QUESTION: HOW COME NONE OF THE SO CALLED . . . “FAMILY LAW EXPERTS” . . . AND NONE OF ANY OF THE . . . “FAMILY LAW ADVOCATES” . . . IN THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES HAS EVER TOLD YOU THAT YOU CAN FILE . . . “A FRANKS MOTION” . . . PURSUANT TO . . . “COSTANICH v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, 627 F.3d 1101, at 1108-1109 (December 3, 2010)” . . . WHICH PROVIDES THAT . . . “THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BASED ON FABRICATED EVIDENCE IS A VIOLATION OF A PERSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS” IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT” . . . “AND THAT THIS PRINCIPLE APPLIES WITH EQUAL FORCE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING” . . . BUT LUIS EWING DID?

ANSWER: BECAUSE ALL OF THE SO CALLED . . . “FAMILY LAW EXPERTS” . . . AND . . . “FAMILY LAW ADVOCATES” . . . IN ALL FIFTY (50) STATES ARE GRADE A RANK AMATEUR WET BEHIND THE EARS GREENHORN ROOKIE BEGINNER WANNABE FAMILY LAW GURUS WHO DON’T KNOW SQUAT ABOUT THE LAW PERIOD!

HOW COME NONE OF THE . . . “LAME ATTORNEYS” . . . AT THE . . . “THE FAMILY FORWARD PROJECT” . . . AND . . . “ATTORNEYS WHO FIGHT AND SUE CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES” . . . TOLD YOU THAT YOU CAN FILE . . . “A FRANKS MOTION” . . . IN A CIVIL FAMILY COURT PROCEEDING TO CHALLENGE THE VERACITY AND TRUTHFULNESS OF THE CPS SOCIAL WORKERS PERJURED TESTIMONY AT A PRE-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING IF ALL YOUR . . . “LAME ATTORNEYS” . . . AT THE . . . “THE FAMILY FORWARD PROJECT” . . . AND . . . “ATTORNEYS WHO FIGHT AND SUE CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES” . . . WERE NOT MILKING THE COW AND BLEEDING YOU DRY OF ALL YOUR MONEY IF THEY WERE NOT WORKING IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE CPS TO HELP STEAL YOUR CHILDREN UNDER THE COLOR OF NO LAW???

WATCH THIS VIDEO AND PAY EXTRA SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ALL THE JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS ATTACKING THE COSTANICH CASE BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS THAT ALL THE JUDGES ARE ABSOLUTELY TERRIFIED OF COSTANICH v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, 627 F.3d 1101, at 1108-1109 (December 3, 2010), BECAUSE IT CITES JONES v. STATE, 170 Wash.2d 338, 242 P.3d 825, 831-32 (2010) WHICH BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL WHICH BRINGS IN MY WHOLE FRANKS ARGUMENT THAT WE CAN USE A FRANKS MOTION TO CHALLENGE PERJURED TESTIMONY!!!

THE FACT THAT NOT A SINGLE SO CALLED FAMILY LAW EXPERT OR ANY OF THE JUST AS IGNORANT RANK AMATEUR BEGINNER FAMILY LAW ADVOCATE HAS EVER TOLD YOU ABOUT A FRANKS MOTION IS PROOF THAT ALL THE WANNABE FAMILY LAW LEADERS DON’T KNOW SQUAT ABOUT THE LAW AND THIS IS THE MAIN REASON WHY THE FAMILY LAW NON MOVEMENT HASN’T MOVED ANYWHERE FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS!

DO NOT LET ANY OF THESE RANK AMATEUR BEGINNER FAMILY LAW ADVOCATES TELL YOU THAT YOU CANNOT USE THIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ATTACKING PERJURED TESTIMONY IN THE FAMILY COURTS BECAUSE IT’S A CIVIL PROCEEDING AND NOT CRIMINAL, ALL OF THESE SO CALLED FAMILY LAW EXPERTS AND ALL OF THESE FAMILY LAW ADVOCATES DON’T KNOW SQUAT ABOUT THE LAW PERIOD!!!

HERE ARE THE EIGHT (8) CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CASE LAW HOLDING DECISIONS THAT THE CROOKED PANEL OF THREE JUDGES AND THE CROOKED WOMAN ATTORNEY PANCY LIN DON’T WANT YOU TO READ:

1.) Costanich v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 627 F.3d 1101, at 1108-1109 (December 3, 2010).

2.) Costanich v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 138 Wash. App. 547, 156 P.3d 232 (App. Ct. 2007).

