Supervisory order being requested is multi-fold. The most pressing matter is the fact that in Illinois senior citizens are being herded into the Guardianships without concern as to the protections built into the system. Legislative protections are ignored and these senior citizens (such as Mary Sykes) are then denied their liberty and property interests.
The Statement that attorneys made not speak of this terrible situation is an ‘assault’ on the core values of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States has deplored such a situation and made in clear in Alvarez the even untrue content speech is protected speech. Only the Administrator of the ARDC appears to suggest that an Attorney may not complain concerning the denial of Civil Rights effectuated by “judicial officials”[1] The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the regulation of ‘content’ based speech such as appears in the Denison Blog and publications.
Ms Denison objects to the Administrator’s failure to be completely candid with this Court. The Administrator did not cite In re: Green 11 P 3d 1078 in which it was held that the First Amendment protection included the right to make the allegation that a particular judge was a racist and a bigot, and did not note the distinction in Palmisano, i.e:
“If Palmisano had furnished some factual basis for his assertions, then we would need to determine whether either the Constitution or principles of sound judicial administration permit a sanction-for an attorney is not absolutely liable for every statement that turns out to be incorrect. It would unduly quell investigation and exposure of corruption to disbar an attorney who publicized suspicious conduct, just because the suspicions were dispelled.” Matter of Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995)
Ms. Denison has attached affidavits of 3rd persons as part of her response that confirm the direct miscreant conduct in violation of the clears words of the Supreme Court of Illinois and the Legislative of the State of Illinois[2]. These affidavits have not been challenged.
Discussion
“Disbarment is not an adversarial proceeding” Matter of Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1995) and therefore, it is respectfully suggested that the Administrator’s objections are groundless and disingenuous. Even in his defense to the clearly erroneous decision to disqualify Ms. Denison’s attorney appearing for her at the ARDC proceeding the Administrator does not suggest a single question that Mr. Ditkowsky can be called as a witness concerning. Conclusions are interesting but irrelevant and it is respectfully suggested that no proper court would have entertained the disqualification motion advanced by the Administrator without specifics. There is no affidavit submitted with the Motion that suggests that Denison’s attorney had any exclusive personal knowledge. (The Common Record in Sykes has been seen by dozens of people. If the Administrator did at Rule 137 examination of the record he also has personal knowledge that the Sykes court acted without jurisdiction).
It should be noted that the Administrator does not state that Mr. Ditkowsky viewed or attended any hearing or other proceeding involving Mary Sykes, Indeed, Attorney Denison has waived any ‘conflict of interest’ she might have with her attorney, as in fact there is none. To eliminate an attorney who does not please the adversary, following the administrator’s reasoning all the adversary has to do is claim that the offending attorney will be called as a witness[3].
The objection filed the administrator is interesting in that he does not display in his appendix the Request to Admit that were filed by Ms. Denison with the Commission. The Administrator’s evasive and unresponsive Responses also are not in his appendix[4]. The significance of the response of the Administration is that the Administrator is so intent on ‘winning’ that Justice is not a consideration. Candid answers to the Request to Admit is respectfully submitted to be the end the Denison case. The death knell occurred years before this case was brought as the Illinois Supreme Court has made it very clear that:
“The court acquires jurisdiction over the allegedly disabled person by personal service upon him of a copy of the petition and summons not less than 14 days before the hearing. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, Ch. 110½, par. 11a–10(e); see McCormick v. Blaine (1931), 345 Ill. 461, 178 N.E. 195.) It is also a jurisdictional requirement that the petitioner give notice of the time and place of the hearing by mail or in person to the nearest living relatives of the allegedly disabled person not less than 14 days before the hearing. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, Ch. 110½, par. 11a–10(f); see In re Guardianship of Sodini (1988), 172 Ill.App.3d 1055, 123 Ill.Dec. 67, 527 N.E.2d 530.” In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 630 N.E.2d 801, 807 (1994)
The Administrator is not by law supposed to be an advocate for the persons appointed as “judicial officials” by a Court lacking jurisdiction. He is supposed to protect the rights of citizens such as Mary Sykes, Gloria Sykes, Yolanda Bakken, Scott Evans, JoAnne Denison, etc. In not providing this Court with a copy of its responses to the Request to Admit and in not candidly answering the Administrator pursuant to Rule 216 admits that the Circuit Court record does not demonstrate that in Sykes ( as an example) the 14 days’ notice was served upon Gloria Sykes, Yolanda Bakken, et al . It is respectfully suggested that the Administrator was not candid in citing Palmisano for reasons stated infra.
