From Atty Candice Schwager in Texas–excellent discussion of judicial immunity

These are sections from a complaint she wrote regarding general law and theory from her latest complaint which I am not publishing yet, because it has not been served yet. But I will publish as soon as these miscreants in Texas get an earful from Candice and her long suffering Plaintiffs.


XI. Affirmative Pleading on Doctrines of Immunity
181. Fraus Omnia Vitiat.
182. There is no judicial immunity to civil liability for non-judicial acts, anti-judicial
acts or RICO Predicate Acts forming a pattern of racketeering activity, as none of these types of conduct can be said to be judicial functions even when disguised as such.
183. Article III, Section I of the Constitution for the United States of America,
specifically creates the U.S. Supreme Court and gives Congress the authority to create the lower federal courts. Congress used this power to establish 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals, 94 U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Claims. and the U.S. Court oflntemational Trade.
184. The U.S. Supreme Court is the only court of general jurisdiction in the federal
system, all other federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created and empowered by Congressional statute.
185. Chief Justice Marshall. writing for the Court in Cohens. 19 U.S. at 404 observed:
1/ is most true that this Court will not lake jurisdiction if if should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be
brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid;
but we cannot, “Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal
jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds. “

186. The list of predicate acts specifically enumerated at 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) includes
§§37 I, 1346 and 195 I each of which requires a public corruption/color oflaw element.
187. To argue that a judge is immune from a public cOiruption statute if acting within
the four walls of a court room and exempt if not acting in his public capacity is a very precise statement that judges are above the law and that the victims of public conuption related deprivations of rights have no remedy and, thus, no rights.
188. 42 U.S.C. §1983 clearly slates an exception to actions brought against judicial
officers. That one exception provides pre-requisites to injunctive relief in actions brought against judicial officers. To conclude that Congress did not intend a private right of claims against judges under § 1983 is to render the language of the statute superfluous, which thc rules governing statutory construction will not allow.
42 Us.c. §1983 Civil Action for Deprivation of Civil Rights (emphasis added)
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District a/Columbia, subjects, or causes 10
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive reliershall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96-170. § 1. Dec. 29. 1979. 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104- 317.
title Ill, § 309(c). Oct. 19. 1996. llOStat. 3853.)
189. There is no privity defense, no attorney immunity defense and no judicial
immunity exception to the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization statutes. The language of the Act differentiates between criminal and civil liability and explicitly provides private parties with civil remedy for injuries to property and business caused by a pattern of racketeering activity involving two (2) or more of the predicate acts defined at 18 USC § 1961 (1).
The RICO Act provides for criminal penalties in Section 1963 and provides private litigants with civil remedy in section 1964(c).
190. Several predicate act statutes, mostly codified in Title 18 of the United States
Code, provide for federal prosecution of public corruption. Among these are the Hobbs Act (18 USC § 1951), the mail and wire fraud statutes (18 USC §§ 1341 & 1343), the honest services fraud provision (18 USC § 1346), the Travel Act (18 USC § 1952), the federal official bribery and gratuity statute, (18 USC § 201 enacted 1962), the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (enacted 1977), the federal program bribery statute, 18 USC § 666 (enacted 1984) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 USC §§1961-1968 enacted in 1970). Each statute directly addresses public corruption and most of these are specifically identified as RICO predicate acts at 18 USC. 1961(1).
191. The recent plea bargain and sentencing of Texas State 404th District Court Judge
Abel Limas to six years in federal prison for violating 18 USC §§ 1343 (Honest Services Wire
Fraud), § 1346 (Honest Services Fraud) and § 1951 and 2 (Hobbs Act Extortion), clearly verifies that these public corruption statutes apply to judges by operation of the RICO statutes 12.



This cancerous judicial black market plague has spread like wildfire throughout
the state court systems whether family law court, juvenile, traffic, probate or any other municipal level judicial arena on the state wide level. They have all become criminal racketeering enterprises and the root cause for each of these obscenities is “impunity” by any other name.


195. Imposition of an enlarged version of the judicially created English common law
doctrine of limited Judicial Immunity to foreclose private claims for civil remedy against judges under the RICO and civil rights statutes, has nurtured a contagion of public corruption throughout all three branches of government. is in direct opposition to the clearly expressed intentions of Congress in providing such remedy, is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and, as the learned Chief Justice Marshall expressed, “treason to the constitution”.
196. Article I Section 8 Clause 3 of the federal Constitution grants exclusive
jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce to Congress. Given that all federal crimes are commercial the nexus with interstate commerce is inarguable and the notion that state court judges are absolutely immune from 42 U.S.C. §1983 or 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) actions ignores the very clear language of those sections and violates the supremacy clause.
XII. Aiding and Abetting, Fraud, and the Texas Attorney Immunity Doctrine
197. “Attorney Immunity” is a vague expression. Any civil immunity an attorney has
is strictly limited to the litigation context and does not include actively engaging in an organized criminal color of law enterprise involving RICO predicate act conduct.