3.) Jones v. State, 170 Wash.2d 338, 242 P.3d 825, 831-32 (2010)

4.) Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008).

5.) Kalina v. Fletcher, No. 95-36129, 93 F.3d 653; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 21488; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Service 6255; 96 Daily Journal DAR 10251 ( Ninth Circuit, August 22, 1996).

6.) Kalina v. Fletcher, No. 96-792, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S. Ct. 502, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7498; 66 U.S.L.W. 4031; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9233; 97 Daily Journal DAR 14869; 1997 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3203; 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 258 (December 10, 1997).

7.) Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1361-63 (5th Cir. 1987)

8.) Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990.)

HERE ARE FIFTY E NINE (59) OTHER NINTH CIRCUIT CASES HOLDING YOU CAN’T USE PERJURED TESTIMONY OR SUBMIT DOCUMENTS THAT CONTAIN MATERIALLY FALSE STATEMENTS OR TESTIFY FALSELY BECAUSE . . . “THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BASED ON FABRICATED EVIDENCE IS A VIOLATION OF A PERSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS” IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT” . . . “AND THAT THIS PRINCIPLE APPLIES WITH EQUAL FORCE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING” . . . IS . . . “A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT” . . . AND THIS BRINGS IN MY WHOLE ARGUMENT THAT WE CAN FILE . . . “A FRANKS MOTION” . . . TO CHALLENGE ALL THE LYING CPS SOCIAL WORKERS PURSUANT TO FRANKS v. DELAWARE, 438 U.S. 154, 92 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

1.) Kalina v. Fletcher, 93 F.3d 653 ( 9th Cir., August 22, 1996).

2.) Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008).

3.) Costanich v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 627 F.3d 1101, at 1108-1109 (December 3, 2010).

4.) Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009).

5.) McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 560 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2009).

6.) Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2007).

7.) Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007).

8.) Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007)

9.) KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004).

10.) Miller v. Gamie, 335 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2003).

11.) Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003).

12.) Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).

13.) Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

14.) Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002).

15.) Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir.2002).

16.) Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2001)

17.) Mabe v. San Bernadino County Department of Public Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001).

18.) Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001).

19.) Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2001).

20.) Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1286 (9th Cir.2001).

21.) Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 545, 151 L.Ed.2d 423 (2001).

22.) Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.2001).

23.) Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).

24.) Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).

25.) Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).

26.) Schenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir.2000).

27.) Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.2000).

28.) Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999).

29.) Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n. 1 (9th Cir.1999).

30.) Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1998).

31.) Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1997).

32.) Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1997).

33.) Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1997).

34.) Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

35.) Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1996).

36.) Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 1995).

37.) Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 115 S.Ct. 1695, 132 L.Ed.2d 559 (1995).

38.) Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.1994).

39.) Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1993).

40.) Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).

41.) Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1991)

42.) Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991).

43.) Kennedy v. L.A. Police Department, 887 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1989).

44.) Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1989).

45.) Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).

46.) United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1989).

47.) Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir.1989).

48.) Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989).

49.) Benigni v. City of Hemet, 853 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1988).

50.) Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988).

51.) Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987).

52.) King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986).

53.) Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986).

54.) Ashelman v. Pope, 778 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1985).

55.) United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).

55.) McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1984).

56.) United States v. Davis, 714 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1983).

58.) Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983).

59.) Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982).

HERE IS THE HOPE v. PELZER CASE THAT THE CROOKED JUDGE WAS TALKING ABOUT:

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 743, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).

LUIS EWING EXPOSES THE TWO (2) MAIN REASONS WHY THE PANEL OF THREE (3) JUDGES WERE ATTACKING THE COSTANICH V. DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, 627 F.3D 1101 (DECEMBER 3, 2010) CASE, WHICH CITES JONES v. STATE, 170 WASH.2D 338, 242 P.3D 825 (2010), WHICH CONCLUDED THAT . . . “THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY BASED ON FABRICATED EVIDENCE IS A VIOLATION OF A PERSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS” IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT” . . . “AND THAT THIS PRINCIPLE APPLIES WITH EQUAL FORCE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING” . . . AND THIS BRINGS IN MY WHOLE ARGUMENT USING A . . . “FRANKS MOTION” . . . MAKING . . . “A GIGLIO CLAIM” . . . “A NAPUE CLAIM” . . . “A PYLES CLAIM” . . . “AN ALCORTA CLAIM” . . . “A MOONEY CLAIM” . . . “AN AGURS CLAIM” . . . AND . . . “A BRADY CLAIM” . . . TO OVERCOME ALL THE JOHN 8:44 LYING CPS SOCIAL WORKERS PERJURED TESTIMONY WHICH IS THE MOST DANGEROUS PROCEDURE THAT COULD UNDO 90 % TO 95 % OF ALL CPS CASES!