On the other hand the if the Administrator denies the Request to Admit, the Administrator must prove the impossible by clear and convincing evidence[5] that Ms. Gloria Sykes, her two aunts, and all who have viewed the Sykes record are all mistaken. Indeed, if the 14 day notices were not served on Gloria Sykes and her two aunts the statements made in Ms. Denison’s blog are indeed true. Ms. Farenga, Ms. Troepe, Mr. Stern are not “judicial officials” and Mary Sykes has been the victim of the tort of false imprisonment, the non-inventory of her property much more than the breach of fiduciary relationship etc. More seriously, the claimed “judicial officials” are guilty of much more than ethical violations. Indeed, the Administrator may himself have violated Himmel.
The portion of the Palmisano decision that the Administrator in his objections failed to call to the Court’s attention is documented as:
“If Palmisano had furnished some factual basis for his assertions, then we would need to determine whether either the Constitution or principles of sound judicial administration permit a sanction-for an attorney is not absolutely liable for every statement that turns out to be incorrect. It would unduly quell investigation and exposure of corruption to disbar an attorney who publicized suspicious conduct, just because the suspicions were dispelled.” Matter of Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995)
Ms. Denison has provided a significant factual basis for her assertions. She has provided affidavits of the affected persons and the wrongful prosecution of Ms. Denison is a chilling violation of the Free Speech of a citizen protected by the First Amendment.[6]
The Administrator has claimed that statements made on the publication (Blog) maintained by Ms. Denison are untrue as they relate to public officials; however, significantly missing from the appendix attached to the objections is a single certification by anyone that they served the 14 days’ notice required in the Sykes case by 755 ILCS 5/11a -10(f) on Gloria Sykes or the two siblings of Mary Sykes.
Why has the Administrator of the ARDC failed to produce a scintilla of evidence either herein or in the Commission proceedings to suggest, or even imply that 755 ILCS 5/11a – 10(f) was even attempted to be complied with? Certainly copies of the return or certification of the Sheriff, private investigator, attorney, or other person who served the 14 day notices required to vest the Circuit Court probate division with jurisdiction would be persuasive. As the Court file in Sykes is a public record (or at least was a public record) a copy of the return or certification of service of the 14 days’ notice would be easy to present so as to counter the affidavits of Mary Sykes daughter and two sisters. It is respectfully submitted that no return or certification ever existed (prior to today) and the Administrator is fully aware that Ms. Denison’s blog contains no knowingly untrue statements. The Administrator is aware that it is a violation of Rule 8.4 by the Administrator and Rule 137 of the Supreme Court Rules[7] to file documents in any judicial proceeding that are knowingly untrue.
