From Lane v. Franks where an employer fired an employee for testifying against him when he was engaged in fraud, is the sworn testimony protected speech or ordinary speech?  SCOTUS held:

Lane’s sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is entitled to First Amendment protection. Pp. 6–13.
(a) Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568, requires balancing “the interests of the[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”Under the first step of the Pickering analysis, if the speech is made pursuant to the employee’s ordinary job duties, then the employee isnot speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes, and the inquiry ends. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421. But if the “employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” the inquiryturns to “whether the relevant government entity had an adequatejustification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Id., at 418. Pp. 6–8.
(b) Lane’s testimony is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Pp. 8–12.
(1) Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of citizen speech for the simple reason that anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth. That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a testifying public employee might have to his employer. The Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too broadly in holding that Lane did not speak as a citizen when he testified simply because he learned of the subject matter of that testimony in the course of his employment. Garcetti said nothing about speech that relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of that employment. The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. Indeed, speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment. Pp. 9–11.
(2) Whether speech is a matter of public concern turns on the “content, form, and context” of the speech. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–148. Here, corruption in a public program and misuseof state funds obviously involve matters of significant public concern. See Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 425. And the form and context of the speech—sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding—fortify that conclusion. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 11–12.
(c)
Turning to Pickering’s second step, the employer’s side of the scale is entirely empty. Respondents do not assert, and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor—for instance, evidence that Lane’s testimony was false or errorenousor that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, orprivileged information while testifying. Pp. 12–13.

Interestingly enough, an even more important question is whether the employee could seek damages from the employer and the government agency because could the employer have held a reasonable belief that his action was protected.  That, it turns out was a  question for another day because it was not part of the brief submitted to SCOTUS.

Nonetheless, the decision by SCOTUS was unanimous that government employees when speaking out against corruption do have First Amendment protection.

Ken’s Writ of Cert. has been submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Approximately 4,000+ Writs for Certiorari are submitted.  Only about 300 get a decision, with about 100 summary confirmations, another 100 short or slip opinions, and only around 70 get a full blown opinion.  Let’s hope and pray that Ken’s brief is considered and the decision of the ARDC dismissed on grounds similar to Lane v. Franks.

Read the entire opinion here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6FbJzwtHocwVm03ZnBSWi1VdWs/edit?usp=sharing

The decision was unanimous and I think SCOTUS makes it clear that when speaking of corruption, very wide berth must be given to one’s First Amendment rights.