THE SECOND REASON THE JUDGES WERE PLAYING STUPID AND ASKING ATTORNEY PANCY LIN IF SHE HAD ANY NINTH CIRCUIT CASES AND PANCY LIN FALSELY CLAIMED SHE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY OR AT LEAST TRUTHFULLY SAID THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT IN FRONT OF HER THERE IN THE COURT ROOM WAS BECAUSE THE CROOKED JUDGES WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO TRY TO AVOID DISCUSSING BELTRAN v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008); BUCKLEY v. FITZSIMMONS, 509 U.S. 259, 275, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) AND KALINA v. FLETCHER, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S. Ct. 502, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471 (December 10, 1997) AND PAY ATTENTION TO THE SUPREME COURT KALINA v. FLETCHER CASE WHICH IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT PROVIDES . . . “THE NINTH CIRCUIT KALINA v. FLETCHER CASE” . . . Kalina v. Fletcher, 93 F.3d 653 ( 9th Cir., August 22, 1996).

THE CROOKED LADY ATTORNEY PANCY LIN TRUTHFULLY AND FALSELY ARGUED THAT THIS WAS . . . “A BIOLOGICAL versus FOSTER PARENT LIBERTY.”

THE CROOKED PANEL OF THREE JUDGES FRAUDULENTLY ATTEMPTED AND DID MAKE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO PUT DOWN AND BURY THE COSTANICH CASE BY ARGUING THAT SECONDARY FOSTER CARE, THAT’S A WHOLE STRANGE THING, IT’S NOT A PARENTS REAL CHILD, AND A GUARDIAN, IT’S NOT THE SAME THING!

THE CROOKED LADY ATTORNEY PANCY LIN LIED AND SAID THAT WE DO NOT HAVE ANY NINTH CIRCUIT CASE, BUT THEN WARPED HER LIE INTO A PARTIAL TRUTH AND SAID “AT LEAST NOT IN FRONT OF ME”, HA, HA, HOW LAME THIS CREW OF ATTORNEYS WERE TRYING TO COVER UP THE COSTANICH CASE WHICH CITES THE TWO (2) OTHER MAIN NINTH CIRCUIT CASES, Kalina v. Fletcher, 93 F.3d 653 ( 9th Cir., August 22, 1996) AND BELTRAN v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008) AND THE KILLER WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT CASE JONES v. STATE, 170 WASH.2D 338, 242 P.3D 825 (2010), WHICH BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN CRIMINAL CASES AND CIVIL CASES AS BEING EQUAL AND THIS BRINGS IN MY WHOLE ARGUMENT THAT WE CAN USE . . . “A FRANKS MOTION RAISING A GIGLIO CLAIM IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING.”

HERE IS THE IMPORTANT PART OF THE COSTANICH CASE THAT THESE CROOKED JUDGES AND THE CROOKED CPS WOMAN ATTORNEY DID NOT DISCUSS ON PURPOSE:

“We conclude that deliberately fabricating evidence in civil child abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a liberty or property interest is at stake, and that genuine issues of material fact exist on the question of deliberate fabrication.. The Washington State Supreme Court has also recently concluded that “the deprivation of liberty based on fabricated evidence is a violation of a person’s constitutional right to due process” in the criminal context, and that this principle “applies with equal force in a civil proceeding” adjudicating a pharmacist’s license, reasoning that a pharmacist’s professional and business licenses are property interests protected by the due process clause. Jones v. State, 170 Wash.2d 338, 242 P.3d 825, 831-32 (2010). . . . In Beltran, we held that social workers are “not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under the penalty of perjury, because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute.” 514 F.3d at 908. We analogized the social worker to “[a] prosecutor [who] doesn’t have absolute immunity if he fabricates evidence during a preliminary investigation before he could properly claim to be acting as an advocate, or makes false statement in a sworn affidavit in support of an application for an arrest warrant.” Id. (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502). “[A]s prosecutors and others investigating criminal matters have no absolute immunity for their investigatory conduct, a fortiori, social workers conducting investigations have no such immunity.” Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908-09. Duron’s argument that in filing the declaration, she acted as a witness, and therefore deserves absolute immunity under Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1989), is unpersuasive in light of Beltran’s clearly controlling conclusion to the contrary. Thus, Duron is not entitled to absolute immunity from the claims that she deliberately fabricated evidence in her investigation and made false statements in the sworn declaration submitted in support of the guardianship termination proceedings.” Costanich v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 627 F.3d 1101, at 1108-1109 (December 3, 2010). And;