This Supreme Court has the decision in Hunter before it and therefore can determine the scope of the decision and whether or not the Virginia Supreme Court obviated any notion that attorneys are second class citizens to be denied their Free Speech Rights.[8] It is also quite significant and very disappointing that the Administrator does not address the important Constitutional limitations on its jurisdiction . Missing from the objection filed by the Administrator was any mention of this Court’s or the Supreme Court’s decisions that are the strong basis for the request for an investigation and the supervisory order have been over-ruled are not relevant or superseded. Indeed, as an example the Administrator fails to address the 2011 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011), New York Times vs. Sullivan (citation omitted), Alvarez, etc. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States must be given proper respect. In proportion the respect due them is infinitely more than that to be given to “judicial officials” appointed by a Court lacking jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the instant Motion for a Supervisory order is not an academic or an athletic exercise. The issue herein is the fact that lawyers are being intimidated by the Illinois ARDC to keep silent as to persons being denied their liberty and property interest because they deemed by certain “judicial officials” appointed by a Court lacking jurisdiction to be in need a guardian. The issue is the Elder Abuse and Financial Exploitation of Senior citizens and persons with diminished capacity. The issue is the concept that a judgment of the need for a guardian is not to protect the individual but to strip him or her of all liberty and property rights.[9]
Equally serious, but not of the same Constitutional moment of the First Amendment issue is the fact that the legislature in 755 ILCS 5/11a – 17 and 11a -18 has determined that guardianship was not the ‘kiss of death’ but a compassionate method of making as little interference into the life of a affected person as possible. Indeed, the legislature decreed that people such as Mary Sykes would not be isolated from family, friends, activities, assets, and liberty.
Conclusion and Summary
Senior citizens and disabled persons are not ‘second class citizens’ and when the Illinois Legislature enacted a legislative scheme to protect them the Illinois ARDC was not delegated the authority to silence attorneys such as Ms. Denison who complained that the protections were being thwarted by certain “judicial officials” who were appointed by a Court lacking jurisdiction. The Administrator of the Illinois ARDC has called attention ( by his prosecution of Ms. Denison for publishing on her ‘blog’) to the fact that a 90 plus year old senior citizen (and others) have been dominated illegally by ‘judicial officials’ who sans jurisdiction of the appointing court have ignored the legislative protections afforded to senior citizens who have either the potential for or actual diminished capacity.
Mary Sykes for one has been stripped of a million dollars (plus or minus) in gold coins that were not inventoried and isolated from her family for more than three years. In an effort to silence JoAnne Denison the Administrator and the ARDC panel disqualified her attorney upon the facade that he might be called to testify. The seriousness of the Sykes case and related cases promulgated Attorney Denison to petition this Court for a Supervisory order requiring the Courts to follow the legislative and jurisdictional mandate and for an honest, complete and comprehensive investigation by law enforcement of how in the United States of America something like the Sykes case could flourish[10].
Ms. Denison prays that this court enter its supervisory order and deny the Administrator’s objections.
Respectfully Submitted,
[1] Following the reasoning of the Administrator there would have been no prosecution of the 15 judges who went to jail as the result of their corruption (in Greylord) and there would be no need for the Judicial Inquiry Board. Indeed, a lawyer who co-operated with the Justice Department in an investigation of Judicial corruption would be subject to Disciplinary action by the ARDC. Ironically the corruptors and the corrupt would be free to operate their nefariousness at will.
[2] The Objection suggests that the Blog contains untrue matter. The burden of proof is upon the Administrator to prove by clear and convincing evidence the facts upon which his claim is based. The affidavits placed of record, and documents on the blog substantiate that the statements have a credible basis and that the petitioner had every right to assert them as facts.
[3] It should be noted that this was the technique was allegedly used to prevent Ms. Denison from protecting the interests of Mary Sykes and Gloria Sykes in the Sykes case. Thus, the Court record reveals that Mary Sykes was in defiance of the Article 11a (755 ILCS 5/11a et seq) Mary had her liberty and property taken from her and no attorney was appointed or allowed to represent her or the assert the jurisdictional deficiency that this court pointed out in In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 630 N.E.2d 801, 807 (1994)
[4] Ms. Denison filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the ARDC panel based upon the responses filed by the Administrator. The objection suggests that the Commission has adopted a Rule to prevent the termination of spurious and improper disciplinary actions by the Administrator. However, this Court in enacting Rule 137 over-ruled such a tactic to thwart a denial of Equal Protection of the Law toward Legal Professionals. The ARDC should be like Caesar’s wife! It should not be an instrument of intimidation.