198. The RICO Defendant attorneys understood that the conduct of their clients was
tortious and criminal and the lawyers helped the clients with the conduct thinking only to stuff their own pockets, showing no regard for ethics or law.
199. Conduct sufficient to state a claim of a racketeering conspiracy including
predicate acts of extortion § 1951. Obstruction §371, Honest Services § 1346, Impartial Forum §242, Illegal Wiretap §25 11 , Mail Fraud § 1341, Wire Fraud § 1343, Banking Fraud § 1344 and Securities Fraud 15 U.S.C. 78 et seq., is not within the scope oflega.! representation and cannot be excused as part of the attorney’s discharge of his duties to his client, even when masqueraded under the litigation umbrella. (The Litigation Privilege)
200. Acts constituting knowing substantial assistance, sufficient to state a claim for in concert aiding and abetting RlCO predicate act crimes, torts and breaches of fiduciary committed by the client, are sufficient to establish in-concert liability of the attorney. There are no exceptions.
201. In reading the text and legislative history of the RlCO act, the Fifth Circuit has
interpreted that Congress intended the act to strike at criminal conduct characterized by at least two consequential dimensions. The offenses must be of a degree sufficiently serious not only to inflict injury upon its immediate private victims, but also to cause harm to significant public processes or institutions, or otherwise pose threats to larger societal interests worthy of the severe punitive and deterrent purposes embodied in the statute.
202. These aims and structure are somewhat akin to those reflected in the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15, after which RICO civil remedies were patterned.
203. Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of “private attorneys general” on a serious
national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed “inadequate”; see also  Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; Genty v. Resolution Trust Co., 937 F.2d 899, 912 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“Congress obviously had much more in mind than merely providing compensation for
individual RICO victims when it authorized RICO civil actions. Indeed, the harn of racketeering is dispersed among the public at large, including draining resources from the economy. subverting the democratic process and undermining the general welfare. “)
204. This construction accords with the legislative intent of RICO. As explained by the
Supreme Court, the purpose of the Act was to address a problem which Congress perceived “was of national dimensions.” Turkette. 452 U.S. at 586. Specifically, in the Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX of which encompassed RICO, Congress declared that the activities of organized crime that prompted the legislation “weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commence, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.”
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
205. Congress did not distinguish between public and private Organized Crime. Public
corruption and criminal abuse of the state judicial office has become the number one threat to the security of the people of this nation. The creation of the RICO act as exemplified by the “Statement of Findings and Purpose” and the inclusion of public corruption requisite statutes among the list of predicate acts at 18 U.S.c. § 1961 (I) clearly indicates a congressional intention to curb public corruption and abuse of the doctrines of immunity, by a dishonest self-protection criminal racketeering industry.

206. The protection for criminal conduct in Texas has also been expanded to include
wrongful conduct by attorneys under the Texas Attorney Immunity Doctrine, which has also led to the corruption and criminal takeover of our state judicial institutions.
207. Congress never intended to immunize state-court judges from federal civil rights
suits nor from federal Racketeering suits and a doctrine of judicial immunity implemented by the judiciary to protect a corrupt judiciary from legislation designed to protect the public interest from corruption violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine and undermines the public’s confidence in the legitimacy of the government of this Nation.
XIII. Affirmative Pleading on Conspiracy and Statutes of Limitations
208. Before the Court are allegations of public corruption involving a conspiracy to
deprive the People of Texas and others of the honest services of elected public officers. The
conduct complained of is only a small part of a complex multi-layered, multi-faceted criminal industry run by state court judges. who act with impunity with the full collusion, cooperation and participation of attorneys, court appointed administrators, social workers and others.
209. Federal conspiracy laws rest on the belief that criminal schemes are equally, or
even more reprehensible than are the substantive offenses to which they are devoted. The Supreme Court has explained that a “collective criminal agreement-(a] partnership in crime presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual verdicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.’ Moreover, observed the Court. “[g]roup association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked.” Finally, “[combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed.” In sum, “the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.”
210. Conspiracies and acts in furtherance are considered a single continuing act for
limitations purposes. The equitable doctrines of tailing and estopple apply to these claims.
XIV. Affirmative Pleading on Public Corruption
211. Public corruption involves a breach of public trust and/or abuse of position by
federal, state, or local officials and their private sector accomplices. By broad definition. a
government officia1~ whether elected, appointed or hired, may violate federal law when he/she asks, demands, solicits, accepts, or agrees to receive anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of their official duties.
212. Public corruption poses a fundamental threat to our national security and way of
life. It impacts everything from how well our borders are secured and our neighborhoods
protected … to verdicts handed down in courts … to the quality of our roads, schools, and other government services. And it takes a significant toll on our pocketbooks, wasting billions in tax dollars every year. 14


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