“In Hodorowsky v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir.1988), the court determined that the seizure of children in the absence of a court order under Texas law would not be protected by absolute immunity. The court reasoned that seizure without a court order in the face of an immediate danger seems to us more akin to the function of a police than prosecutors. Policemen, not prosecutors investigate dangerous situations and are charged with the duty, if necessary to prevent injury. BUT POLICEMEN, LIKE MOST OTHER EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS ARE ORDINARILY NOT PROTECTED BY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY . . . UNLESS THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A FUNCTION INTEGRAL TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, SUCH AS TESTIFYING AS A WITNESS. . . . Likewise, in Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1361-63 (5th Cir. 1987), the court determined that the filing of an allegedly false verified complaint, which under Louisiana law initiated temporary custody of a child, but did not initiate the judicial process concerning need of care proceedings, was not entitled to absolute immunity. THE COURT ANALOGIZED THE FILING OF A VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY A CHILD ABUSE WORKER TO THE SEEKING OF AN ARREST WARRANT BY A POLICE OFFICER, BECAUSE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN THE LATER CASE, SO TOO WOULD IT BE INAPPROPRIATE IN THE FORMER. Austin, 830 F.2d at 1362.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990.). And

“The Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation”–a requirement that may be satisfied by an indictment returned by a grand jury, but not by the mere filing of criminal charges in an unsworn information signed by the prosecutor. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975); See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Accordingly, since most prosecutions in Washington are commenced by information, Washington law requires, in compliance with the constitutional command, that an arrest warrant be supported by an affidavit “or sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.” Washington Criminal Rule 2.2(a) (1995) provides: “A warrant of arrest must be supported by an affidavit, . . . or sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. . . . The court must determine there is probable case . . . before issuing the warrant.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, at 129 (December 10, 1997). And;

“We think the right at issue in this case is appropriately identified as the right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in a investigating capacity. Understood this way, we conclude that the right at issue is a constitutional right, provided that the deprivation of liberty of which Zahrey complains can be shown to be a result of Coffey’s fabrication of evidence.” Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, at 349 (July 20, 2000). And;

“The defendants in Calabretta maintained, primarily, that the search and seizure at the family home was reasonable because “any check on the welfare of children” triggered the “exigent circumstance[s]” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement . Id. at 811. They also came at the problem another way, arguing that traditional Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to child abuse investigations at all, as such investigations constitute administrative searches requiring probable cause nor a warrant. Id. At 812. We rejected both arguments, holding both that traditional Fourth Amendment protections apply to child abuse investigations and that the family’s right to be free of warrantless searches and seizures in their home, even within the context of a child abuse investigation, was clearly established at the time of the incident. See id. At 817. We have reaffirmed our holding in Calabretta twice, noting that although the crime of child sexual abuse “may be heinous . . . [this] does not provide cause for the state to ignore the rights of the accused or any other parties.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2000); See also Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir.2007).” Green v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, at1022-1023 (9th Cir. 2009). And;

HERE ARE MORE CASES THAT CLEARLY SHOW THAT WE CAN USE A . . . “FRANKS MOTION” . . . MAKING . . . “A GIGLIO CLAIM” . . . “A NAPUE CLAIM” . . . “A PYLES CLAIM” . . . “AN ALCORTA CLAIM” . . . “A MOONEY CLAIM” . . . “AN AGURS CLAIM” . . . AND . . . “A BRADY CLAIM” . . . TO OVERCOME ALL THE JOHN 8:44 LYING CPS SOCIAL WORKERS PERJURED TESTIMONY

“The same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000).” Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, at 1019 (7th Cir. 2000). And;

“There is no ‘social worker’ exception to the Fourth Amendment.” Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, at page 1225 (10th Cir. 2005). And;

“The courts may not use a different standard other than probable cause for the issuance of such orders.” Griffin v. Wilcox, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). And;

See also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. citing Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) holding that: “. . . probable cause has not been abandoned as a requirement . . . .” MARSHALL v. BARLOW’S, INC., 436 U.S. 307, 310, 315 (May 23, 1978).