[5] A search of the Circuit Court record reveals that not only was the Petition for the Guardianship of Mary Sykes defective as it did not name the two siblings of Mary Sykes (and was brought in the wrong venue) but, it not served in accordance with 755 ILCS 5/11a – 10, Sodini, and Steinfeld.
[6] The recent Supreme Court of the United States Decisions suggest that Palmisano today would not be good law. That is not to say that if Mr. Palmisano insulted the Court while participating in a court proceeding he could not held in contempt, or that he could not be sued for defamation. Government however cannot limit his content based speech. This issue however is not part of the Motion for Supervisory order. The portion of Palmisano not disclosed by the Administrator discloses the weakness of the Administrator’s position and as the Administrator in its objection has quite articulately stated he will not investigate the attorneys accused of Elder Abuse and Financial Exploitation of senior citizens such as Mary Sykes. Thus, a supervisory order is extremely necessary if Senior citizens are going to be protected from court attorned Elder Abuse and Financial Exploitation of Senior citizens.
[7] It is respectfully suggested that had the Administrator a scintilla of proof of jurisdiction being afforded to the Probate Court pursuant to 755 ILCS 5/11a – 10(f) the Administrator would welcome an investigation into the Sykes case. Unfortunately, it is very clear that for more than three years Mary Sykes has had her liberty taken from her. Her personal property which is valued in excess of a million dollars has not been inventoried. The two Guardian ad Litem who are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the court instead of on the record reporting these facts to the Court have authored complaints to the ARDC to investigate the attorneys who have objected to the non-inventory of a million dollars in assets by a plenary guardian who was appointed by a Court lacking jurisdiction. It is respectfully submitted that if this Court were to request the Administrator of the ARDC to produce credible documentary evidence that Gloria Sykes and Mary Sykes two siblings were served with the 14 days’ notice the Administrator could not do so!
[8] The administrator’s attempt to distinguish Hunter exposes his embarrassment. Hunter involved a measure of Commercial speech. The Virginia Supreme Court dealt with the fact that where there is commercial speech the Court has some lee-way to protect the public; however, as to content based speech this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have evolved their opinions more in line with the opinions of Justice Black and Justice Douglas. It is significant that the Administrator does not address Alvarez or the statement that was the basis of the Brown decision:
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are of course exceptions. “ ‘From 1791 to the present,’ … the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–383, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992)). These limited areas—such as obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–449, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam), and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)—represent “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” id., at 571–572, 62 S.Ct. 766.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011)
[9] The issue is the fact that each one of us is reaching (or reached) senior citizen status and we might find ourselves being railroaded in to guardianship wherein we lose our liberty and property.
[10] The Administrator has pointed out in his objections that he has prosecutor discretion and if he does not wish to investigate the two guardian ad litem appointed by a court lacking jurisdiction et al that is strictly up to him. Indeed, this is the reason that Ms. Denison would appreciate this Court directing law enforcement to examine the facts of the Sykes case and in particular determine:
1. How could Mary Sykes be deprived of her liberty by a Court lacking jurisdiction (because of the failure to serve the 14 day Sodini notices) for so many years.
2. How could a million dollars of uninventoried personal property (gold coins) be obtained by the plenary guardian?
3. Why in Sykes are there two guardian ad litem and why did they not report the non-inventory of the assets of Mary Sykes?
4. Why was an admission of neglect by the plenary guardian not reported to the Court by the plenary guardians
5. Why was Mary Sykes isolated from her two siblings and younger daughter. Why was Mary Sykes removed from her home, her activities, her friends, etc.
As the Illinois Legislature enacted 755 ILCS 5/11a et seq it obviously intended to protect senior citizens. In the case of Mary Sykes and unfortunately many other seniors the protections have not been implemented. The question that must be addressed is why not! It is respectfully submitted that the Administrator’s objections may provide a suggestion. Ms. Denison and her counsel respectfully request an investigation to ascertain the facts. Illinois cannot afford another Greylord.
Ken Ditkowsky