“The boundary for defendant’s conduct establishing the “contours of the right” involved is the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3038-39. In 1988, the case law had unimpeachably established “the cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, at 787 (10th Cir. 1993). And;

“The Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure provisions are applicable to the defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).” Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, at 602 (2nd Cir. 1999). And;

“Caseworkers investigating child abuse, however, like police officers, routinely conduct investigative seizures and searches. Requiring familiarity with the Fourth Amendment will not, therefore, be unduly burdensome.” Tenenbaum v. Williams, 862 F.Supp. 962 at 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). And;

“In the context of a seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation, as the district court recognized, see Tenenbaum I, 862 F.Supp. at 974 n. 7, a court order is the equivalent of a warrant.” Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, at 602 (2nd Cir. 1999). And;
“We have held that the Fourth Amendment regulates social workers’s civil investigations, . . . Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 925 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]dentical fourth amendment standards apply in both the criminal and civil contexts.”); . . . In Franks, 717 F.2d at 186, we applied the same Fourth Amendment probable cause standard to regulate the conduct of both a police officer and a social worker.” Doe v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services, 299 F.3d 395 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Gates v. Texas Dept. Of Protective & Reg. Services, 537 F.3d 404, at 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding “that it is well established in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment regulates social workers’ civil investigations.) And;

“The strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to child welfare workers, as well as all other governmental employees. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 n. 4 (7th Cir.2000); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir.2986).” Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, at 509 (7th Cir. 2003). And;

“The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have equated the procedures required under the Fourteenth Amendment with those required under the Fourth Amendment for searches and seizures related to child abuse investigations. . . . Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that “the same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children”); Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 605 (“Whatever Fourth Amendment analysis is employed, then, it results in a test for present purposes similar to the procedural due-process standard.”).” Gates v. Texas Dept. of Protective & Reg. Services, 537 F.3d 404, at 434-435 (5th Cir. 2008). And;

“We have reaffirmed our holding in Calabretta twice, noting that although the crime of child sexual abuse “may be heinous . . . [this] does not provide cause for the state to ignore the rights of the accused or any other parties.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2000); See also Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir.2007).” Green v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, at1022-1023 (9th Cir. 2009). And;

PROOF THAT YOU CAN BEAT PERJURED TESTIMONY STARTS FROM THESE CASES:

1.) FRANKS v. DELAWARE, 438 U.S. 154, 92 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

2.) GIGLIO v. UNITED STATES, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (February 24, 1972).

3.) NAPUE v. ILLINOIS, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (June 15, 1959).

4.) MOONEY v. HOLOHAN, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935).

5.) PYLES v. KANSAS, 317 U.S. 213, 215-216, 63 S.Ct. 177, 178, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942).

6.) ALCORTA v. TEXAS, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.E. 29 (November 12, 1957).

7.) UNITED STATES v. AGURS, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (June 24, 1976).

8.) BRADY v. MARYLAND, 373 U.S 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (May 13, 1963).

A FRANKS MOTION RAISING THESE TYPE OF CLAIMS COULD UNDO EVERY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN ANY CASE WHERE THE STATE OBTAINED A JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE JOHN 8:44 LYING CPS SOCIAL WORKERS FALSE TESTIMONY AND PERJURED STATEMENTS!!!

THE FACT THAT ALL OF THE BAR ATTORNEYS HAVE NEVER TOLD ANY OF THE PARENTS ABOUT THIS IS 100% PROOF THAT ALL THE ATTORNEYS ARE ALL WORKING IN COLLUSION AND CONSPIRACY TO LOSE YOUR CPS CASES ON PURPOSE!!!

HERE ARE THE FOUR (4) MAIN CASES THAT SAYS THAT IF YOU PROVE THAT A CONVICTION WAS OBTAINED UPON FALSE AND PERJURED TESTIMONY, IT IS A MANDATORY REVERSIBLE ERROR AND THEY HAVE TO GIVE YOU A NEW TRIAL OR RELEASE THE DEFENDANT FROM CUSTODY:

1.) United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2nd Cir., Aug. 13, 1991).

2.) United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (Nov. 7, 1975).

3.) United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1333 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975).

4.) Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972).

For more information, please contact the author at:

Luis Ewing Home Office Phone: 1 – (360) 335-1322

Luis Ewing Cellular Phone: 1 – (253) 226-3741

Luis Ewing SKYPE: <luisewing>

E-mail: <rcwcodebuster@yahoo.com>

E-mail: <rcwcodebuster@aol.com>

E-mail: <rcwcodebuster@gmail.com>

NOTE: My business hours are between 1:00 PM through 10:30 PM on Pacific Standard Time, but you can call up to 12:00 AM Midnight if it is important!
PLEASE DO NOT CALL ME BEFORE 1:00 PM on PACIFIC STANDARD TIME!
Preslie Hardwick v. Marcia Vreeken, No. 15-55563

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